A. Barkai The Economic Struggle of German Jews Source: A. Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation, The Economic Struggle of German Jews 1933 - 1943, Hanover & London 1989, pp. 37 - 53, 77 - 92, 106 - 109. Part A, B, C, D, E The Jewish Reaction: Struggle for Legal Rights? How then did Jews in Germany react to this sudden onslaught and new reality? In answering this question, it is necessary to distinguish between (a) individual reaction and (b) those of the new Jewish organisations that now came into being and began to adjust to the new situation. After the first shock had been weathered, Jewish individuals attempted to come to terms somehow with the new state of affairs - each in his own way, in keeping with his personal situation and based on individual attitudes and convictions, individual strength of resistance, or ability to accommodate. In 1933, nearly forty thousand Jews left Germany, most more or less in great haste. They were generally younger or unmarried persons; whether still employed or jobless, they enjoyed greater economic and social mobility. Those who emigrated in 1933 also included wealthier Jews who had been able to sell their property quickly. This first wave of emigration, which remained the largest emigration in a single year until the November 1938 pogrom, presumably also included an appreciable number of politically active Jews fleeing Germany as a result of their justified fear of the concentration camps 63 . However, for the great majority of German Jews, the situation was different. Whoever had a family and children of school age, a shop or some other business, a house or other property found himself unable - unless he was immediately threatened - to arrive so easily to a decision to take leave of his homeland. After the first shock waves of the Nazi take over and April boycott had passed, people began to get used to the situation. Many clung to the illusion that things would perhaps not turn out all that badly. After all, there had been a rapid turnover of governments in the final years of Weimar, and it was thought that Hitler too would not last in power for very long. Others assuaged their fears with a belief in the continued existence of the constitutional state, in which legal norms would finally win out despite all of the revolutionary upheaval of the early weeks of the new regime. In this connection, they were able to point to the numerous declarations by the government denouncing 'individual actions', declarations whose real purpose was to help calm down and stabilise the economy. This attitude is reflected in the many complaints lodged by Jewish individuals and firms preserved in the files of national and municipal government offices. The style and tone of such formal complaints differ substantially. Some of those lodging a grievance point confidently to the civil rights anchored in the constitution. Others cite statements by the government against arbitrary unlawful 'individual actions' in the economy. Yet there are also overly zealous assertions of one's contribution the fatherland and protestations of the strength of one's 'national patriotic outlook'. In some instances, there are denials that one belongs to Jewry. Half a century after full legal emancipation, those letters reflect the diverse complexity of the Jewish minority in Germany: the attitudes expressed run the gamut from intense assimilationism to the point of self-denial all the way to a proud insistence on one's own identity and the rights that had been won. A typical example is represented by correspondence between the Dortmund department store concern Gebr. Kaufmann and the local mayor in October 1933 64 . After prior verbal discussion, the mayor's office was supplied by the firm with extracts and copies of government regulations, declarations by the Trustee for Labour ( Treuhaender der Arbeit ), and decrees and circulars issued by the Economy Ministry in order to demonstrate that the Trustee of Labour, in matters pertaining to economic measures, is authorised to provide government offices with orders to be passed on to the various agencies'. Apparently, the mayor had rejected this, quite in keeping with the sense of Gauleiter Buerckel's position as quoted above. The letter of the Jewish department stores requested the municipality to inform the firm whether it was prepared to rescind the prohibition to purchases by municipal employees, the freeze on placing ads, the exclusion of the firm from bidding for public contracts, and its exclusion as a firm where welfare vouchers could be redeemed. The reply by the mayor of Dortmund to this very objective and respectful letter is symptomatic of the situation at the time: Returning your enclosed supporting documents', the mayor informed the firm that all central government ministerial decrees regarding the cancellation of the boycott against Jewish department stores, prohibitions on their placing public advertisements, and so on had also led in Dortmund to a cancellation of local prohibitions. However, the mayor chose to add his own comments regarding each individual point of the complaint 'personally, as a National Socialist'. As a National Socialist, he found it difficult to understand how a civil servant could do his shopping in a Jewish department store.' He could not imagine that any newspaper in Dortmund would accept ads from Jewish businesses.' Although the firm was free to bid for tendered contracts of the municipality, you cannot demand from me as a National Socialist that I approve your bid.' One could cite a great many similar letters and grievance from the year 1933, some of which went all the way to the Reich Chancellery. A Jewish meat wholesaler in Wanne-Eickel in Westphalia, for example, appealed directly to Hermann Goering after his local protestations and a complaint to the district governor in Arnsberg had produced no results. Referring to Goering's orders that prohibited 'interference in the economy,' the petitioner enclosed a letter written by his battalion commander during World War I and stressed his wartime achievements. He then went on: self-employed here in this town since 1900, I have never been accused of any wrongdoing and have always fulfilled my duties toward the municipality and the state.' In this case as well, the reaction of the authorities was typical. The local Gauleiter replied by threatening physical violence regarding a number of similar grievances that involved sanctions against the Jewish cattle and meat trade in particular. On September 27, 1933, the district governor in Arnsberg wrote to the Reich Interior Minister requesting that he look once again into the matter of the Jewish question, in detail, and if possible in co-operation with the national head office of the NSDAP and the top command echelon of the SA.... Because, first of all, the heads of the local agencies... do not see any possibility for doing full justice to the decrees and secondly, it is highly likely that there will be a serious disturbance of public law and order if the decrees are implemented, judging from opinions that have been transmitted to me by party officials.' Such statements cannot be viewed as proof of the existence of a contradictory 'dualistic' Jewish policy, as the following section of the same letter shows. The district governor indicated his understanding of the need for a 'calming down of the economy' and the 'struggle against unemployment' yet requested that another aspect be borne carefully in mind: the extent to which, specifically during the struggle to gain power, the demand was raised for an elimination of the disproportionate influence of Jews in various areas of the economy, and the fact that opposition to Jewry is the emotional foundation of the movement 65 .' In the light of such experiences, it is understandable that the stream of personal grievances submitted by Jews to the local and central authorities was gradually reduced to a trickle as 1933 wore on. Jews had come to recognise the hopelessness of any appeals to norms of constitutionality in the 'new Germany' and attempted instead to cope with mounting difficulties on their own and with the assistance of the Jewish community. Building a Network of Jewish Self-Help Before 1933, the Jewish Gemeinden in Germany had not yet federated into a general representative body to promote their interests. This fact was characteristic of German Jewry, which was dispersed in hundreds of Gemeinden throughout the entire expanse of Germany and which was likewise far from unified in any philosophical or religious sense. It is true that there was a State Federation of Jewish Gemeinden in Prussia, but that body was more an organisation appendage of the Jewish Gemeinde in Berlin, where more than half of all Jews in Prussia lived in 1925 66 . It was also in the Berlin Gemeinde that the first foundations were laid for the establishment of an extensive system of self-help for German Jews. The nucleus around which this organisation crystallised was a respected group of young social workers, active for many years in Jewish welfare, whose organisational and ideological centre was within the Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der deutschen Juden (Central Welfare Agency for German Jews). By the 1920s, they had developed an impressive network of modern social welfare services in the poorer Berlin neighbourhoods and had successfully applied progressive methods of social work. Their accumulated experiences, after an admirably swift readjustment to the new circumstances, were now utilised for the benefit of a broad and ever expanding circle of German Jews. Among these Jews were many who, just a few short months before, would never have imagined in their wildest dreams that they would someday have to rely on the services of any institution of social welfare 67 . A call for contributions by the welfare office of the Jewish Gemeinde in Berlin in April 1933 can serve to convey something of the attitude that accompanied these first fledgling steps down the path to creating a network of Jewish self-help. The call quoted from an essay by Ismar Elbogen, head of the Hochschule fuer die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin, which had appeared on April 4 in the C.V. Zeitung, the weekly paper of the Centralverein: Tens of thousands have been stripped of their source of livelihood and forced out of their profession. Many who were self-employed are now uprooted. It is meaningless to ask today about reasons and causes. There is no sense in accusing ourselves or others. There is but one dictate of the hour: to word and to help! They can condemn us to hunger, but they cannot condemn us to starvation! They can squeeze the space that remains to us for living ever tighter, yet in its constricted confines we must join together, and each must try to support his fellow.... Think of the history of our forefathers-repeatedly, they experienced such catastrophes, yet did not surrender their will to live! Unperturbed, they searched out and found ways and means for continued arrival and the building of a new existence, albeit more modest, in place of that which had been lost. And so we too must, after the paralysing stupor of these past weeks, once again regain our senses and undertake all possible efforts to create bread and work for our sisters and brothers' 68 . After difficult negotiations on the bridging of regional, political, and even personal differences, an organisation representing all German Jews officially came into being in the autumn of 1933 in the form of the Reichsvertretung der Deutschen Juden 69 . However, the urgency of the need for economic self-help was recognised at an early point, so that a national Zentralauschuss der deutschen Juden fuer Hilfe und Aufbau (Central Committee of German Jews for Relief and Rehabilitation) was formed as early as April 13. It was later integrated into the Reichsvertretung 70 . The various individual Jewish Gemeinden soon put the existing and newly established organisations to work in helping to provide crucially needed assistance. The largest of these organisations was the Zentralstelle fuer juedische Wirtschaftshilfe (Central Bureau for Jewish Economic Relief, hereafter Wirtschaftshilfe) opened the beginning of April in Berlin 71 . In its first few days, the offices of the Wirtschaftshilfe were stormed by hundreds of persons seeking assistance, since rumours had spread that the bureau had large sums of money for support at its disposal.' 72 Its actual possibilities were far more modest in scope, yet the extent of relief assistance available at that time appears surprising from a present-day perspective. The university graduates and civil servants hard hit by the Civil Service Law were in particular and pressing need of assistance. For this reason, their problems also shaped the character and the approach of the Wirtschaftshilfe in this early first stage of its activity. Attempts were made, in a demonstratively legalistic manner, to have 'illegal' dismissals reversed by the submission of grievances to competent government offices and, if need be, by the filing of a suit with the labour court. If reinstatement was not possible, an attempt was made at least to assure that the legally stipulated compensation and dismissal notification periods were adhered to. Special legal advice columns were started in all Jewish newspapers. These columns published the full text of new laws and regulation, commented in detail on basic court rulings, and encouraged those affected to insist on their legal rights. Among other things, this may have been a product of the greatly enlarged legal-aid sections in all Jewish organisations: a kind of internal Jewish employment scheme to give work to the large numbers of jobless Jewish attorneys and judges. In addition, this practice reflected a view that was also predominant at the time in Jewish leadership circles: namely, that it was possible to defend economic positions by juridical means and methods. Only in this way can one explain the suggestion advanced then-though soon abandoned-to form a Jewish organisation for protecting the interests of Jewish blue-collar and white-collar workers who had been barred from membership in the DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) 73 . During the first stage of development, the other sections of the economic relief network structured along the lines of occupational groups also operated according to the principles described earlier. The Commercial Advisory Office attempted to have the municipal regulations on purchasing restrictions for civil servants and the ban on granting public contract to Jewish firms rescinded by means of protest and intervention by the courts. In general, such attempts met with just as little success as complaints filed by individuals and firms. Consequently, one soon shifted out of necessity, to an approach that stressed the practical provision of financial relief aid. These measures, still regarded at the time as temporary, were dubbed 'economic first aid'. Alexander Szanto, who was active in the Berlin Wirtschaftshilfe, has left a very vivid description of this 'constructive first aid': For many years, a Jewish restaurant owner had been operating a small pastry and coffee shop, whose clientele consisted mainly of Christians....Since the Boycott Day, [customers] had hardly dared to venture to his shop.... At the same time, difficulties started to crop up with the Christian waiter in his employ, and the authorities harassed him with all sorts of chicanery. He became indebted, was unable to find a buyer for his shop and had to close it.... The Wirtshafshilfe assisted him in opening an ice-cream parlour in a completely different neighbourhood of town.... The ice-cream machine was purchased for him by the Wirtschaftshilfe from a Jewish manufacturer.... The Jewish merchant Y. was a competent and hardworking travelling salesman dealing in textile goods. Since he was on excellent terms with his network of customers - both Jewish and Christian - he initially was able to successfully continue his trips in the rural countryside. But he ran into difficulties in finding a hotel room in the small provincial towns, where hotels and inns tended more and more toward a policy of refusing a room to guests. The Wirtschaftshilfe provided a car for him, and later on a delivery van. In this way, it proved possible for him to organise...his strips in such a way that in the evening... he could manage to get to a larger town, where accommodations were still available. When this became impossible as well, he used to spend the night in his van by the side of the road, preparing a meal from canned goods he had brought along.... The press photographer Z. was fired as a non-Aryan from his well-paid job with a newspaper publisher. The Wirtschaftshilfe provided him with a loan for the purchase of his own high-quality photographic equipment, and helped him set up his own studio.... When he decided to emigrate and the loan had not as yet been completely repaid, he returned part of the equipment to the Bureau, which then was able to utilise that equipment in its own retraining courses' 74 . In view of the economic structure of German Jewry, it was likely that the Commercial Advisory Office would soon become the most often consulted section of the Wirtschaftshilfe. The discussion regarding the legal situation and the juridical struggle for every position it was still possible to salvage went on for a time, but practical assistance became an ever more important focus. It was the 'little guys' - the craft artisans, tradesmen and shop owners - upon whom the Commercial Advisory Office bestowed its assistance... on the assumption that even in the framework of the National Socialist state it would be possible for Jews to survive economically.... In answer to all those who criticise the fact that we wished from 1933 to 1941 to give economic assistance to persons who were in any event condemned to annihilation after 1941, one thing must be said: such a criticism rests on an interpretation after the fact. To be wise in hindsight is an easy matter! For us then it was simply a matter of aiding Jews threatened by hunger and worry and in distress' 75 . The principle of self-help also was adopted within individual occupational groups. In the spring of 1933, Jewish lawyers and doctors spontaneously organised internal collections among themselves for colleagues who had been affected by the Civil Service Law and were without any income. Special gala functions, such as the Jewish 'Doctors' Ball' in Berlin, were dedicated to raising contributions for the various relief funds. A Jewish Artists' Relief Organisation founded by middle-class women supported needy artists by organising lectures and artistic performances in restaurants and private homes. In addition, the Artists' Relief supported its own soup kitchen and a club, from private contributions, before the Juedischer Kulturbund (Jewish Cultural League) that was established in Berlin and other cities was able to offer jobs to artists. Ernst Loewenberg, a teacher and member of the board of directors of the Jewish Gemeinde in Hamburg, reports about this type of assistance: In April 1933, Jewish lawyers, doctors and teachers set up special committees in order ... to help colleagues affected.... As a co-ordinator for the teachers, I ... probably interviewed in my office all those teachers who had been forced in Hamburg to leave the school system...[in order to] place colleagues from Hamburg in newly established Jewish schools via contacts with the school section of the Reichsvertretung.... Among the many visitors...the memory of one in particular remains vivid. In the autumn of 1933, a haggard old woman teacher came to me and explained straightaway that she had never had anything to do with Jews, but that she was desperate. She had been a village teacher for many years in Schleswig-Holstein...and was from a strict Protestant family.... However, she had discovered when trying to prove her Aryan descent that her father - who himself was the son of a Protestant minister - was Jewish by race. So she had been dismissed from her job. Distant friends had taken in the totally destitute woman. Her brothers lived abroad. She found it impossible to grasp the idea that Jews, with whom she had never had anything to do, should now help her, a German Protestant.... I gave her the streetcar fare to go to the advisory office. Later on, her passage to America was paid by a general foundation and from Jewish sources' 76. This Professional Self-Help Section was also involved in trying to locate jobs abroad to make it possible for persons trained in the free professions and now unemployed to emigrate. In those days, that was a difficult task even when it came to doctors because very few of them were willing to relocate to underdeveloped countries and areas where they could gain entry and acceptance. Palestine was an exception. Many Jewish doctors chose to emigrate there and made outstanding contributions to the establishment of a modern health system. Other Western countries placed the greatest obstacles in the path of doctors wishing to immigrate and obtain a work permit 77 . Thus, in its first few weeks the Wirtschaftshilfe in Berlin had to deal with almost four thousand doctors in need of support, half of whom no longer had any income whatsoever. Only gradually were some of those doctors who remained in Germany able to find work in Jewish Gemeinden , schools, and sport associations or to earn something by substituting for doctors on vacation or by temporary employment in the offices of Jewish doctors still able to practice. In a similar fashion, many attorneys also found employment in the administrative bureaucracy of Jewish Gemeinden and other organisations 78 . In all of these measures, the borderline between 'constructive help' and actual welfare assistance remained fluid. Until that time, the welfare activities of the Jewish Gemeinden had been a well-developed system geared to providing financial support to poor or low-income marginal groups in the Jewish population, though such groups had increased in number dramatically during the Depression. Most individuals in these groups were already recipients of public welfare assistance, and relief funds provided by Jewish welfare were meant as supplementary assistance. The Jewish Gemeinden maintained special institutions for such assistance, and it was on these that they expended the largest proportion of their welfare budget: day-care and convalescent homes for children, clinics and old-age homes for the indigent elderly, and so on. There was need for an immediate response to the sudden distress in which many Jewish families, who previously had never had any contact with welfare offices, now found themselves. That privation was ameliorated by financial relief to assist with daily needs, although initially there was not a large amount of funding available for such types of aid. This was compounded by the fact that the Jews dependent on public welfare, who were subject to various harassment's and restrictions, also had to be supported by Jewish welfare as well. As a consequence of these heavy burdens, many Gemeinde -linked institutions, such as nursing and convalescent homes, now found themselves in economic straits and were forced to close down 79 . In the past, the public welfare agencies had even assigned non-Jewish needy persons to these homes, and they had been able in this way to help cover part of their operating costs. References: 63.A. Margalioth, 'Rescue,' p. 247f.; Rosenstock, p. 377; Strauss 1981, p. 348f. 64.Knipping, p. 161ff. 65.StaA Muenster, Reg. Arnsberg, IG/573. 66.Letschinsky, Schicksal , p. 63. On the Prussian State Association, see Birnbaum, passim. 67.On the activities of the Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle, see its publication Juedische Wohlfahrtspflege und Sozialpolitik ( JWSP ; until 1930: Zeitschrift fuer juedische Wohlfahrtspflege ). The volumes of this journal are an indispensable source of information for all social-historical research in this area. 68. Gemeindeblatt der juedischen Gemeinde zu Berlin 23 (1933), no. 4. Elbogen's essay in C.V. Zeitung , 4 April 1933, quoted here according to Juedische Emigration , p. 42. 69.See Ball-Kaduri, p. 136ff.; Herzfeld, p. 11ff.; Max Gruenewald, 'The Beginning of the Reichsvertretung,'' YLBI I(1956): 57¯67. 70.Gruenewald, op. cit. 71.On the first organisational efforts, see Adler-Rudel, p. 10ff.; Haavera-Transfer , pp. 11, 15f. 72. Gemeindeblatt der juedischen Gemeinde zu Berlin 23(1933), no. 5 (May). 73. C. V. Zeitung , 15 September 1933. 74.Richarz, vol. 3, p. 222f. 75.Szanto, Erinnerungen , p. 133f. 76.Richarz, vol. 3, p. 247f. 77.Leibfried, p. 20ff. 78.Adler-Rudel, p. 139ff. 79. RV/Arb. 1933, p. 21f. Part B At the start of 1933, there were twenty-five small Jewish credit associations in existence. These were viewed more as means to provide 'constructive welfare assistance' than as credit institutes. The independent capital of all of these associations amounted to a total of only approximately RM 750,000 and was used for providing small, interest-free (or almost interest-free) loans of from RM 100 to RM 200 to small-enterprise artisans and tradesmen. Such credit associations had initially been set up in the 1920s in Eastern Europe by the 'Joint' and spread from there to Germany. They had fulfilled an important function, particularly in Poland, where there was a large impoverished Jewish middle class suffering from an anti-Semitic boycott that had been openly endorsed and supported by the government. In Germany, such loan associations had had a much smaller company of beneficiaries until 1933, consisting principally of Eastern European artisans and small tradesmen who could indeed be materially assisted by such modest loans 80 . Jewish self-help efforts were also able to link up with already existing initiatives in the field of occupational-vocational training and counselling. During the Depression years, job placement bureaux had been set up by the Gemeinden to assist school graduates and jobless youngsters in choosing a vocation and to provide help in locating jobs and apprenticeships. In addition, the Zionist youth leagues maintained agricultural training farms that prepared young people for emigration to Palestine. At the beginning of 1933, these institutions, which until then had served only a small number of Jewish youth, were literally swamped by a sudden deluge of applications from thousands of young and even older Jewish men and women. The Jewish job placement bureaux and training centres formed the nucleus of a comprehensive system of occupational counselling and job retraining. Many placed their hopes in learning a new profession in order to be able to build new lives for themselves later either in Germany or abroad. The available places were far too few, even if it had proved feasible to multiply their numbers quickly. By the end of 1933, the system of organised vocational training encompassed more than six thousand people, including a number of older persons. Thirteen hundred were studying and living in communal training centres, mainly on the agricultural teaching farms, the so-called hachshara (Hebrew for 'training') program of the Zionist leagues. The others received training in individual teaching centres. Almost half of the training courses were devoted to agriculture and gardening; the remainder were in areas such as artisan crafts and even in the field of domestic help 81 . The impressive figures indicate just how swiftly the respective organisations responded to the new circumstances. Nonetheless, only a small number of people could be accommodated. In earlier years, the greater proportion of Jewish youngsters leaving school and entering the job market, as well as older persons who needed to learn a new trade, had made their vocational choices individually, and then had found themselves a suitable place for training. In 1933, however, despite the upswing in the job market, it became more and more difficult for Jews to find apprenticeship places, even before the introduction of official sanctions. Under these circumstances, the various services expanded by the Jewish Gemeinden - such as the occupational counselling and job placement bureaux, as well as the training/retraining courses in agriculture and the craft trades - all took on a growing importance. After a certain amount of time, it proved possible to mollify the German authorities 82 , particularly the Gestapo, who had initially viewed these efforts with scepticism and had interfered at various points. This was done repeatedly emphasising one salient argument: vocational training served to prepare people for later emigration. Beginnings of a 'Jewish Economic Sector' The efforts of the Jewish job placement bureaux were focused after January 1933 mainly on Jewish firms. Increasingly, Jewish blue-collar and white-collar workers could hope to find jobs only with Jewish employers. As long as the number of independent firms Jewish firms and businesses was still relatively large, it was possible to facilitate procurement of many jobs and apprenticeship positions in this way. This then represented the beginning of the development of an independent - though by no means autarkic - Jewish economic sector previously non-existent in Germany. The more the vocational and job prospects of Jews were restricted as a result of legislation, 'spontaneous' boycott, or administrative measures and chicanery, the closer the Jewish community joined together, closing ranks in economic respects as well. And the more hopeless the legal battle to maintain existing positions in the economy proved to be, the clearer was the recognition by ever increasing numbers of Jews that in their struggle for economic survival they could rely only on themselves and perhaps on the support of their co-religionists abroad. Jewish economic life thus began to undergo a restructuring: more and more, Jews were now working for and employing Jews, assuring themselves a livelihood by means of economic intercourse among themselves. As in other areas, Jewish young people here too showed themselves to be more inventive and farsighted than many adults or than a number of Jewish organisations. As early as May 1933, an appeal was circulated by the National Committee of Jewish Youth Leagues, signed by Ludwig Tietz and Georg Lubinski. It called on the local branches of all Jewish youth organisations to take an active part in efforts to procure jobs for the Jewish unemployed. Each member was obligated to locate at least one vacant job or apprenticeship by making inquiries among friends and relatives. An effort was to be made to find places for individual agricultural training ('individual hachshara ') among local farmers - if necessary only in exchange for food and lodging and even with the supplementary payment of a small sum of money to the farmer. In the course of a few weeks, several hundred positions, mainly agricultural apprenticeships, were located and arranged in this manner 83. Beginning during the Weimar Republic, appreciable numbers of Jewish blue-collar workers and even more white-collar personnel had found employment in Jewish-owned firms. This was one by-product of the anti-Semitic boycott that had already intensified at the time of the Depression; it was also a consequence of intentional efforts undertaken by the Jewish job placement offices. A large proportion of these workers were dismissed during the course of the April boycott under pressure from NSBO factory cells and the supervision by the DAF was less effective. In a number of cases, the employment of new Jewish workers was combined with the awarding of contracts by Jewish institutions to the employment firms. In this way, both the new Jewish employee and his or her Jewish employer came to benefit economically from the arrangement 84 . The Jewish newspapers were also mobilised in the search for jobs. The success of recurring appeals in the press appears to have been only negligible in the early period, when circulation figures for the Jewish press had just started to climb at a slow pace. But it was at this juncture that the importance of Jewish newspapers for the subsequent development of the Jewish economic sector began to emerge and make itself felt. Clearly articulated in the columns of these papers was the urgency of the need to procure gainful employment for Jewish workers and an appeal to the feeling of Jewish solidarity: as, for example, in an article published in September 1933 with the characteristic title 'We accuse!' The article criticised Jewish master craftsmen, cooks, barbers, tailors, and the other artisans because they were prepared to take on Jewish apprentices only in exchange for the payment of an apprentice fee. This was denounced as an attempt to try to profit from the distressful hard times. Where should these people, who sometimes did not even have enough for a warm meal, get the necessary money to pay such fees? 85 Along with press releases, the Wirtschafshilfe issued a mimeographed bulletin entitled 'Vermittlungsdienst' (Exchange Service). Its first issue in the spring of 1933 reflected the desperate situation faced by the jobless and impoverished. Doctors and lawyers appealed to their colleagues in particular, requesting to be kept in mind when they were buying tea, coffee, or soap. Their wives advertised assistance with various types of written work and knitting. Dismissed judges and state attorneys offered their gowns for sale and their legal libraries 'at bargain prices.' The mimeographed pages also carried requests for and offers of capital investment, ranging from RM 3,000 to RM 40,000, although there were more requests than offers. Frequently, factories shops were offered for sale at what appeared to completely ridiculous prices: for example, a 'shipping firm in Mannheim' for the incredible sum of RM 1,000; or a doctor's practice, completely equipped and with a family home, in an office whose rent was prepaid until April 1935 - RM 5,000 to RM 6,000! 86 The sources do not indicate whether buyers were found for the properties. Yet how desperate must the situation have been for those who had placed the ads. And so it was that the Jewish economic sector came into being - unplanned and by no means conceived as the long-term solution to the crisis situation of German Jewry - in the early months of the Nazi regime at the initiative of individuals and groups who suddenly found themselves jobless and without any income. Many may have taken the assurances of the new rulers at face value - namely, that Jews had nothing to fear in the field of the vocational trades - and thus ventured in such trades to build a new basis for their continued economic existence in Germany. Others sold off their legal or medical practices in order to emigrate to a new homeland. It seemed reasonable to everyone in need of help to turn first to their own community. Yet the ensuing joining of hands economically also marked the beginning of a new process of intellectual and organisational self-assertion by the Jewish community, which had been left to fend for itself. Individual Jews reached a decision, sometimes earlier than those in positions of leadership in the community: to liberate themselves from the sway of the arbitrary measures introduced by the new rulers, to contend to the best of their abilities with the new circumstances, and to cope for the present with their new lot - whether in order to remain in Germany, economically active and productive despite of everything, or to rescue and transfer as much as possible of their capital at the time of their prospective emigration. First Attempts to Salvage Personal Assets The difficulties inherent in transferring assets abroad originally had no connection with Nazi policy of persecution of the Jews. In 1931, the Bruening government had imposed legal restrictions on currency export to prevent the calamitous flight of capital during the Depression. Even the Reich Flight Tax (Reichsfluchtsteuer), later utilised by the Nazi regime to rob and despoil departing Jews, had already been introduced at that time 87 . In 1933, capital transfer abroad was almost completely suspended. The new rulers issued regulations on exceptions pertaining to the transfer of Jewish assets in order to accelerate Jewish emigration. In the first two or three years of the new regime, it was still relatively simple, despite the tense currency situation, to transfer funds abroad. For this reason, it proved possible during this period to salvage a certain amount of Jewish capital and spirit it out of the country, in contrast with later years. Affluent and farsighted Jews tried to utilise the existing possibilities for immediate or imminent emigration. Heads of large industries and bankers with the advantage of foreign business and financial connections were naturally in a far better position to do this than the great majority of the middle classes, whose capital was largely tied up in business and real estate. In the first few months of the new regime, before the complete Nazification of all government offices, an appreciable number of wealthy Jews appear to have found ways to liquidate their assets and emigrate without absorbing any large capital loss. For this reason, there were a good many affluent Jews in the first wave of emigration 88 . Member of the Jewish upper class who chose to remain in Germany for the time being began to spirit their capital abroad by means of trading deals and the investment of foreign firms their companies. In addition, the transferral of their firms, even if only to partial foreign ownership, afforded them the advantage of a certain protection from boycott measures and other encroachments, at least for a brief period of time. By 1933, something tantamount to a new 'branch' of financial consultants and transfer experts had come into being. The Gestapo files report of their activities. Thus, a letter written by a Berlin financial adviser was confiscated in the offices of a Dortmund businessman and then passed on to the Gestapo. The writer of this letter offered his services to preserve Jewish capital, especially legal investment abroad'; this naturally would have to be compatible with German interests.' In addition, he claimed to have also arranged conversions of Jewish businesses and industries, so-called Gleichschaltungen' , without the Jewish partner having lost influence in the firm.' This economic adviser informed the Berlin Gestapo, in written reply to an inquiry, that he had got the idea of Gleichschaltungen because I wished to give Aryan friend an opportunity to find a position. It is a matter of general knowledge that non-Aryan businesses can be bought very cheaply today, since a large number of owners are contemplating emigration. I am involved in arranging Gleichschaltungen in order to enable non-Aryan entrepreneurs to emigrate, while at the same time helping my previously unemployed friends to find a position'. The Gestapo appears to have found this double motive understandable and convincing. It is characteristic of the situation at the time that this economic adviser was under constant Gestapo surveillance until 1941 but was allowed to continue his activities, as indicated by regular entries in Gestapo files. In 1935 and 1937, he was repeatedly interrogated and was briefly taken into custody. He had been anonymously accused of camouflaging Jewish firms as Aryan, buying up patents with Jewish money for illicit sale abroad, as well as engaging in the illicit sale and transfer of assets outside the country.' Yet in none of these cases could any punishable charge be proved against him. 89 This instance has been described here in detail because it presents a realistic picture of the concrete co-operation between German and Jewish official agencies, including the Gestapo, in promoting Jewish emigration. Such co-operation was already in effect by the beginning of 1933. Nourished by totally opposed motives, it led to an agreement that made possible the transfer of a portion of Jewish assets to Palestine and other countries. Only after it was stabilised and had been strengthened by its successes on the economic front and in foreign policy did the Nazi regime switch to a policy of expropriating Jewish capital and forcing Jews whose assets had been plundered and who were now destitute to leave the country. Earlier, when such an approach did not seem feasible, the regime was prepared to deal flexibly with the existing laws in the interest of accelerated Jewish emigration. Not only did this attitude lead to the conclusion of various agreements with representative Jewish bodies - such as the Haavara Transfer Agreement discussed below - it was also a key factor operative in individual initiatives. In the summer of 1933, the director of the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Tel Aviv, who had come to Berlin to participate in negotiations on the transfer of capital, wrote in his July 1933 confidential report: Practical actions goes its own ways. It does not wait for the official bureaux, and can achieve a great deal. There are many avenues for individual action ... such as private agreements with persons or corporations who have payments to make in Germany, etc. It goes without saying that there is also the illegal way. Naturally, a businessman who has maintained contacts abroad over the years, the man who knows his way around the government agencies - and any clever and resourceful person - have things easier in this regard than some simple fellow, say a university graduate, who has twenty or maybe fifty thousand marks in liquid assets and is waiting for some administrative office that will arrange to get the money out of the country for him.' 90 The Haavara Transfer Agreement 91 came about through an initiative that was originally private. Sam Cohen, director of HLtd., a firm dealing with citrus plantations in Palestine, concluded a kind of clearing agreement with the Reich economy minister in May 1933. According to this agreement, every Jew wishing to emigrate was permitted to deposit a sum of up to RM 40,000 in a blocked account. In return, they received from Hanotea the full equivalent value in Palestine currency, based on the official exchange rate (similar to the pound sterling), in the form of real estate such as a house or a citrus plantation in Palestine. Hanotea in turn, obligated itself to use the funds in the blocked account for importing German goods to Palestine, mainly pipes, pumping equipment, fertilisers, and the like. In July 1933, the agreement with Hanotea was expanded to the sum of RM 3 million on the condition that the official Zionist organisation be involved in the scheme. 92 These negotiations sparked vehement discussion and dispute within the Jewish public in Palestine and in other countries. An arrangement that directly or indirectly helped promote German exports contradicted all efforts to organise a world wide boycott of German export goods as a protest against the persecution of Jews in Germany, including efforts by non-Jewish organisations such as the British trade union movement. The Haavara Agreement was the subject of public controversy and heated discussion in the Jewish press and at the Prague Zionist Congress in August 1933. The executive of the Zionist World Organisation initially hesitated to accept the transfer agreement and take over its implementation. However, when the financial situation of the German Jews continued to deteriorate and the urgent necessity for them to emigrate became absolutely clear, the 19th Zionist Congress in Lucerne decided that the entire activity of the Haavara scheme should be placed under the official control of the Jewish Agency for implementation. The desire was to rescue at least a portion of Jewish assets and to give to German Jews the possibility of emigrating to Palestine. According to the regulation of the British Mandatory Government for Palestine, there were annual immigration quotas for Jews without means, so-called capitalists who had the sum of least £1,000 Palestine (approximately RM 15,000 at the time) in their possession, were issued a 'capitalist immigration certificate'. That certificate enabled them to immigrate without any restrictions. 93 The circular letter issued by the Economy Ministry on August 28, 1933, informing all foreign currency bureaux about the signing of the Haavara Agreement, reveals something about the possible underlying motives of the German government. It is stated there, among other things, that the agreement had been concluded with the official Jewish organisations involved ... in order to continue to promote the emigration of German Jews to Palestine by granting the requisite sums - without putting an excessive burden on the foreign currency reserves of the Reichsbank, while at the same time increasing German exports to Palestine.' 94 The 'granting' of the 'requisite sums', which constituted a clear exception under foreign currency regulations in effect at the time, referred to the amount of at least £1,000 stipulated by the Mandatory authorities. In the first few years, this was provided by the Reichsbank in foreign currency at the official rate to emigrating Jews. It is true that the Haavara Agreement did not promise the German side any additional influx of foreign currency, since all goods exported to Palestine were paid for in reichsmarks drawn from the blocked Haavara account. However, the Economy Ministry was doubtless banking on the anticipated stimulus for employment of the increased volume of exports. The government, overestimating the financial might of 'world Jewry,' also appears to have had definite fears about the impact of a world wide boycott of German products. It expected the foreign boycott efforts would be more successful than they actually turned out to be. The German consul general in Jerusalem, Heinrich Wolff, who actively supported efforts for the agreement, may have shared this apprehension, or may have been cleverly playing on such fears, when he pointed out the danger of further drops in exports as a result of the Jewish boycott in an April 1933 report to the Foreign Office in Berlin 95 . After the agreement had been concluded with official Jewish representatives, including the German Zionist Federation (ZVfD), the Palaestina Treuhandstelle (Palestine Trusteeship Office, abbreviated 'Paltreu') was set up in Berlin. Two Jewish private banks - Warburg in Hamburg and Wassermann in Berlin - also had financial involvements with the Paltreu Office. The Haavara, registered with the Anglo-Palestine Bank, functioned as partner in Palestine. By the end of 1933, these institutions had already transferred some RM 1.255 million; this sum had risen to nearly 140 million by the outbreak of the war in September 1939. The monies transferred considerably eased the burdens of emigration to Palestine for approximately fifty-two thousand German Jews and their subsequent absorption there. In many cases, such emigration was possible at all only as a result of the Haavara scheme. References: 80. JWSP , 1933/34, pp. 123ff, 215ff. 81.Ibid., p. 113. 82.Szanto, Erinnerungen , p. 153f. 83.Schaeffer, file no. 26. 84.Ibid., Szanto, Erinnerungen , p. 150ff. 85. C. V. Zeitung , 15 September 1933. 86.Wirtschaftshilfe der juedischen Gemeinde Berlin, Wiener Library, Tel Aviv, PC3/4, no. 4. The official exchange rate of the reichsmark was pegged early during the Nazi period at an overvalued RM 2.5 to the U.S. dollar (instead of the long-standing rate of 4.2 to the dollar) but was manipulated in an extremely complex manner, resulting in a panoply of multiple rates, depending on type of transaction. Cf. Howard S. Ellis, Exchange Control in Central Europe (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), especially pp. 233¯242. Also Gustav Stolper et al., The German Economy: 1870 to the Present (New York, 1967), especially p. 329 (chart). 87.See Barkai, Wirtschaftssystem , p. 136f. 88.Rosenstock, p. 378f.; Strauss 1980, p. 345; Strauss 1981, p. 348f. 89.HStaA Duesseldorf, Gestapo-Akten (RW 58), no. 23 201. 90.CZA, L51/527. 91.The Hebrew word for 'transfer' ( haavara ) was also the official term in the German documents. 92. Haavara-Transfer , p. 21ff. 93.Ibid., pp. 19, 51. A detailed discussion of the Haavara Agreement in the Jewish public and press abroad preceded the Zionist Congress decision. One of the initiators, the head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, Haim Arlosoroff, was murdered in June 1933, a case that has never been fully cleared up. Withing the Jewish public, his murder was associated, most probably incorrectly, with the negotiations on Haavara. In any event, these public debates and discussions, as well as the later literature, prove just how misleading the subtitle of Black's book ( The Untold Story of the Secret Agreement... ) is. It is just as untrue that the story was 'untold' as that the Haavara Agreement was 'secret' in nature. Therefore, it remains astonishing that a reputable publisher engaged in such a sensationalist promotion campaign for the book and indeed stooped to publish the volume at all. 94. Haavara-Transfer , p. 26. 95.Ibid., p. 22. Part C This agreement must likewise be evaluated in the context of the reaction of German Jews to the catastrophe that had befallen them. Despite the political turbulence and constantly exacerbating anti-Semitism in the Weimar Republic that had preceded the National Socialist regime, the Jewish population and its leadership were almost completely unprepared for that catastrophe. Today we can only admire the ability they evinced to adjust swiftly to the changed situation, rely on their own wits and resources, and proceed to create a comprehensive and relatively well-organised system of Jewish self-help. Not all the problems could be solved in this way, even though many of the new programs and initiatives of the year 1933 were improved and expanded in the ensuing period. Later on, German Jewry find itself facing ever new forms of repression and persecution in the economic sphere and beyond - repression against which it ultimately proved unable to muster any defence. The Daily Struggle for Survival Between 1933 and 1938, German Jews experienced alternating phases of hope and despair. A few calm months were enough to awaken optimistic expectations for stabilisation, which might, in spite of it all make economic survival feasible in Germany even if such a life would now be more laborious in its demands and stintingly modest in its rewards. The outbreak of boycott actions, on the other hand, helped to lend credence to pessimistic assessments. Optimists and pessimists differed primarily in respect to the intensity of their preparations for emigration. Initially, however, all had to invest the bulk of their energies in the daily struggle to scrape together enough to allow themselves and their families a relatively decent level of existence. Jewish occupational structure underwent an accelerated process of restructuring, though this had very little to do with the earlier 'productivisation' aimed at various groups in the Jewish community. Along with the restructuring organised by Jewish self-help associations, a spontaneous and more regressive occupational restructuring process took place, in which the old vocation of peddler once again became a respected calling after having almost totally vanished from Jewish occupational statistics since the end of the nineteenth century. Former doctors and lawyers, as well as junior- and senior-level officials, now turned itinerant travelling through the countryside or from house to house with their goods and samples. Because this activity required a permit for trade or peddling, it was listed in the statistics of the government offices as the 'establishment of a new business' by Jews, just like the transfer of a store into one's private residence. Party offices and interested middle-class businessmen, especially in the retail garment area, believed they could see in this a sign of an increase in Jewish economic activity and were correspondingly alarmed. In re, the volume of business transacted by Jews was shrinking steadily. The turnover in sales outlets that had been shifted to private dwellings declined, despite the general pickup in overall demand. Jewish travelling salesmen, who often were the victims of dishonest swindlers, were in many cases unable to cover even their transportation expenses. 67 The shrinking of business volume also necessitated a reorganisation of the form of the business in order to economise. The family business was the most suitable modus because women and young school leavers had few prospects for employment in any event. The shift of commercial and artisan shops into one's private residence made this transaction easier. Doctors and lawyers who still had a small practice employed members of their phenomenon as an expression of the strengthened 'community of fate' ( Schicksalsgemeinschaft ) of the Jewish family and proof of its will to survive. In distress and under duress, the Jewish family had abandoned its resistance to the idea of married women going out to work. The ancient Jewish tradition, according to which the woman in the devout family often provided a living for her Talmud-studying spouse, was cited as a laudable example 68 . Soon after 1933, there was a change of direction in organised Jewish financial assistance. There were hardly any illusions about the value of legalistic intentions. If one applied at all to the authorities, an attempt was made to locate those case workers who were prepared, as decent human beings, to help Jews in a difficult situation, if they could in any way.' 69 The principal efforts were increasingly aimed at providing direct financial assistance. In the first few years of the Nazi regime, there was still hope to provide a secure, albeit altered, basis for the continued existence of German Jewry for many years to come by means of an 'economic rehabilitation program.' By the end of 1936 at the latest, people became convinced that emigration should be regarded as the most comprehensive form of a constructive program of economical aid.' However, in view of the structure of the German Jewish community and the restricted possibilities for immigration in other countries, a substantial Jewish population was likely for some time to come, consisting of individuals who were subjectively and objectively unable - or not yet able - to emigrate.' 70 Offices of the Wirtschaftshilfe could now be found throughout the country. The district centres served Jews resident in smaller localities in particular. The circle of those needing assistance had a different composition compared with 1933 and was now broader in compass. In 1936, more than sixty-two thousand persons received advice and relief aid. The proportion of those from the free professions was considerably smaller as a result of emigration and the absorptive capacity of the developing Jewish educational system and network of Jewish cultural institutions. In contrast, there was a steady rise in the number of jobless self-employed and white-collar workers as a consequence of the process of 'quiet displacement.' The Jewish credit associations attempted to provide support for the self-employed. They distributed two types of loans: 'category A' loans, lent against collateral and at an interest rate of 3 to 6 percent, and 'category B' loans to businessmen who were economically worse off. The latter were interest-free and generally did not require collateral; they were repayable 'according to ability' and without any due date. In both cases, only small sums were involved, and the distinction between the two categories blurred over the course of the years. This division into categories was abandoned completely in 1936, since only a few of the applicants were able to provide the necessary collateral according to rules that had been laid down by the 'Joint.' A new version was now introduced, 'category Z' loans, designated almost exclusively for use in covering moving expenses or in connection with the liquidation of existing businesses. Between 1933 and 1938, the credit associations distributed 12,300 individual loans totalling RM 4.5 million. This amounts to an average of about RM 370 per loan, a sum that can serve better than any description to characterise the modest clientele of these credit associations. Human beings in deep financial straits, facing the total collapse of their economic existence, were sometimes also helped by loans of just RM 100 or RM 200. The associations often provided indispensable financial first aid. The capital of such loan associations often provided indispensable financial first aid. The capital of such loan associations was insufficient for long-term activity or for credit needs of businesses. Their clientele consisted almost exclusively of individuals on the economic margins of society, small tradesmen and house-to-house and market peddlers, including a large number of Eastern European Jews. Accordingly, these credit associations should in retrospect be viewed as an institutional component of the broader welfare system 71 . A number of Jewish co-operative banks served the credit needs of the wealthier middle classes. A few such banks had been in existence for some time but really came into their own only during the Nazi period. One example was the Ivria Bank in Berlin, principally for Zionist-oriented circles; another was the Jewish Credit Association, which catered to the liberal circles around the Centralverein. There were Ivria banks in Leipzig and Chemnitz as well, not surprisingly, as these were cities with a high proportion of Eastern European Jews. Despite the uniform name, each of these banks was an independent co-operative with its own capital funding. Their importance for the system of economy and finance in the Jewish community in Germany was greater than that of the credit associations. The Ivria in Leipzig, for example, reported capital assets in 1935 of RM 1.35 million and a volume of 59 million 72 . Nonetheless, the co-operative banks covered only a small portion of the credit needs of Jewish businesses. The upper middle classes and the Jewish large entrepreneurs calculated their needs in quite different and much larger figures. They continued to obtain loans for a time from the general banks and increasingly from the Jewish private banks, for which there is no available data on total volume. At an early point in developments, offices and organisations involved with providing economic assistance were aware of the obligation to assure as orderly a liquidation of the Jewish enterprises in Germany as possible. This is reflected in the establishment, initiated as early as 1934, of a special 'Society for the Promotion of Economic Interests of Jews Now or Formerly Resident in Germany, Ltd.' 73 This long and complicated name had been invented by the official charged with registering the organisation, who even in 1934 apparently had trouble imagining there could still be anything like 'German Jews' in the country. The complete name was almost totally unfamiliar among the Jewish public, the organisation being known by its familiar abbreviation, F.W.I. The declared task of the society was to prevent the hasty sale of Jewish enterprises and to salvage as large a portion of Jewish assets as possible by means of expert advice and orderly handling of all transactions, using domestic and foreign financial institutions. The society was apparently thought of as a tool to serve larger business enterprises. Its offices were located on the Kurfuerstendamm in Berlin, and it tried to project an image that was solid and inspired trust. There were leading Jewish personalities on its board of directors. The banking house of Gebr Arnholds was likewise involved and had a financial interest in the initiative. Despite all of this, the society was unable to point to any substantial success, a result of the initially hesitant attitude of Jewish entrepreneurs and of the differences of opinion within the board of directors regarding the economic future of Jews in Germany. Even after these differences had become irrelevant under the pressure of events, and there was general recognition of the necessity for business liquidations, the F.W.I. never really came into its own. The large Jewish entrepreneurs went their own way in arranging transfer of capital and assets, and those with medium-size and small businesses found solutions in the framework of the Haavara Agreement or parallel organisations, which is discussed later (see 'Emigration and Transfer of Assets'). The Expanded 'Jewish Economic Sector' Only a smaller number of the large Jewish department stores and businesses were able to retain their Jewish directors and a clientele not directly exposed to the pressures of the party. With this one exception, the Jewish community must now live in its own framework, and is increasingly taking on the character of a new type of ghetto. A ghetto which is admittedly not surrounded by walls, yet which is cut off from economic as well as social and intellectual contact with the surrounding world. The typical German Jew today is a middle-aged man, whose children have emigrated and who ekes out a meagre existence as a small businessman in one of the larger cities.' 74 This description, taken from the 1937 annual report of the major British assistance organisation for German Jewry, the Council for German Jewry, paints and accurate picture. The developments described had been forced on the German Jews by external circumstances, and the 'Jewish economic sector' had evolved over the course of the years against their will. At the end of 1936, voices still could be heard among the Jewish public decrying a Jewish 'economic ghetto' and rejecting any abandonment of positions still in Jewish hands 75 . Yet the pressure of circumstances proved to be stronger. Naturally, it is impossible to speak about any sort of autarky of the Jewish sector for the simple reason that Jews were dependent on goods and services that they were unable to manufacture or supply themselves. However, as producers and employees, they were increasingly dependent on the internal 'Jewish market,' which was becoming even smaller. Those who had left active economic life lived first off the proceeds from liquidation and lifelong savings and then off their very bone and substance. Or they were dependent on Jewish welfare, financed by funds from Jews still able to contribute, or, to a lesser extent, by assistance from co-religionists abroad. The administrative bureaucracies of the Jewish Gemeinden and organisations had not only been enlarged to help cope with the growing tasks, they represented a kind of 'scheme for creation of jobs' from the funds of the Jewish public sector. These monies derived largely from tax revenues paid by the German Jews themselves. Jewish doctors found work in an impressive publicly supported health system, equipped with hospitals and homes. Former lawyers were able to make use of their knowledge and experience in Jewish administration. Teachers were placed in the significantly expanded Jewish educational system and in adult education, often as language teachers in courses preparing for emigration. Writers and journalists worked for the Jewish press and in Jewish publishing houses, which flourished on a scale hitherto unknown 76 . This development was also reflected in the ad sections of Jewish newspapers, which published the addresses of still practising Jewish doctors and dentists and of attorneys whose licenses were still valid. Even without any special appeal, most Jews frequented Jewish physicians and specialists. Jewish boarding houses in spas announced the availability of kosher cuisine. They were preferred by non-Orthodox clientele as well, even before signs proclaiming 'Jews not wanted' made their appearance in most hotels. The advertisement sections of the papers became more and more voluminous and reflected all facets of the 'Jewish economic sector': ads from job seekers and, far less frequently, want ads for vacancies, announcements concerning stores and artisan shops and businesses of all kinds, apartments and rooms to rent - a diversified picture of everyday occupations and needs, which necessarily brought together again individuals who had log been estranged from the Jewish community. The process of economic liquidation was also manifested in the pages of these papers: businesses and properties, furniture, and concert pianos were offered for sale at bargain prices 'due to emigration.' 77 The bureaux of the Wirtschaftshilfe increasingly became offices for the provision and co-ordination of services in the 'Jewish sector.' The bulletin Vermittlungsdienst stopped publication in 1936 because no corresponding responses were forthcoming from the numerous ads offering something for sale or requesting capital. Jews who had capital as a result of liquidation of businesses or other sources generally were chary of investing it in Jewish enterprises. They increasingly preferred various forms of liquid accounts, which were then available to them whenever needed for emigration or purposes of everyday living. On the other hand, the Wirtschaftshilfe bureaux and the Jewish Gemeinden and organisations now had at their disposal 'means of advertising' in order to stimulate mutual Jewish economic intercourse. Loans could be granted in the form of shipments of goods from Jewish commercial firms and manufacturers. The extensive orders placed by Jewish institutions were also give, wherever possible, to Jewish suppliers. Jewish sales representatives and agents were furnished with recommendations to Jewish firms. The agricultural teaching farms and artisan crafts training centres bought their supplies from Jewish firms; in turn, they passed on their own produce and products whenever possible to those same concerns for distribution and sale. This is also true in the case of hospitals, schools, and welfare organisations - in short, the entire Jewish 'public' sector. That sector, taken as whole, represented a quite sizeable market in its own right 78 . Since more and more Jews were being turned away or placed at a disadvantage by the German banks, the Jewish credit institutions gained in importance. The already mentioned co-operative banks tripled their deposit accounts and loan volume. The existing mutual insurance firms were also able to show substantial growth 79 . However, the statistical data on the number of insured and the principal of the policies prove, like the data from the Jewish co-operative banks, that in both instances only a fraction of total amount of Jewish insurance or loan credit was represented here. As a consequence of the liquidation of firms, Jewish entrepreneurs apparently were no longer in need of credit. On the contrary, they now had liquid reserves at their disposal or were able for a time to make use of both general and Jewish banks for their needs. In any case, the insurance companies were by no means equipped to take on a substantial proportion of Jewish insurance requirements. An arbitration office was established in the Berlin Wirtschaftshilfe, in which Jews were able to resolve business disputes by working out an arbitrated compromise. In view of the prevailing atmosphere in the German courts, this was a welcome alternative 80 . Orthodox Jews, especially in the Eastern European milieu, had always preferred the traditional religious rabbinical court system internal to the Jewish community; in a revised and secular form, a new version of this ancient judicial custom was now adopted by less religiously observant Jews. Jewish workers, both blue- and white-collar, were even more dependent on the Jewish sector than the self-employed. Even after full employment was reached in the German economy, it was almost impossible for them to be hired by non-Jewish employers because the prerequisite for such employment was formal membership in the DAF. Jewish employers, especially smaller firms, figured out various ways to circumvent these regulations. Even larger enterprises sometimes devised ways to retain at least a portion of their Jewish work force and, in some instances, to treat these workers in exemplary fashion. Also, Jewish solidarity was often manifested in working conditions and personal relations on job, though not in all cases. For example, the owner of the Schocken department store concern assisted Jews in its employ with the preparation and implementation of plans for emigration. Of some 250 Jewish workers in Schocken, 150 had left Germany, together with their families, by October 1935. The owners of the N. Israel department store in Berlin assisted their employees in a similar fashion 81 . There were undoubtedly analogous responses in many other large Jewish-owned firms, but the relatively low percentage of Jews in a work-force numbering in the thousands proves what little importance such still extant firms actually had for the internal Jewish labour market. Even before the take over by the National Socialist, there had been a number of job placement bureaux in the larger Jewish Gemeinden in Germany. These bureaux were federated together in the publicly recognised United Central Organisation for Jewish Job Placement (Vereinigte Zentrale fuer juedische Arbeitsnachweise). Until its forcible dissolution at the end of 1936, this organisation took on an increasingly important role in both job procurement and the channelling of internal Jewish migration. Over the course of the years, it became clearer and clearer that its activity was condemned to failure, an unending labour of Sisyphus: thousands of job seekers faced with a steadily shrinking pool of vacancies. No more than 20 percent of the jobless commercial workers, who made up the bulk of job seekers, were eventually placed. A somewhat higher percentage of success was achieved for female job seekers, especially after the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws. The Jewish jobless were not choosy either: Trained bookkeepers were prepared to work as shop assistants or errand boys, and experienced secretaries hired out as domestics. Young school leavers, more and more of whom wished to learn artisan trades, found fewer and fewer available apprenticeships because Jewish craft trades were also on the decline 82 . References: 67.The worry of the party offices was manifested in the exchange of the district leadership in North Westphalia; SaA Muenster, nos. 10 (1935), 25 (1937). On the true situation of the Jewish representatives, see Israelitisches Familienblatt , 5 March 1936. 68. C.V. Zeitung , 19 December 1936; Israelitisches Familienblatt , 14 November 1935. 69.Sabatzky, in Richarz, vol. 3, p. 293. See also Weil, ibid, p. 271. 70. RV/Arb . 1936, p.103; see also Adler-Rudel, p. 121ff.; Szanto, "Economic Aid," p.208f.; Szanto and Loewenberg, in Richarz, vol.3 , pp.221, 246f. 71.This presentation based on the following: Margalioth, "Tendencies," p.345f.; Szanto, Erinnerungen, p.134; Adler-Rudel, p.124f; C.V.Zeitung , 7 November 1935; RV/Inf., no.12, December 1936, p.127f.; Bauer, p.130f. Likewise, the informations sheets and annual reports of the Reichsvertretung generally, 1934 to 1937. 72. C.V.Zeitung , 23 April 1936. 73.German name: Gesellschaft zur Foerderung wirthschaftlicher Interessen von in Deutschland wohnhaften oder wohnhaft gewesenen Juden m.b.H. See the following: RV/Arb . 1935; RV/Inf ., no.3-4 (1936); YVA, 01/273. 74.Council, 1937, p.7. 75.Margaliot, "Tendencies," p.348f. 76. RV/Arb , 1934-37; see Poppel, Salman Schocken and the Schocken Verlag, YLB 17(1972): 93ff.; M.T.Edelheim-Muehsam, "The Jewish Press in Germany," YLBI 1(1956): 163ff; E. Simon, "Jewish Adult Education IN Germany as Spiritual Resistance," YLBI 1(1956): 68ff. 77."Die juedische Presse als Wirtschaftsspiegel," Israelitisches Familienblatt, 2 April 1937. 78. RV/Arb . 1934, p.59f.; 1936, p.102f.; Adler-Rudel, p.133ff.; Szanto, Erinnerungen , p.137f.; idem, "Economic Aid," p.221f. 79. C.V.Zeitung , 24 April 1936, 11 June 1936, 25 June 1936, 6 August 1936, 7 May 1937 : Juedische Rundschau , 25 June 1937. 80.Juedische Gemeinde Berlin, Vervaltungsbericht fuer das Jahr 1937, p.24. 81.Moses, p.81; H. G. Reissner, "The Histories of 'Kaufhaus' N. Israel' and of Wilfried Israel, " YLBI , 3(1958): 247f. 82. RV/Arb . 1935, p.105f.; RV/Arb. 1936 p.117f.; JWSP , 1937, p.7ff. Back to the top