A. Barkai The Economic Struggle of German Jews Source: A. Barkai, From Boycott to Annihilation, The Economic Struggle of German Jews 1933 - 1943, Hanover & London 1989, pp. 37 - 53, 77 - 92, 106 - 109. Part A, B, C, D, E Part D Along with the organised system of job referral and placement in the Jewish Gemeinden , the internal Jewish labour market expanded perhaps even more via the network of official, often personal connections. One was given employment by friends and relatives and, increasingly, in the business directly owned by one's parents. Appeals were made to the Jewish sense of solidarity in synagogues and on the occasion of other gatherings; such gatherings also served as places to exchange addresses and suggestions on how to go about finding employment. In Breslau, a program of 'sponsorship' was introduced; each sponsor had the task of finding a job for at least one Jewish job seeker 83 . Paradoxically, the Nuremberg Laws functioned to ease the situation in respect to work for women. In the autumn of 1935, there was temporarily even a surplus of vacancies because the law stipulated that it was necessary to dismiss all 'Aryan' domestic servants up to the age of forty-five working in Jewish households. An attempt was made initially to fill the ensuing breach in part by hiring male domestic help. Moreover, efforts were initiated to persuade young Jewish girls of the advantages of such employment. The Jewish Women's League, which had for many years fought for equal rights for working women and access to all vocations, was constrained now to adapt to the new circumstances and organise training courses for domestic help. One could not remain blind to the fact that the exclusion of Jewish working women from many occupations, forcing them into work as domestics, where they could earn a living wage and often support the entire family. Doubtless, it was no easy task for the Jewish proponents of women's rights, compelled by circumstances, to persuade young female school leavers of not only the necessity but also the respectability of traditional female occupations 84 . In the Jewish public, there were reactions in connection with the attempt to employ men as domestic servants, reminiscent of the campaign against 'women with double incomes' during the Depression. Letters appeared in newspapers demanding that, first of all, young girls and women employed in the offices of Jewish organisations should be sent to work as domestics, freeing their jobs to be occupied by older and more experienced male civil servants. Then both sides would be aided in finding their 'natural' place in the economy 85 . In actual fact, locating employment for older workers was a difficult problem to solve. Former commercial employees and civil servants constituted the 'hard core' of the Jewish unemployed. Younger unemployed persons were at least able to complete an agricultural training course or learn a new trade. Moreover, emigration was easier for them. Some of the older job seekers criticised the Jewish organisations, contending they gave preference to younger personnel or those already on pension, mainly in order to economise, since the latter had lower salary expectations. It was argued that decisions should not always be based just on monetary considerations 86 . Early in 1935, the regulation of the compulsory employment booklet was introduced. It affected foreign and stateless Jews in particular. Even Jewish employers were prohibited from offering such people legal employment unless they had an employment booklet, and they were usually denied the issuance of such a document. The closing down of the Jewish employment bureaux on January 1, 1937 had even more dire consequences for all Jewish jobless. This had been ordered in November 1933 87 , but the Reichsvertretung had been able to persuade the German authorities and stay their hand. From then on the Jewish unemployed were dependent on the public employment offices. They had little prospect of being included in the lists there and were often subject to discrimination and abuse. The closing of the Jewish employment offices was only one further step in a continuing process intended to exclude Jews from any active role in the economy. The semi-legal, internal system of job referral and procurement, largely without any written documents, was continued, with steadily decreasing success. In view of the rapidly multiplying tasks it had to grapple with, the Jewish economic sector - and thus the internal Jewish labour market - were able to offer less and less assistance 88 . Vocational Preparation and 'Restructuring' The new employment situation made top priorities of the problems of vocational training for young people leaving school and the possibilities for retraining older workers. As noted above, the beginnings of efforts by Jewish organisations to deal with these challenges can be traced back to the Weimar Republic. Thus, in 1933, without any large-scale preparation, it had proved possible to place some six thousand persons in various collective and individual training programs. Most of these individuals opted for agricultural or other manual occupations for either ideological or practical reasons. After 1933, it soon became more and more difficult to find places for young Jewish apprentices and trainees in the vocational trades. There were few Jewish master artisans in the craft trades, to say nothing of agricultural vocations. Moreover, the non-Jewish members of these middle-class occupations were heavily influenced by anti-Semitic propaganda, and the relevant professional trade associations barred the employment of Jewish apprentices. Although the economy minister had announced in January 1934 that there was no law excluding... non-Aryans from being accepted as artisan apprentices,' 89 the Chamber of Artisan Crafts in Halle, for example, distributed a circular stating that it considered it obvious that the craft trades would not employ Jews as apprentices.' 90 In contrast, there was an untapped reservoir of trainee-ship places in the commercial sector before the displacement process had decimated the number of Jewish shops and commercial firms. The vocational counselling offices found it impossible to close their eyes to these facts. The Jewish press also carried warnings against concentrating too one-sidedly on training opportunities in the craft trades and neglecting training and job opportunities in commerce 91 . An additional factor was the assumption that artisan craft and agricultural qualifications could facilitate obtaining an entry visa, not only for Palestine but for other countries as well, had turned out to be sadly mistaken. There was still unemployment in the developed industrial countries, but countries in the developing world, especially in South America, were particularly interested in attracting experienced commercial and industrial entrepreneurs with large amounts of capital. Under these circumstances, a discussion took place between 1934 and 1936 within the Jewish community about the principles that should govern the orientation of vocational education and retraining. Practical-minded 'realists' warned about abandoning occupations that had stood the test of time over generations and emphasised the importance of language courses. Future-oriented 'ideologues' wished to achieve the so-called productivisation of the Jewish occupational structure and prevent any return to 'intellectual work' after the tendency to exaggerated intellectualisation now finally [appeared] to have been overcome.' 92 There were differences of opinion in the various bodies of the Reichsvertretung, but all were more or less agreed that emigration should in any case be preceded by a solid practical training course in Germany, no matter where the emigrant was headed. Accelerated courses, it was argued, could provide only superficial knowledge and training, and this was not enough as a sound basis for a new existence 93 . This view, whether it was determined by basic considerations or the illusion that there was still sufficient time left for the Jews in Germany, was quite realistic in view of the existing possibilities for emigration. Only members of certain professions or applicants with large amounts of capital were able, after a great deal of wearisome red tape, to obtain immigration visas for countries in Europe or overseas. The certificates for Palestine as well were issued by the British Mandatory government according to a strict annual quota, except for 'capitalists.' Thousands of Jewish young people, who were leaving school each year with or without a diploma, were waiting for some sort of job and further training even if they planned to emigrate at a point in the future - an intention that was by no means shared by all in the early years of the regime. For this reason, the vocational counselling offices attempted initially to utilise the still extant possibilities for an individual apprenticeship or trainee post in the artisan crafts or a commercial shop or office. This was still the most frequent form of vocational training. However, such posts were generally not obtained through the vocational counselling offices of the Gemeinden ; rather, they were obtained in the early period by means of private connections via friends or relatives or through other initiatives of one's own. Organised vocational training in collective courses, often linked with living away from home, was more costly and required a considerable amount of organising. Consequently, it was possible to make it available to only a small segment of youth leaving school and entering the job market 94 . However, the number of individual apprentice and trainee posts also was limited, and the problem of placing school leavers became more and more pressing for Jewish social work and the youth movements. Even the Zionist organisations had no ready answer at first because immigration to Palestine as chalutzim (pioneers) - that is, on the basis of the so-called worker certificates (Category C) - was not possible before the age of eighteen. Moreover, even here there were annual quotas. As early as 1932, Recha Freier, the wife of a Berlin rabbi, had sent a first group of teenagers, ranging in age from fifteen to seventeen, to a children's village in Palestine, where they received agricultural vocational training. This was the beginning of the Youth Aliya 95 , an organisation that was expanded in 1933 and that succeeded over the course of the years in bringing several thousand young people to Palestine. Most of these youngsters were placed for training in kibbutz settlements. However, this type of immigration was available to only a relatively limited number of young people, mainly members of the Zionist youth leagues. It was only a partial solution to the intractable problem of viable options for school leavers. The introduction of a ninth school year in Jewish elementary schools provided a modicum of relief. These schools had experienced a sharp rise in the number of pupils. In addition, a 'pre-training course' in artisan crafts was initiated in schools in Berlin and other large Gemeinden . These courses introduced youngsters to the basic principles of the woodworking and metalworking trades as preparation for a future apprenticeship. Courses in sewing and home economics were set up for female pupils. Such courses also included subjects in general education and Jewish studies because many young people, especially those living in smaller towns and rural areas, had been forced to break off their schooling prematurely. Many of them came to the large cities without their parents and had to be housed and take care of in dormitories. The Youth Aliya operated a school for continuing education in Berlin; it taught mainly Hebrew and Jewish studies, subjects designed to prepare young people waiting for their immigration certificates for their new life in Palestine 96 . For members of the Zionist youth leagues aged fourteen to seventeen, 'Intermediate Hachshara " teaching farms for agricultural training were set up in 1935. This program was incorporated into already existing hachshara centres for adult chalutzim or housed on new training farms that had been purchased or rented for this special purpose 97 . All of these institutions for vocational training and restructuring required a substantial financial and organisational outlay, yet they were able to assist only a small segment of Jewish young people. Between 1934 and 1937, the number of participants fluctuated between twenty-five hundred and five thousand. One third of these were in collective training courses, mainly in hachshara centres; the rest were attending programs in urban teaching centres. The list of institutions supported by the Reichsvertretung at the end of 1936 provides some notion of the impressive scope of the Jewish vocational educational system 98 . The Reichsvertretung spent about RM 1.5 million in 1938 for maintenance of these 139 training centres, a sum amounting to 28 percent of its total annual budget. Yet that covered only a fraction of the total cost for this system of vocational education. A far larger proportion of operating costs for the hachshara centres and other training schools was provided by funding from the Jewish Gemeinden and from parents still able to contribute to the costs of their children's education. Personal maintenance costs alone amounted to RM 42.50 a month per person. This means that for an average of 4,720 trainees in 1937, RM 2.5 million was required, not including staff salaries and operating costs. In actual fact, the budgetary staff in the Reichsvertretung was upset by these high expenditures, demanded steps to economise, and refused to give its approval to an increased number of trainee places for 1938. Nonetheless, that number rose to 5,520: the ever more threatening situation outweighed the objections voiced by the concerned budget planners 99 . Along with such hachshara centres in Germany, a growing number of 'pioneers' obtained training in neighbouring countries. These young people generally lived on private farms, were housed in groups, or met daily after work for Hebrew lessons and social get-togethers. In some countries, special hachshara farms were leased or made available by Jewish owners. The government in Holland provided 140 hectares of land that had been reclaimed in the area of the Zuyder Zee for construction of a 'work village,' in which 150 youngsters from Germany took over construction work and operation 100 . In other countries, it was only possible to place individual young people who were robust enough to withstand the strains and rigors of a hard, long day of labour on a farm. In the Eastern European countries, and in France as well, the police and other authorities created so many problems and bureaucratic hassles for German youngsters that the number placed there was never very large. The activities of hachshara abroad were manifold and diverse. The Jewish organisations in Germany were extremely inventive in their search for new possibilities, and young people were prepared to accept tasks and training involving enormous and unusual physical exertion in order to get out of Germany and make their aliyah to Palestine a reality. Most of these youngsters were still under the age of eighteen and had left their families back in their former homeland, where they were now no longer wanted. Both in the organised Jewish community and among Jewish youth, the attitude manifested here was a far cry from any passive and resigned endurance of the injustice that had befallen them, but objective opportunities were limited. Nonetheless, an estimated nine thousand young Jews were able to leave Germany with the aid of the foreign hachshara program, and most made it to Palestine. When the war broke out, more than one thousand of these youngsters were still living in countries later conquered by Nazi Germany and they shared the fate of the local Jewish population. 101 In addition to agricultural training, the Zionist Hechalutz movement also operated a hachshara program for seamanship in Hamburg. Twenty-five young people had hired on for work on ships still in the possession of Jewish owners. For a time, they even dreamed about having their own hachshara ship, which they wanted to utilise in common to train future deep-sea fishermen and seamen for Palestine. Naturally, these plans came to naught, and the hachshara for seamen remained nothing but a brief episode 102 . In contrast with trends in vocational training for youngsters, there was a distinct decline in the program for occupational training for adults after the first throng of applicants in early 1933. The hope that these measures would enable one to learn an alternative profession in a brief period of time, which could then provide a solid basis for a new existence in Germany or in a country of emigration, proved to be illusory. Even countries granting preference to immigration applications by craft artisans made it known they wanted well-trained craftsmen. Jewish organisations in Germany likewise repeatedly stressed the necessity for a thorough and solid training. A number of earlier applicants had, in the meantime, left the country or found a place in a training program by private means. In any case, not until 1937 was another new vocational training course set up - for workers over the age of thirty-five to learn welding 103 . However, it is likely that older and experienced individuals were able to locate private opportunities for vocational retraining. All kinds of private short courses were advertised in the Jewish press: cosmetics and stenography, sewing and other handicrafts, and especially a variety of foreign language courses. Former teachers or artists, who provided instruction in making jewellery and similar artistic handicrafts, particularly for women, found a source of livelihood in this way within the 'Jewish economic sector.' 104 There are no reliable figures on the magnitude of individual occupational training and retraining. It is probable that its scope exceeded that of the training program organised by the Reichsvertretung and the various Gemeinden , at least in the early period after 1933. Approximately thirty thousand persons had been trained on the various hachshara farms and in the urban-based study programs by the end of 1938. Two thirds of them were under the age of twenty 105 . Within this community of peers and co-religionists, these young people also found a sense of security and a certain shield protecting them from the abuse and threats they were otherwise exposed to. The Reichsvertretung and the Gemeinden , like the youth leagues and educators, regarded work with youth as the task deserving highest priority on the Jewish agenda. In organised emigration as well, there was heightened emphasis on helping the young to emigrate. Whatever the future might have in store for older individuals, Jewish youth in Germany had no future prospects - that was a view shared by almost all. For this reason, the largest expenditures were made and the best persons recruited within the program of occupational training and education. What does the success of these programs look like in statistical terms? According to the census of June 1933, there were 62,000 Jewish young people between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five in Germany at that time. Of the 54,800 children ranging in age from six to fourteen, approximately 20,000 had finished schooling by the end of 1938 106 . Thus, the age groups eligible for all types of hachshara and vocational training over the six years from 1933 to 1938 totalled approximately eighty thousand youngsters. Of these, it proved possible to place just under 40 percent in training programs, at least for a short period of time. If one subtracts the figure of approximately nine thousand young people in hachshara abroad (who had, in most instances, emigrated from Germany in the two years preceding the outbreak of war), we find that an average of only thirty-five to thirty-eight hundred youngsters could be placed annually on the various hachshara training farms and in the other training courses in Germany itself. The record year was 1938, with a figure of fifty-five hundred trainees. At that time, there were still nearly forty thousand Jewish young people between the ages of fourteen and twenty-five living in Germany, so the system of occupational training was able to reach only some 15 percent of this group on an annual basis 107. References: 83 . Israelitisches Familienblatt , 23 April 1936. 84. Kaplan, p.182ff.; RV/Arb . 1935, p. 108f.; RV/Arb . 1936, p.121f.; C.V.Zeitung , 10 October 1935, 23 April 1936; Israelitisches Familienblatt , 9 January 1936. 85. C.V.Zeitung, 5 December 1935, 19 December 1935. 86. Juedische Rundschau , 26 May 1936; Israelitisches Familienblatt , 9 January 1936. 87. Walk II/42. 88. JWSP, 1937, p. Iff. 89. Walk I/323; see also RV/Inf ., 2 September 1934. 90. Walk, I/473. 91. Adler-Rudel, p. 50; RV/Arb. 1934/II, p. 61; CV Zeitung , 5 July 1934, 19 July 1934. 92. Israelitisches Familienblatt , 3 December 1936, 17 June 1937; CV Zeitung , 8 October 1936, 17 December 1936. 93. RV/Inf, no. 1-2 (Jan-Feb) 1936. 94. Adler-Rudel, p. 147f. 95. Aliya, Hebrew for ascent, is the Zionist term for immigration to the land of Israel. 96. Szanto and Loewenberg, in Richarz, vol. 3, pp. 224f, 249f,; Szanto, Erinnerungen, p. 157f; Juedische Rundschau, 20 September 1935. 97. RV/Arb. 1935, p. 142f; 1936, p. 144f. 98. RV/Richtlinien fuer die Berufsausbildung (ab. 1.1.1937 gueltig), p. 13f. 99. RV/Arb. 1937, Finanzbericht (Anlage ), pp. 37, 91; RV/Arb. 1938, p. 37. 100. G. van Tijn, "Werkdrop Nieuwesluis," YLBI, 14 (1969): 182-199. 101. N. Bentwich, They Found Refuge (London 1956), p. 91; quoted in Adler-Rudel, p. 71. 102. Richarz, vol. 3, p. 250 (Loewenberg); Juedische Rundschau , 20 July 1937. 103. Wollheim (transcription), p. 2; RV/Arb. 1935, p. 124f; RV/Arb. 1936, p. 146f; RV/Arb. 1937, p. 87f; Szanto, Erinnerungen, p. 155f. 104. RV/Inf. 1936, nos. 10-11, 12; RV/Inf, 1937, no 1-2; Israelitisches Familienblatt, 27 February 1936; 1 April 1937. 105. Calculated according to RV/Inf. 1938, no. 5-6; Adler Rudel, p.48. 106. DR/Stat. 451/5, p. 17. 107. Phiebig 1938, p.138; RV/Arb. 1938, p.37. Part E Consequently, the functionaries and social workers of the Reichsvertretung responsible for occupational training were dissatisfied with the level of success of their work. Georg Josephtal, director of the relevant department within the Reichsvertretung and later labour minister in Israel, noted with alarm that at the end of 1937, based on similar calculations, only some 10 percent of Jewish youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five were being trained in such programs. This was far too low a percentage to provide a solution to the problems of unemployment among Jewish youth. To be sure, the Jewish community in Germany [could] not deal totally with occupation training' but had to make all possible efforts for occupational training for school leavers.' It must be the aim of the Jewish community in Germany to help direct all school leavers, insofar as possible, toward useful vocations.... A new social stratum, the children of the socially and culturally advanced middle class, must be included in efforts aimed at productivisation.' Along with the objective prerequisites, 'subjective [preconditions] in public opinion' would have to be created in particular 108 . Most of the young people reached by the system of vocational education were members of the Zionist youth movement. The small group of non-Zionist trainees, in Gross-Breesen and the rural communal farm Neuendorf, also came mainly from the assimilationist youth movement and had formulated the goal of establishing a communitarian agricultural 'settlement,' influenced by romantic agrarian ideologies. A Jewish settlement had been established in Gross-Glasgow near Kottbus in 1930. Twenty to twenty-five Jewish families settled there as small farmers until the settlement had to be disbanded in 1935 109 . Not until 1936 was an expressly non-Zionist agricultural training farm with the objective of a common settlement overseas set up in Gross-Breesen, near Breslau. Both the 'conscious affirmation of Jewish tradition' and an 'avowed attachment to German cultural life' were fostered there. These were intended to shape and determine the behaviour of the young trainees beyond the period of training Gross-Breesen in the new country of settlement as well.' 110 In all these cases, only a fraction of organised Jewish youth was included in this vocational training program; the great mass of young people were left to fend on their own. Undoubtedly, financial difficulties also played a role in this connection: applicants on occasion had to be turned away because of a lack of subsidies for operating expenses, even though the youth leagues normally accepted their own members in their hachshara centres even without payment of any fees to defray costs. Thus, it was often specifically those young persons from small, rural communities, who had had no earlier ties with the youth leagues, who found they had no opportunity to escape their hostile surroundings 111 . Viewed from the vantage of today, it appears that the organised system of vocational training was of principal benefit to those young people emigrating to Palestine. According to the sources, nearly 80 percent of Jewish youth trained in the state of Hesse between 1933 and 1936 reached Palestine. For the most part, they were absorbed there in agricultural settlements, mainly in kibbutzim 112 . A similar situation probably prevailed in other regions of Germany. In contrast, all of the projects for collective emigration and settlement in other countries failed. For those who completed the training program in Gross-Breesen, we have the results of a survey conducted after the end of the war. These results indicate that only a small proportion of them were able to put the agricultural occupation they had learned to practical use in order to build a new life for themselves outside Germany 113 . The Creeping Displacement from Economic Life - a Balance Sheet The community of 350,000 to 365,000 Jews still living in Germany at the end of 1937 differed distinctly in its demographic composition from German Jewry on the eve of the Nazi advent to power in 1933. Even then, the Jews had been a group characterised by declining numbers and a rapid process of over-ageing. Now, only six years later, these demographic features were far more pronounced. The Jews had also suffered a massive loss in economic power. As a group, they still had quite substantial assets at their disposal, yet many individuals had already been reduced to living off their last savings. The press carried almost daily reports on bankruptcies and business closures, particularly in the provinces. It was almost impossible to obtain credit. German banks no longer issued loans to Jews and foreclosed on their mortgages. The Jewish banks still in existence did not have sufficient funds to replace the credit that had been withdrawn 146 . Nonetheless, the Jewish community had not yet abandoned all hope: Individuals tried by all available means to retain their factories, stores, or jobs. If unsuccessful, they attempted to learn a new profession. The amounts of income tax paid by Jews had declined in some cities by 20 to 40 percent; nonetheless, in 1937, Jews still paid out nearly RM 80 million in taxes. This sum, however, included the substantial taxes levied on proceeds from liquidations 147 . The economic measures that were feared in the wake of the Nuremberg Laws had not materialised, but administrative practices directed against Jews intensified from month to month. Jews were still legally permitted to practice virtually all commercial occupations. Yet in administrative practice in many localities, they were even denied permits as itinerant peddlers, though this had no basis in law. They were also beleaguered by a crisis in housing: those who were no longer able to afford large, expensive apartments were hard put to find alternative suitable housing. The want ads in Jewish newspapers are wrenching testimony to the harrowing situation: They are replete with inquiries for small apartments, furnished rooms, shared apartments with a common kitchen, and room and board for elderly, isolated individuals. There were even a few offers of corresponding vacancies, a further source of income for some in the Jewish economic sector 148 . In the Jewish press and the mimeographed annual reports of the Reichsvertretung, apprehensions about the future were formulated hesitantly, with great reserve. Perhaps the intended wish was to avoid discouraging people. Or maybe another fear played a certain role: that one might be accused of spreading 'atrocity propaganda' if one protested too vehemently against the harrassments by the German authorities. Nonetheless, perceptive observers, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, could read the unambiguous signs of the times. In October 1935, the Westdeutscher Beobachter published a 'Warning to the Excessively Enterprising' subtitled 'Jews Want to Sell.' The paper had learned that for a number of weeks, non-Aryans had been looking for buyers for retail stores, wholesale firms and, in a few isolated instances, for factories, houses and real estate property.' In particular, a large number of non-Aryan business and factory owners in small and medium-sized towns [were attempting] to sell their firms to Aryans.' Since these wishes had not been fulfilled, due to lack of qualified buyers with sufficient capital,' the hope was expressed that the responsible authorities [were] already dealing with this problem.' For the time being, the 'Aryan' buyer was advised to make sure to acquire the entire inventory when making a purchase. In this way, the Jewish owner would be prevented from selling off his inventory at throw-away prices in a liquidation sale.' 149 What is stated here in veiled language is expressed more openly in the files of the DEAs. Those files noted that Jewish sellers had been forced by all imaginable pressure tactics to sell off the remainder of their inventory stock at piddlingly ridiculous prices. For the lucky buyers, this proved to be a welcome extra profit bonus; for the rest of the retail trade, it functioned as a protective measure against price-gouging competition. Thus, everyone got what they wanted. Everyone, that is, except the Jews. In December 1935, the southern German correspondent of the Austrian paper Reichspost - which sympathised with the Nazis but was at that time not yet subject to the restrictions of Goebbels's Sprachregelung (centrally regulated information policy) - sketched with undisguised satisfaction a knowledgeable picture of the situation faced by Jews active in economic life. He first offered a description of the growing number of 'Aryanizations,' the possibilities for emigration, and the activity of the Haavara, which had been responsible for an increase in exports, 'sadly enough, specifically to Palestine.' The journalist then went on to note that ... among Jews, [it was] likewise not everyone's wish to settle in Palestine. Thus, the question takes on enhanced importance: what is to be done then with the remaining German Jews, whose thread of existence has already been served? ... Most recently, the pressure to emigrate has also become acute for many Jews active in economic life. However, the Jewish merchants in small and medium-size provincial towns have, for some time now, been fighting a difficult battle. In these towns, the weapon of the boycott can be utilised far better than in a place like Berlin, for example. The consequence is that there is now a massive sell-off of Jewish retail shops.... There are reports.... from certain areas... that an average of 40 to 50 percent of all Jewish businesses have already been transferred to Aryan ownership. Along with this, there are many small towns in which the last residues of Jewish business activity have already been liquidated. This is also the reason for the fact that various small Gemeinden are offering their synagogues for sale. Only recently, a farmer in Franconia was able to purchase such a building for the price of 700 marks - for the purpose of storing grain. ... The material side of the problem on the Aryan side would probably be well on the way to solution by the establishment of a special Auffangorganisation , whose purpose would be to permit capable Aryan qualified buyers lacking the proper amount of capital to purchase lJewish enterprises. ... However, there is no answer to the question about what to do with Jews who are forced to sell their businesses far below true market value, and for whom any further economic activity is extremely difficult. ... In recent days, the plan has appeared of an international Jewish transfer bank. ... Should this plan be realised with the assistance of international Jewish high finance, those many thousands of Jews who today are... consuming the last remaining residue of their assets would be given a chance to leave Germany - before they have been reduced to total poverty.' 150 Jewish observers outside Germany viewed these events with alarm - and probably with greater clarity than the German Jews and their leadership inside the Reich because they enjoyed the vantage of distance from the scene and an uncensored foreign press. The European representative of the 'Joint,' Bernhard Kahn, reported at the end of 1935 about a massive sell-off of Jewish businesses at farcical prices and the deepening pauperisation of German Jews. According to Kahn's estimate, more than a quarter of German Jews were already destitute and in need of welfare 151 . At the end of 1936, Jakob Lestschinsky, writing from Paris, also viewed the situation with great consternation: Some 20 to 22 percent of the Jewish population today is already more or less dependent on welfare. 20 to 25 percent are living on their last savings. People have liquidated or transferred their businesses, and received a bit of money in return: a few isolated individuals got millions, a few dozen were handed hundreds of thousands - and tens of thousands received nothing but a paltry thousand marks. Now this last scrap of savings is being eaten up. Whoever has children and was somehow able to manage has sent them abroad. His hope now is to receive some good news. And that redeeming message is requesting him to come to the new homeland. The homeland for children. Whoever is childless sits and counts his coins. And prays to heaven that his years will not outlast, God forbid, his handful of marks. Earning a living - and maybe in some cases a quite decent one - that's something only 10 to 15 percent of the Jewish population, at the most, are able to do. The rest have just enough to scrimp by on. But all ... sense that it is definite now: their fate has been severed from that of the Germans. And is henceforth bound up with another country - of which they only dare to dream. All their thoughts and feelings, all their hopes and longings are fixed on one consuming idea: emigration! So what then is happening: is this the liquidation of German Jewry?!' 152 Letschinsky had lived in Germany for many years before 1932 and was regarded as one of the most knowledgeable observers of the economic developments among German Jewry. The study cited here also demonstrates a very detailed knowledge of the situation in Germany at the time and has been confirmed by later research. Yet at the end of 1936, even Letschinsky did not want to think it possible (and hoped against hope he was wrong) that German Jewry, after nearly two thousand years of Jewish life in that land, was nearing the endpoint of its history. This is most probably why he added a question mark after the exclamation point at the end of the above-cited passage. One year later, he would have left out that question mark. By the end of 1937, even the optimistic observer had to admit that economically, at the very least, German Jewry was facing final destruction. Yet the most discerning and clear-sighted were unable to foresee the swiftness with which this process would come to its calamitous conclusion. References: 108. JWSP, 1938, p. 7. 109. Szanto, in Richarz, Vol. 3, p. 226f.; see also Barkai, "Weimar", p. 336. 110. See Angress, Juedische Jugend, especially p. 55ff. 111. Szanto, in Richarz, vol. 3, p. 225ff; JWSP, 1937, p. 137f. 112. JWSP, 1937, p. 55. The Creeping Displacement from Economic Life - a Balance Sheet 146. RV/Arb. 1937, p. 66f.; ALBI/Jm, Adler-Rudel Collection, G/16, p. 5; Israelitisches Familienblatt , 2 April 1936, 29 October 1936. 147. Joint 1937; Budget, Reichsvertretung, 1938; RV/Arb. 1936, p. 101. 148. Walk, II/138; 374; ALBI/Jm, Adler-Rudel Collection, G/6, p. 2f. 149. Westdeutscher Beobachter , 30 October 1935. 150. Reichspost , Vienna, 1 December 1935. 151. Quoted in Bauer, p. 136f. 152. Lestschinsky, Zusammenbruch , p. 31. Back to the top