W. Angress The German Jews Source: W. Angress, "The German Jews, 1933 - 1939", in: M. Marrus, (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust , Westport & London, 1989, Vol. 2, pp. 484 - 497. A week after Hitler's appointment as chancellor, a fixture professor of history, Ernst Simon, wrote from Palestine to his friend and teacher Martin Buber about an article on Zionism he was writing. At the end of the letter was a brief question: Does the Hitler thing [ Hitlerei ] affect you directly? And what's your prognosis?' 1 Buber replied on February 14 from Heppenheim - after a very thorough analysis of Simon's essay - that the "Hitler thing" had so far done nothing to him, although he was prepared for anything. As for a prognosis, he felt that this would depend on the outcome of the anticipated conflicts between the Nationalists and the Nazis within Hitler's coalition government. A shift of the present power constellation in favour of the Nazis, even if they should succeed in further strengthening their parliamentary basis, was unlikely to be granted by the Nationalists, who held an overwhelming majority in the Cabinet. In that case, according to Buber, the Hitler people will either remain in the government, regardless; then they'll be sent into battle against the proletariat, which will split their party and will render them harmless. Or they'll quit [the government]; then there will be presumably a state of siege in which . . . the technical superiority of the army vis-a-vis the . . . [Nazis] will undoubtedly win the upper hand. As long as the present coalition prevails, any real persecution of Jews [Judenhetze] or anti-Jewish legislation is unthinkable. . . . Buber added that administrative nastiness could be expected, but legislation against Jews would only become possible - the present power constellation in the government should shift in favour of the Nazis, which seemed unlikely. Open persecution of the Jews would merely occur between the time the Nazis quit the government, and the proclamation of a stage of siege 2 . Buber's prognosis proved to be wrong, of course, but he was by no means alone in misjudging the situation. Like the majority of the nation, most German Jews - there were five hundred and thirty thousand of them in January 1933 3 - underestimated Hitler's skill in political manoeuvring, and few believed that his regime would last long or that, if it did, any far-reaching anti-Jewish measures would materialise. Such optimism rapidly evaporated within a few weeks after the so-called seizure of power, although the real extent of the dangers faced by the Jews remained obscured by what one historian recently termed "creeping persecution." 4 As the party had failed beforehand to devise any definite policy on how to solve the "Jewish Question" once in power, its efforts to eliminate the Jews from all spheres of national life gradually proceeded from 1933 to the end of 1938 without a recognisable pattern of co-ordination 5 . Thus during the first five years of the Third Reich, both the Party and the rapidly Nazified bureaucracy operated on the hazy assumption that some solution would have to be found to rid Germany of her Jews as quickly as possible. But how this was to be accomplished remained for years subject to improvisation. Nevertheless, during the first six months of 1933, when Hitler consolidated his power and elbowed his Nationalist coalition partners into political limbo, the first drastic anti-Jewish measures were taken. Following Boycott Day on April 1, which was staged as a protest against what the Nazis termed "atrocity propaganda" fostered abroad by "international Jewry," decrees were passed which led to the dismissal of Jews from the civil service, and shortly thereafter from the courts and the public health service 6 . These measures were accompanied throughout the Reich by what Party officials fondly called "spontaneous outbursts of the outraged public against Jewish impudence and arrogance," a euphemism for "hooliganism," usually organised by stormtroopers against individual Jews, their houses of worship, their cemeteries, and their places of business. Over the next few years, Jews were driven from the schools and universities - both teachers and students - and ultimately from Germany's economy 7 . Given these developments, it soon became obvious that some sort of leadership would have to be provided within German Jewry in order to present its collective concerns to the regime, render counsel and assistance to those who were losing their livelihood, and, as far as this was possible under the circumstances, chart a course for the immediate future in an attempt to respond to the deteriorating situation of the Jews. Not surprisingly, this task fell to men and women of the educated Jewish elite. Who belonged to this elite? Though any answer is bound to be somewhat arbitrary, we may include first of all members of the professions, all of which required a firm educational basis, usually with university training. This category included the medical and legal professions, educators on all levels, scientists, engineers, rabbis, etc. To these must be added persons from cultural and artistic life, i. e., writers, publishers, journalists, theatre directors, actors, painters, and musicians. Finally, a good number of Jewish businessmen, notably bankers, industrialists, and prominent merchants, tended to be well educated, had attended either six or nine years of secondary schools, and not infrequently held a university degree, usually a doctor of law or philosophy. A rough estimate of their number in 1933 would be thirty thousand 8 . It was precisely this category of Jews - for convenience's sake I shall call them intellectuals - that suffered the first massive dismissals as a result of anti-Jewish legislation passed in April 1933. Deprived of their livelihood as civil servants, state attorneys, judges, teachers, and professors, a relatively large number of them-the exact number is difficult to determine - emigrated during the first year of Hitler's chancellorship. They were joined by Jews not in government employment, whose livelihood and safety were also threatened: writers, journalists, entertainers, and lea-ruing politicians. A few wealthy business people who viewed the future with misgivings also decided to leave the country while "the going was good." 9 Although more Jews, including many educated people, emigrated in 1933 than in any other year prior to 1938-39, many educated Jews remained 10 . They assumed positions of leadership on the national and local levels and attempted to help German Jewry adjust to the drastic changes that had occurred since Hitler had become Chancellor. Few of them realised at the time that more than readjustment was involved, and that they would, in fact, be called upon to preside over the break-up of the Jewish community in Germany. Their task was formidable from the outset. Attempts had to be made to establish contact with the new regime in order to ascertain what National Socialism held in store for the Jews, and what role, if any, the Jewish leadership would be allowed to play in what they initially assumed would be a process of readjustment. As already mentioned, nothing was known in 1933 about any definite policy the regime may have had in connection with the so-called solution of the Jewish Question. This was not surprising because, as we now know, no such policy existed at the time. Aside from establishing some working agreement with the regime, several major areas affecting the Jews demanded the attention of their leadership. All those dismissed from the civil service, the legal profession, and all subsequent victims of Gleichschaltung ( aryanization or nazification), which since April 1933 had affected Jews in most areas of public life, had to be retrained either to enable them to find a new livelihood in Germany, or to prepare them for emigration. Both retraining and emigration, initially thought to be essential primarily for the young generation, had to be organised. People unable to find jobs because of the process of Gleichschaltung, and those either too old or too sick to be retrain, had to be supported by the Jewish community which had to raise the necessary funds from among its own members since Jews were no longer eligible for state aid. Finally, the educational, cultural, and spiritual needs of the Jews had to be met in the face of their rapid and relentless isolation within society 11 . All these tasks required unity and co-operation which, in the approximately one hundred years since emancipation, had always been a weak point with Germany's Jews. Divided among different religious traditions - Orthodox, Conservative (in Germany, Liberal), and Reform - and since the turn of the century also into assimilationists and Zionists (to name but the most obvious divisions), they had never succeeded in creating an all-encompassing organisation that could represent and speak for the Jewish community as a whole 12 . When Hitler took office, the bulk of German Jewry was organised - often with overlapping membership - in the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens (Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith), or CV, and the Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten (Union of Jewish Front Veterans), or RjF. Both were decidedly non-Zionist. The Zionists, who were until 1933 a very small minority, had their Zionistische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland (German Zionist Federation). The various Jewish congregations were loosely organized in the German-Israelite Congregational League. In addition, there existed two small but vociferous organisations of super-patriots, the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden (League of National-German Jews) and Deutscher Vortrupp (German Vanguard). I shall say more about these later on 13 . It was not until September 1933 that an umbrella organisation, the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden (National Representation of German Jews), was established. Representing all Jewish religious and secular factions, this organisation grew out of a less comprehensive Reichsvertretung der juedischen Landesverbaende (Reich Representation of Jewish Regional Associations) founded in 1932 14 . Reichsvertretung and CV were run by men and women of the educated elite, both at the main offices in Berlin and in the regional branches. The Reichsvertretung was jointly directed by Dr. Otto Hirsch 15 , formerly an official in Wuerttemberg's Ministry of the Interior, and by Rabbi Dr. Leo Baeck 16 . Most of the other members of the board also had the title of doctor, a trademark of German Jewry's upper crust. It was similar in the CV, whose board consisted almost entirely of lawyers, and whose newspaper, the C.V Zeitung, was edited by Dr. Alfred Hirschberg and Drs. Hans and Eva Reichmann. Many of those who assumed the burden of leadership responded to the formidable challenge they faced partly from a feeling of noblesse oblige, and partly because they had been ousted from their jobs in the civil service, the press, the law courts, or non-Jewish private enterprise. Left with few choices, they had flocked into the exclusively - and constantly shrinking - Jewish sector where they joined forces with rabbis and a score of prominent business people who had traditionally volunteered their services to the boards of congregations or regional CV and Zionist chapters 17 . During the first two and a half years of the Third Reich, until the passage of the Nuremberg racial laws in September 1935, spokesmen for the principal Jewish organisations as well as the Jewish press took a somewhat precarious dual approach in dealing with the Nazis. While registering their protests against anti-Semitic insults by Party newspapers and speakers, they simultaneously assured the regime of German Jewry's unquestioned loyalty to the fatherland 18 . The objective was to reach some sort of acceptable accommodation with the new rulers. Thus shortly after the April 1 Boycott Day, and after the subsequent passage of legislation ousting Jews from the civil service, the C.V Zeitung, the most widely circulated assimilationist newspaper, responded to the recent events by stating that Jews no longer enjoyed equal rights with the rest of the nation. The ideology of Aryan racial superiority and the imputed unsuitability of Jews for state service was now law, and although the Jews disagreed, they would have to bow to the facts. Yet despite these developments, the paper stated, Germany remained their homeland, and it is our objective to maintain the German-Jewish community in Germany materially, physically, and spiritually unbroken in its strength.' 19 Shortly before Boycott Day, assimilationist and Zionist spokesmen had voiced their dismay at the upcoming boycott to the government. The Nazis justified the boycott as a defence against the lively press campaign abroad which charged Hitler's regime with unrestrained violations of Jewish rights. This "atrocity propaganda," as they chose to call it, the Nazis attributed to the "machinations of international Jewry." In view of this situation, the Jewish spokesmen accompanied their protests with emphatic assurances that Germany's Jews strongly disapproved of, and disassociated themselves from, the anti-German agitation abroad 20 . It was a bizarre situation. Inside Germany, leading representatives of the Jewish community, which had been exposed to countless indignities and sporadic physical outrages ever since January 30, now found themselves compelled, for reasons of political prudence, to disavow the accuracy of the charges raised abroad, although they knew only too well how true many of them were. Worse yet, the charges did not only appear in the major newspapers of neighbouring countries but also in detailed and well informed accounts published in German-language emigre journals then springing up in Paris, Prague, Amsterdam, and elsewhere. Their contributors and editors were mostly Jewish intellectuals who had led Germany with the first wave of refugees in the spring and summer of 1933. They may have meant well, these knights of the pen, but their good intentions were viewed with mixed feelings by the embattled Jews still residing along the banks of the rivers Rhine, Spree, Elbe, and Main rather than along those of the Moldau, Amstel, Thames, or Seine. Since 1933, responsible representatives of the Jews, notably the Reichsvertretung, tried with considerable tact and restraint (and, one might add, with diminishing success) to protect the Jewish community at least from unauthorised violations of their rights while attempting simultaneously to discover, equally unsuccessfully, what place, if any, within German society the regime would allot the Jews. A less balanced approach toward seeking an accommodation with the Third Reich was taken by a few men who headed organisations with a pronounced German-patriotic stance. There was, first of all, Dr. Leo Loewenstein, a scientist by profession, a captain in the Bavarian Army Reserve, retired, and chairman of the Union of Jewish Front Veterans (RjF.) 21 . For over two years he tried to persuade Hitler by mail to allow patriotic Jews, and the young generation in particular, to be absorbed into the German Volksgemeinschaft; settle as farmers on German soil; participate in athletic contests with non-Jewish youth; and, alter the announcement of German remilitarization in March 1935, to serve in the German armed forces. Hitler never replied, and none of these requests was ever granted 22 . However, Loewenstein did succeed in April 1933, through an appeal to the aged President von Hindenburg, in having Jewish civil servants with frontline service during wartime exempted from losing their jobs. It proved a dubious achievement because it created two classes of Jews, privileged and non-privileged. Moreover, the exemptions were honoured only until Hindenburg's death in August 1934 23 . While Loewenstein rushed a lot of Jewish feathers, Dr. Max Naumann, a lawyer and chairman of the League of National-German Jews, succeeded in offending most of his co-religionists by his even crasser attempts to curry favour with the regime. He and his supporters, for the most part respectable members of the professions, publicly de-emphasised theJewishness while stressing their German heritage. They also drew a clear line between themselves and those of their fellow Jews whom they disdainfully labelled Cosmopolitans, Leftists, Zionists, and Eastern Jews. All those falling within these categories were not worthy of being called Germans, according to Naumann, whereas his group was, and therefore should not be subjected to discriminatory racial laws 24 . Less offensive but equally nationalistic was the attitude of the Deutscher Vortrupp (German Vanguard) led by Dr. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, a brilliant albeit eccentric young theologian 25 . Unlike Naumann's group, Schoeps and his disciples were avowed Jews but also fiercely nationalistic, and they tried hard to sell this ideological blend to an utterly unreceptive regime. Both organisations were ordered dissolved by the end of 1935, while the Union of Jewish Front Veterans (RjF) survived until the end of 1938. I chose these selected examples to show how far some Jewish leaders were prepared to go to achieve possible accommodation with the regime. Needless to say, they all failed; but so did the more judicious efforts of the Reichsvertretung and the CV in trying to obtain assurances from the government that at least those Jews unwilling or unable to leave would be allowed to stay in Germany. Whatever hopes the Jewish leadership still had for an acceptable accommodation with Hitler's regime were shattered in September 1935 with the passage of the Nuremberg racial laws. Yet even earlier, in the spring of that year, after Hitler had announced Germany's remilitarization, the provisions of the new defence act of May 1935 excluded Jews from active service. This made it clear to all perceptive observers that Jews were now officially regarded as barely tolerated second-class citizens. The Nuremberg Laws merely substantiated this new status through specific and humiliating definitions. The Nuremberg Laws signalled in legal terms what had been evident de facto since 1933: the end of Jewish emancipation in Germany. This fact was not lost on the Jewish leaders, and they acted accordingly. Two days after the announcement of the racial laws, the chief organ of the Zionists, the Juedische Rundschau, demanded that immediate measures be taken to step up emigration, especially for the young generation. A week later the C.V Zeitung also suggested the establishment of systematic and co-ordinated plans for the emigration of Jewish youth. Thus, assimilationists and Zionists, whose traditional feuds had gradually abated after 1933, still implied in their respective statements that while the young no longer had a future in Germany, the older generation of Jews might be permitted to stay - though under highly restrictive and humiliating conditions - until natural attrition would solve the "Jewish Question" in Germany once and for all 26 . Yet before long that hope, too, began to dissipate. Besides embarking on an intensified program of financial assistance for the growing number of impoverished Jews, of counselling, and of occupational training projects, the Reichsvertretung, with the assistance of the CV and the Zionist Federation, also accelerated the search for every available avenue of emigration. It had become apparent soon after passage of the Nuremberg Laws that the initial expectation of restricting emigration efforts mainly to the young generation was unrealistic. Toward the end of 1935, the Reichsvertretung prepared a program for mass emigration which, given the world-wide economic Depression and the widespread aversion of most countries to admit large numbers of Jewish refugees, proved to be extremely difficult 27 . We cannot dwell on the details of these efforts, important though they were. What concerns us here is that Jewish emigration was planned, co-ordinated with the Nazi authorities, and the necessary funding was secured by that educated segment of German Jews that in 1933 assumed the thorny task of organising what proved to be the liquidation of a Jewish presence in Germany, which had existed there for two thousand years. Their efforts enabled more than half of Germany's Jews-roughly two hundred and seventy thousand-to emigrate. Unfortunately, many of them merely went to neighbouring countries rather than overseas and were ultimately caught in the dragnet of Hitler's European-wide Final Solution. We have so far been concerned with the response of the Jewish leaders to the most pressing practical needs their community faced after 1933. But besides dealing with such vital matters as emigration, occupational retraining, and welfare, they also recognised the importance of educational and cultural needs, two additional spheres within German society from which Jews were gradually but relentlessly excluded. But it was not merely necessity that gave rise to educational and cultural programs. A number of intellectuals, inspired largely by Martin Buber, saw the crisis the triumph of National Socialism had created for their community as a challenge. It provided an opportunity for the rediscovery of Jewish values and traditions and, with it, the age-old commitment to learning. With these considerations in mind, an intensive adult education program was launched in 1933, first in Buber's Lehrhaus in Frankfurt am Main, and subsequently - sponsored by the Reichsvertretung - in all cities with a sizeable Jewish population 28 . The curriculum varied widely and was by no means restricted to religious studies. Philosophy, history, economics, music, and literature were taught by such prominent scholars as Franz Oppenheimer, Ernst Kantorowicz, Arnold Berney, and Hans Liebeschuetz. Thus various courses which Jews could no longer take at German universities were taught by Jewish academicians no longer allowed to teach at German universities. In addition to as well as within the context of traditional disciplines the courses did emphasise Jewish themes in an attempt to rekindle pride and self-respect among men and women who, because of their religion and alleged racial inferiority, were daily exposed to humiliations and slurs on the part of their neighbours and the media. The signal for this short-lived Jewish renaissance - it lasted until the end of 1938 - at a time when the ties with the beloved German homeland were irrevocably dissolving had been given on April 4, 1933, in response to the boycott, by Dr. Robert Weltsch, Editor-in-Chief of Juedische Rundschau. "Wear it with pride, the yellow spot!" read the headline of his editorial, which urged the Jews to affirm their Jewishness 29 . In addition to the adult education program and, alter the fall of 1935, the rapid expansion of Jewish elementary and secondary schools to accommodate the mounting number of youngsters barred from attending regular state schools a separate cultural program was instituted in 1933 30 . As Jews were ousted from the stage, the film industry, the art academies, and the conservatories, and as Jewish audiences found it increasingly unpleasant, and eventually impossible, to attend theatres, concert halls, or opera houses frequented by the general public, the Jewish Kulturbund (literally, "cultural alliance") was founded 31 . At branches in all the larger cities Jewish actors, singers, and musicians performed for exclusively Jewish audiences until even this segregated cultural phase was terminated following Kristallnacht, the "Night of Broken Glass," in November 1938 32 . Performances had to be confined to works of foreign or non-Aryan playwrights and composers, although non-popular works by German Aryans and those with specific Jewish themes, like Lessing's Nathan the Wise, were also permitted. The same held true for musical performances. Beethoven and Wagner were forbidden, Mahler and Mendelssohn were not. At a time of constant fear, uncertainty, and stress for most Jews, evenings at the Kulturbund with performances of high quality provided much more than entertainment. They also gave comfort, brief respite from the pressures outside, and pride in the achievement of Jewish artists. Until June 1939, after most of the remaining Jewish organisations had been banned and after the Rei had been deprived of whatever independence it had still possessed by being renamed Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland (Reich Association of Jews in Germany) and turned into a Gestapo-controlled organisation 33 , the men and women who then composed the Jewish leadership enjoyed a considerable degree of leeway in taking initiatives and making decisions. Faced by what they gradually realised was the last stage of German Jewry's existence as an identifiable entity, they worked unsparingly to turn this human catastrophe into a dignified and orderly process of dissolution. Their responsibilities were varied and heavy: they represented Jewish concerns to the German authorities; they planned and organised emigration; they assumed the burden of caring for the rapidly rising number of people reduced to poverty; they arranged for occupational retraining and both general and Jewish education for adults and children; and they created an ambitious and, until its termination, highly successful series of rich cultural programs. Throughout the period, from 1933 until the summer of 1939, when the last remaining possibilities for independent action had been taken away during the months following Kristallnacht, the Jewish leadership was guided by two basic rules. The first pertained to the prevention of discord among the traditionally divisive Jewish factions so as to present a common front when dealing with government or Party officials. The second required the adoption of an unemotional, businesslike manner in all communications with either the Nazi authorities or the Jewish community, and in all contacts with the former a display of dignity and self-restraint. These rules were never spelled out in so many words, but they were quietly adhered to 34 . To be sure, the Jewish leadership had to make certain rather painful concessions when communicating with the ministries and Party offices of the Third Reich, because letters and memoranda had to be phrased in such a way as to make allowances for the peculiar Nazi mentality 35 . In a few instances, moreover, some leaders of Jewish organisations violated these rules, as has been shown earlier. One might add to these infractions the less than edifying hanky-panky that went on between some Zionist leaders and the Gestapo, involving attempts by the former to attain preferential treatment for those Jews who wanted to emigrate to Palestine 36 . Nor would it be amiss to mention the, still undetermined, number of rabbis who shortly after Hitler's "seizure of power" left their congregations and removed themselves, thanks to the benevolent assistance from rabbis abroad, with what is known in diplomatic parlance as "indecent haste" to new pulpits in Adelaide, Cincinnati, Johannesburg, Los Angeles, New York, and other places. Yet aside from these few examples, the men and women entrusted with the organisation of this difficult dissolution process handled their responsibilities with what in retrospect appears as a remarkable display of courage and discipline-attributes that the Nazis always liked to arrogate exclusively to themselves. And while many Jewish intellectuals who had served their dying community faithfully since 1933 joined the last and largest emigration wave between November 1938 and September 1939, a small but dedicated number of them who also might have saved themselves stayed on, literally to the bitter end, because they considered it their moral obligation to do so 37 . Was it Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative that inspired them to do so - and steeped as they were in German culture they knew their philosophers - or did they recall the words of the prophet Habakkuk: I frill stand at my post, I will take up my position on the watch-tower, I will watch to learn what he will say through me, and what I shall reply when I am challenged. . . ? We shall never know.' References: 1. Martin Buber, Briefwechsel aus sieben Jahrzehnten , vol. 2 (Heidelberg, 1973), p. 463. 2. Ibid., pp. 465¯67. 3. These figures are rough approximations and pertain only to Jews who listed themselves as Glaubensjuden , i.e., Jews who professed their faith. The 1925 census recorded 564,379 Glaubensjuden in Germany; by June 1933, six months after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, the census established a figure of 499,682 Glaubensjuden . See Esra Bennathan, 'Die demographische und wirtschaftliche Struktur der Juden,' in Werner E. Mosse and Arnold Paucker, eds., Entscheidungsjahr 1932. Zur Judenfrage in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik . Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts, 13 (Tuebingen, 1965), pp. 87¯88. The figure 530,000 in January 1933 - again a rough estimate - is based on compilations from the following studies: Werner Rosenstock, 'Exodus 1933¯1939. A Survey of Jewish Emigration from Germany,' in Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute , vol. I (1956), pp. 373¯90 (hereafter cited as LBI Year Book ); Wilhelm Treue, 'Die Juden in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Rheinischen Raumes 1648¯1945,' in Monumenta Judaica (Cologne, 1964), pp. 458¯59; Helmut Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich (Goettingen-Berlin-Frankfurt-Zuerich, 1966), pp. 274, 291; and Bennathan, passim . 4. Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , p. 4. 5. This is evident from the findings of Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy Toward German Jews 1933¯1939 (Urbana-Chicago-London, 1970) and Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Duesseldorf, 1972). See also Hans Mommsen, 'Der nationalsozialistische Polizeistaat und die Judenverfolgung vor 1938: Dokumentation,' Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte , X (1962), 76. But cf. the older account in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, Gerhard Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. Studien zur Errichtung des totalitaeren Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933¯34 (Cologne and Opladen, 1960), p. 277. On the genesis of anti-Jewish legislation predating the 'seizure of power' see ibid., p. 411¯13, and Saul Esh, 'Designs for Anti-Jewish Policy in Germany up to the Nazi Rule,' Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance , VI (1967), 83¯120, esp. 115¯20 (hereafter cited as YVS ). 6. Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung , pp. 278¯79; Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz , pp. 62¯91; Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , pp. 43¯59. 7. Adam, Judenpolitik , pp. 51¯71, and passim ; Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz , pp. 95¯114, and passim: Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung , pp. 277¯86, 496¯503; Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich. Mit ausgewaehlten Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Beamtenpolitik. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte , XIII (Stuttgart, 1966), 48¯60. 8. This estimate is based on Bennathan, in Entscheidungsjahr 1932 , pp. 111¯12, and Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , p. 287. 9. Rosenstock, in LBI Year Book I (1956), pp. 377-80, esp. p. 378; Schleunes, The Twisted Road , p. 199; Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden , p. 291. 10.Rosenstock, in LBI Year Book I (1956), pp. 373¯74, 377; Genschel, Verdraengung , p. 291. 11.Friedrich S. Brodnitz, 'Die Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden,' in Hans Tramer, ed., In zwei Welten. Siegfried Moses zum 75. Geburtstag (Tel Aviv, 1962), pp. 106¯13. 12.Marjorie Lamberti, 'The Attempt to Form a Jewish Block: Jewish Notables and Politics in Wilhelminian Germany,' Central European History , III (1970), 73. 13.Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung , p. 262. On the origins of the CV see Ismar Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German Antisemitism 1870¯1914 (New York-London, 1972), pp. 117¯48, and Arnold Paucker, 'Zur Problematik einer juedischen Abwehrstrategie in der deutschen Gesellschaft,' in Werner E. Mosse and Arnold Paucker, eds., Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890¯1914 . Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts, 33 (Tuebingen, 1976), pp. 480¯548. On the RjF see Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten 1919¯1938. Geschichte eines juedischen Abwehrvereins (Duesseldorf, 1977); Ruth Pie, 'Embattled Veterans: The Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten,' LBI Year Book XIX (1974), pp. 139¯54. On the RjF, and also on th Verband nationaldeutscher Juden and the Deutscher Vortrupp , Gefolgschaft deutscher Juden ,' unpubl. Ph.D. Diss., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1978, passim . On the origins of the Zionistische Vereinigung see Jehuda Reinharz, Fatherland or Promised Land. The Dilemma of the German Jew , 1893¯1914 (Ann Arbor, 1975), pp. 90¯143, and passim . 14.Brodnitz, in In zwei Welten , pp. 106¯13; Hugo Hahn, 'Die Gruendung der Reichsvertretung,' ibid., pp. 97¯105; Franz Meyer, 'Bemerkungen zu den zwei Denkschriften,'' ibid., pp. 114¯18, and 'Zwei Denkschriften,' ibid., pp. 120¯27; Max Gruenewald, 'Der Anfang der Reichsvertretung,' in Robert Welsch, ed., Deutsches Judentum, Aufstieg und Krise. Gestalten, Ideen, Werke (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 315¯25; Hans-Erich Fabian, 'Zur Entstehung der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland,'' in Herbert A. Strauss and Kurt Grossmann, eds., Gegenwart im Rueckblick. Festgabe fuer die juedische Gemeinde zu Berlin 25 Jahre nach dem Neubeginn (Heidelberg, 1970), pp. 165¯68. For two rather critical Zionist views of the Reichsvertretung , see Kurt Jakob Ball-Kaduri, 'The National Representation of Jews in Germany¯Obstacles and Accomplishments at its Establishment,' YVS , II (1975 [1958]), 159¯78, and Abraham Margaliot, 'The Dispute Over the Leadership of German Jewry (1933¯1938),' ibid., X (1974), 129¯48. 15.For a brief sketch of Hirsch's life, see Leo Baeck, 'Gedenken an zwei Tote,' in Deutsches Judentum , pp. 312¯13, and Ernst G. Lowenthal, ed., Bewaehrung im Untergang. Ein Gedenkbuch (Stuttgart, 1965), pp. 71¯74. See also Annedore Leber, Das Gewissen entscheidet: Bereiche des deutschen Widerstandes von 1933¯1945, in Lebensbildern (Berlin-Frankfurt/Main, 1957), pp. 12¯17. 16.The literature on Leo Baeck is growing steadily. Here it will suffice to list some of the earliest and some of the latest publications. The former consist of several short sketches by Siegfried Moses, Hans Liebeschuetz, Eva Reichmann, and Wolfgang Hamburger, under the heading: 'In Memorium Leo Baeck,' LBI Year Book II (1957), pp. 3¯34; among the latter is Leonard Baker, Days of Sorrow and Faith. Leo Baeck and the Berlin Jews (New York, 1978). For a rather polemical exchange on Baeck's image, see Ball-Kaduri, 'Leo Baeck and Contemporary History. A Riddle in Leo Baeck's Life,' YVS , VI (1967), 121¯29; and Ernst Simon, 'Comments on the Article on the late Rabbi Baeck,' ibid., pp. 131¯34. 17.Brodnitz, in In zwei Welten , p. 111. In Bewaehrung im Untergang . Lowenthal, in his series of brief biographies, presents 178 men and women who served the Jewish community in Germany either in Berlin or on the congregational level in the provinces, and who perished in the Final Solution. Of these, 50 were rabbis, 46 jurists, 24 educators on all levels, 15 businessmen, 8 physicians, and the remainder former public officials, journalists, architects, or full-time employees of Jewish congregations. Lowenthal makes it clear in the introduction that this is by no means a complete list but merely a 'representative' one as he was unable to secure the names and data of everybody who served in a similar capacity, and perished. 18.Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Machtergreifung , pp. 282¯83; Brodnitz, in In zwei Welten , p. 108; see also the two 'Denkschriften,' ibid., pp. 120¯27, and Gruenewald, in Deutsches Judentum , p. 320. For a succinct survey of this reaction as it affected the various Jewish organisations, regardless of religious or ideological orientation, see Dunker, Reichsbung juedischer Frontsoldaten , pp. 115¯24. 19. C.V Zeitung , XII, 15 (April 13, 1933). 20.See, for example, the appeal by the (old) Reichsvertretung in conjunction with the Executive of the Berlin Jewish Congregation to Hitler, dated March 29, 1933, in Klaus J. Hermann, Das Dritte Reich und die deutsch-juedischen Organisationen 1933¯1934. Schriftenreihe der Hochschule fuer Politische Wissenschaften Muenchen, Neue Folge, 4 (Cologne-Berlin-Bonn-Munich, 1969), p. 61. See also Dunker, Reichsbund , pp. 121¯22 (for the CV); Jakow Trachtenberg, Die Greuelpropaganda ist eine Luegenpropaganda, sagen die deutschen Juden selbst (Berlin, 1933). 21.On Loewenstein, see Rheins, unpubl. Diss., pp. 21, 207, and passim ; Hermann, Das Dritte Reich , p. 18. 22.Dunker, Reichsbund , pp. 132¯44, 173¯75; Hermann, Das Dritte Reich , pp. 18¯21, 49¯52, 66¯67, 69, 92¯105, 119¯23, 126¯27, 132¯42; Rheins, pp. 177¯79. 23.Dunker, Reichsbund , pp. 132¯44; Schleunes, The Twisted Road , pp. 95¯96, 104¯5; Mommsen, Beamtentum , pp. 48, 54, 59; Adam, Judenpolitik , p. 64; Gruenewald, in Deutsches Judentum , p. 320. 24.On Naumann and the VndJ see Rheins, pp. 58¯101; Hermann, pp. 12¯13, 21¯31, and passim . 25.Rheins, pp. 147¯90, and the following autobiographical books by Hans-Joachim Schoeps: Die letzten dreissig Jahre: Rueckblicke (Stuttgart, 1956); Ja¯Nein¯und Trotzdem. Erinnerungen¯Begegnungen¯Erfahrungen (Mainz, 1974); and the documentation, 'Bereit fuer Deutschland.' Der Patriotismus deutscher Juden und der Nationalsozialismus. Fruehe Schriften 1930¯1939. (Berlin, 1970). 26. Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII, 75 (September 17, 1935); C.V Zeitung , XIV, 39 (September 26, 1935). 27.Hahn, in In zwei Welten , pp. 108¯9; Dunker, Reichsbund , pp. 159¯60; Margaret T. Edelheim-Muehsam, 'Die Haltung der juedischen Presse gegenueber der nationalsozialistischen Bedrohung,' in Deutsches Judentum , pp. 376¯77. For a tentative assessment of Jewish emigration patterns, including the role played by the Hitler regime, see Schleunes, The Twisted Road , pp. 169¯213. This topic is still in need of further investigation. 28.For this and the following see Ernst Simon, Aufbau im Untergang. Juedische Erwachsenenbildung im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland als geistiger Widerstand. Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts, 2 (Tuebingen, 1959), esp. pp. 1¯75; Richard Fuchs, 'The Hochschule fuer die Wissenschaft des Judentums' in the Period of Nazi Rule. Personal Recollection,' LBI Year Book XII (1967), pp. 3¯31. 29. Juedische Rundschau , XXXVIII, 27 (April 4, 1933). 30.Solomon Colodner, 'Jewish Education under National Socialism,' YVS , III (1975 [1959]), 161¯85; Hans Gaertner, 'Probleme der juedischen Schule waehrend der Hitlerjahre, unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Theodor-Herzl-Schule in Berlin,' in Deutsches Judentum , pp. 326¯52. 31.A thorough study of the Kulturbund deutscher Juden , later Juedischer Kulturbund , remains to be written. A good, succinct appraisal is Herbert Freeden, 'A Jewish Theatre under the Swastika,' LBI Year Book I (1956), pp. 142¯62. See also Elisabeth Flessen, 'Nathan der Weise im Staate der Nazis,' Die Zeit , October 14, 1977; and Erwin Lichtenstein, 'Der Kulturbund der Juden in Danzig 1933¯1938,' Zeitschrift fuer die Geschichte der Juden , X (1973), 181¯90. 32.On Kristallnacht , see Lionel Kochan, Pogrom. November 10, 1938 (London, 1957); Erich Lueth, 'Die Reichskristallnacht,' in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed., Die Reichskristallnacht. Der Antisemitismus in der deutschen Geschichte (Bonn, 1959), pp. 9¯18; Ball-Kaduri, 'The Central Jewish Organisations in Berlin During the Pogrom of November 1938 (Kristallnacht'),' YVS , III (1975 [1959]), 261¯81; Genschel, Die Verdraengung , pp. 177¯86; Hermann Graml, Der 9. November 1938 , 'Reichskristallnacht' (Bonn, 1953); Wolfgang Scheffler, Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich . Zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 4 (Berlin, 1964), pp. 29¯32. 33.Adam, Judenpolitik , pp. 230¯31; Fabin, in Gegenwart im Rueckblick , pp. 165¯79; Ball-Kaduri, 'Von der Reichsvertretung' zur Reichsvereinigung',' Zeitschrift fuer die Geschichte der Juden , I (1964), 191¯99; Shaul Esh, 'The Establishment of the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland' and its Main Activities,' YVS , VII (1968), 19¯38. 34.Gruenewald, in Deutsches Judentum , pp. 320¯21, 324¯25. 35.Gruenewald, ibid., p. 320; Brodnitz, in In zwei Welten , p. 108. 36.The crassest case is that of Georg Kareski. See Herbert S. Levine, 'A Jewish Collaborator in Nazi Germany: The Strange Career of Georg Kareski, 1933¯1937,' Central European History , VIII (1975), 251¯81. For evidof preferential treatment of Zionists by the Nazi authorities, see Mommsen, 'Polizeistaat,' Vierteljahreshefte , esp. Documents No. 2, 5, 8, and9. 37.See Lowenthal, Bewaehrung im Untergang. Back to the top