A. Margaliot Jewish Reactions to the Nuremberg Laws Source: A. Margaliot, “The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to the Nuremberg Laws”, Yad Vashem Studies , Vol. 12, pp. 75 - 107. Part A, B, C In promulgating the Nuremberg laws on September 15, 1935, the National socialist Government's purpose was to implement its decision to deprive the Jews of their status as citizens of the State and to separate them irrevocably, both politically and racially, from the German population. German Jewry's reaction to this illustrates the trends, which guided its organisations and institutions in contending with government hostility. It also indicates the extent to which the total erosion of Emancipation had, by the autumn of 1935, become the pivot of German Jewry's thinking and action. The Non-Zionist Camp . The largest organisation in this category was "The Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith" (Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens - C.V.), which had been founded in 1893. Its members aspired to integration of Jews in German society, but strongly opposed relinquishing their religion. They fought against any attempt to prejudice the Jews' rights while reiterating their loyalty to the fatherland, Germany. When anti-Semitic persecution began, the leaders of the Central-Verein co-operated with the Zionist organisations in order to forge German Jewish unity. Anti-Zionist organisations such as The Union of Jewish Front Veterans ( Reichsbund Juedischer Frontsoldaten - RjF) were also prominent. A special position was held by Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden , which was headed by bankers and industrialists who had declared themselves to be neutral, and within whose administration the Zionists had no influence. This organisation dealt with the procedure of emigration except for that to Palestine, for which the Palestine Office in Berlin was responsible. This distribution of tasks had been agreed on by the two institutions. The Nuremberg Laws constituted a severe blow for these groups, which had grown accustomed to considering Emancipation as the basis for their existence. It is nevertheless extremely difficult to discover their reaction to what was happening. Some weeks previously, at the order of the authorities, the publication of their organ, C.V Zeitung (CV Z.) had been temporarily suspended and in the spring of that year Gestapo surveillance of their spokesmen had been intensified. Some of them had been deprived of the right to speak in public as a penalty for encouraging their co-religionists to remain in Germany rather than urging them to emigrate. We do not have any evidence to indicate whether the leaders of the Central Association (CV) met in September in order to define its stand concerning the new laws. Eleven days later, however, its organ began to appear again, and the first issue after a break of two months contained a leading article on the subject of the Nuremberg Laws. The article stated: 'Not only are we taking leave of the [Jewish] year, which has come to an end, but also of an epoch in history, which is now drawing to its close.' 1 Rather than attacking the government, the author criticised the Zionists, who he claimed had welcomed the laws with a sense of triumph. He advised the Zionists to bewail the fact that their gloomy prophecies had been fulfilled; it would have been better for them had they said: 'Woe to us for we have been victorious.' 2 The impression one gains is that the Central-Verein preferred to encourage its members to stay put rather than urging them to leave the country. However, it was obliged to proceed with caution and to avoid a head-on collision with the authorities. Consequently, a decision was made to publish verbatim pronouncements made by the Heads of State, and at the beginning of December 1935 a series of statements, some of which will be cited below, appeared in the Union's organ. Special emphasis was given to the pronouncement made by the Minister of the Interior, Frick, in the "Organ of German Jurists”, to the effect that: 'The Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of the Race and the regulations concerning their implementation are not intended to harm the members of the Jewish race on the grounds of racial origin. The Jews will not be deprived of the possibility of living in Germany.' Ministerialrat Loesener asserted that the Nuremberg Laws were intended 'to constitute a beginning to the tranquillisation of relations between the German and Jewish peoples. As an outcome of the new reality, in which the Jewish sphere will henceforth be separated from the German one, a tolerable co-existence will be possible between the two nations within the same political area.' Loesener added that: 'For the Jews in Germany this separation means that they will be legally protected, since in future they will live within the German territory in the region designated for them by the State.' Moreover, passages were cited from the speech made by Dr. Hans Frank at the Academy of German Law: 'The publication of the Nuremberg Laws brings to an end, for the moment, the process of revolutionary development in Germany. I would just like to emphasise the fact that the Jews will be able to remain and to function unhindered as a Jewish body. We will, however, prevent any association with that race, which is racially alien to us.' 3 It would seem that the members of the Central Association (CV) attempted to give prominence to statements made by the German leaders which emphasised the possibility of continued Jewish existence within the Third Reich. There are no data to indicate the reaction of the Union of Jewish Front Veterans (RjF), which was a fervently patriotic body; its leaders appear to have opted for silence. They had waged their principal battle against having their rights revoked in the spring of 1935, when they had done their utmost to be allowed to serve in the newly-emerging German army. When these efforts failed they seem to have despaired of being able to maintain the remnants of their rights, which dated from the era of the Emancipation. In their journal, Der Schild , issue of September 1935 4 , they preferred to preserve silence rather than expressing their pain at the government's decisions, which cut them to the quick. In internal discussions, however, they did not remain silent. This is proved by the Report of the Association of Hamburg Communities, according to which the representatives of the non-Zionists spoke their minds plainly. In a discussion held in the Community's Council 5 on September 24, 1935, the "National Representation of Jews in Germany" ( Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden ) was attacked for asserting that under the prevailing circumstances emigration could serve as a solution to the problem. It was claimed, in opposition to this, that a large section of Jewish youth had decided to fight for its position in Germany, refusing to be deflected from this path. Statements like these addressed to a closed meeting, reflected the mood of extremist patriotic and assimilationist groups, such as the RjF. and others like it, which could not express their views openly. Although the non-Zionist organisations continued to believe in the ideals they had always held, they did not ignore the fact that the exigencies of the situation required them to find ways of emigrating and transferring their property abroad. This meant that their desire to be integrated within German society related to the long term, while for the present, given the prevailing circumstances, they preferred to adopt a pragmatic approach. Evidence of this ambivalent attitude is provided by the records of the Regensburg Community (kehilla): 'The Jews of Germany are firmly bound to their fatherland and desire to remain there, knowing that the fate of the country is one with their own. This is not possible, however, in the present circumstances, and it is therefore necessary to emigrate. It is the duty of the Hilfsverein to prepare the way for emigration of this nature, and to extend assistance to those who make the difficdecision to leave their fatherland and establish their home anew outside the borders of Germany.' 6 The Organisation wanted to direct this movement to countries abroad, but not to Palestine, as is evinced by their lack of enthusiasm for the Zionist effort even when it became necessary to take up the wanderer's staff. In this context a closer examination of the activities and methods of the Hilfsverein is indicated. For a long time previously, it had helped Jews to emigrate from Germany but at the same time it considered it its duty to discourage applicants from taking this step if their future abroad was not guaranteed. With the Nuremberg Laws this approach seems to have altered, though it did not disappear entirely. The Hilfsverein's Report 7 notes that in the wake of the events of September 1935 the number of applicants for emigration increased considerably. In Berlin alone the number had reached 4,000 persons per month 8 . The situation called for the expansion of facilities and an increased search for solutions. The Hilfsverein tried to meet the requirements of the hour, but the concept of rescue, involving the hasty departure from Germany of large numbers of Jews, was alien to its leaders. Its members continued their efforts to guarantee that candidates for emigration were thoroughly prepared beforehand, in order to assure their future absorption abroad. Courses in English, Portuguese and Spanish were introduced for these people and lectures were held on the conditions, climate, economy, etc. of the new countries 9 . Their basic approach can be gathered from the publication of an extensively detailed news-sheet covering dozens of countries, and outlining the immigration laws in each one as well as rights of permanent or temporary residence, conditions for obtaining work-permits and employment, wage-levels, living conditions, citizenship laws, the problems of agricultural settlement, social and cultural aspects and other useful information. Four hundred agents throughout the world participated in gathering this information, sending detailed reports to Berlin. The material was presented in Korrespondenzblatt ueber Auswanderungs- und Siedlungswesen , which was distributed in thousands of copies. During this period the Hilfsverein stressed the need to direct emigrants to countries across the sea and not to the European countries, where the chances of absorption seemed limited 10 . For this purpose close co-operation was maintained with such organisations as HICEM, the Joint, JCA and other bodies in the Jewish world which provided aid. The solutions available for those interested in emigrating were nevertheless inadequate, and the heads of the Hilfsverein felt themselves obliged to devote much of the September 1935 issue, in which the Nuremberg Laws were published, to an elucidation of the various difficulties holding up the entry of emigrants to many countries. 11 The Ministry of Finance, drawing up a far-reaching plan of action for emigration and salvaging property. His connections with Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, and with German financial leaders stood him in good stead. Warburg was highly regarded by German Jewry as well as by Jewish leaders in Western Europe and the U.S. He maintained close contact with his brother, Felix Warburg, a prominent banker in the United States, who served as president of the Joint, as well as with Lionel Rothschild, who conveyed his opinions at the meetings of Anglo-Jewish Organizations 12 . Warburg's association with these groups gave added authority to his suggestions on financing emigration. Simon Marks was convinced that as a result of Max Warburg's actions the German authorities gave the topics discussed with him more serious attention than ever before 13 . This is illustrated by the internal correspondence between the various ministries. The language used by the Ministry of Finance in reporting to the Foreign Minister about the discussions held with Warburg clearly reflects an attitude of respect towards the man and his suggestions 14 . The author of the report even promises to inform the Minister of the Interior, the Foreign Minister and even the Fuehrer's Deputy, Rudolf Hess, about further negotiations 15 . It is hardly surprising that the authorities followed the efforts of the leader of the Hilfsverein closely, since they anticipated not only an increase in the emigration of Jews from Germany but also a growth in exports, and the concomitant influx of foreign currency from world Jewry 16 . In accordance with Warburg's suggestion, an international financial organisation, the Liquidation Bank, was to be established, serving as the trustee for Jewish property in Germany, dealing with the sale of Jewish property and arranging for the proceeds to be transferred to the emigrants abroad 17 . The new institution was to be funded from abroad, particularly by West European and American Jewry 18 . The transfer of assets abroad was to be effected through a world-wide distribution of German-made products 19 . It was taken for granted that the Liquidation Bank planned to act with the full co-operation of the international guarantors of its operating capital as well as with that of the German Government. Despite the fact that every effort was made to ensure that the details of the negotiations with the authorities should remain secret 20 , Warburg was not acting on his own. The members of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) 21 had participated in the discussions with government representatives and the leaders of Anglo-Jewry also knew of the matter 22 . When the details of the plan became known to the leaders of American Jewry they most adamantly opposed any action which would further export of German goods and flatly refused to allocate funds for the establishment of the Liquidation Bank 23 . Influenced by this negative reaction, the Anglo-Jewish leaders retracted their support for Warburg's project and the matter was shelved. But the members of the Hilfsverein did not despair, and even developed a sense of mission, feeling that it was incumbent upon the Jews to contribute to the technological and economic advance of the Latin American countries. They claimed that Brazil, Chile, Peru and even Argentina were in great need of first-rate professionals who could improve production systems and bring about the more efficient utilisation of these countries' abundant natural resources. 'Here German Jews will find a challenge far greater than simply supporting themselves; here they can play a historic role by helping to industrialise an area which is one of the world's richest in raw materials.' 24. However, while presenting this new awareness of commitment to a distant continent they were anxious to safeguard their attachment to Germany, the land, the nation and the culture. 'It is no unusual occurrence,' Max Warburg said, 'to find that a Jew has taken a bag of German soil with him as a remembrance of his fatherland.' 25 The individuals link persisted even though he was forced to leave Germany. In the light of the events of September 1935, the leaders of the Hilfsverein became increasingly aware of the fact that the emigrants' Jewish consciousness should be intensified, and that their own role did not end with providing material support, giving advice, assisting in technical arrangements and arranging for professional and linguistic training. Thus the Hilfsverein encouraged the emigrants to preserve their attachment to Jewish traditions and attempted to ensure that a rabbi, a cantor and a ritual slaughterer accompanied each of their groups 26 . It endeavoured to prevent the dispersion of the stream of emigration, as far as this was possible, with the object of preventing the emigrants' assimilation within their new environment. For the same reason it was interested in directing the emigrants to places located near Jewish centres 27 . The organisation also caned upon the emigrants to display a spirit of friendship and co-operation towards these communities and to participate in their institutions. These efforts reflected the Association's desire to give a Jewish character to the stof emigration. Thus the non-Zionist organisations adhered simultaneously to various conflicting principles; they cultivated their sense of German identity while at the same time reinforcing the Jewish element in their activities. On the one hand, they encouraged their members to remain in Germany, while on the other, they took initiatives to enable those who wished to do so to leave the country and put down new roots abroad. They also developed a sense of mission, contending that the emigrants had an historic task to fulfil in helping underdeveloped countries to advance. There can be no doubt that the multiplicity of approaches and confusion of slogans did not help them to find their way, once their world had crumbled as a result of the annulment of the laws of emancipation. References: 1 Central-Verein Zeitung , 26.9.1935 (hereafter ¯ C.V.-Z.). 2 Ibid. 3 C.V.-Z., 5.12.1935. 4 Der Schild , 20.9.1935. 5 Files of the Hamburg Jewish Community, September 24, 1935, Vol. 22, Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem, AHW/297. 6 Files of the Regensburg Jewish Community, not dated (1935?), Ibi., A/176 (253). 7 Die Arbeit des Hilfsvereins der Juden in Deutschland 1934¯1935, Berlin, 1936, pp. 6¯8 (hereafter ¯ Hilfsverein). 8 Hilfsverein 1935¯1936, p. 13. 9 Ibid. , p. 20. 10 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 18. 11 Korrespondenzblat ueber Ausswanderungs- und Siedlungswesen, Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland, Berlin, September 1935, (hereafter - Korrespondenzblatt). 12 See Martin Rosenblueth to Georg Landauer, November 19, 1935; Leo Hermann to Rosenblueth, December 11, 1935, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter ¯ CZA), S 25/9810. See also the report of February 13, 1936 of the “Central British Fund for German Jewry”, London (hereafter ¯ CBFA). 13 Simon Marks, the British Zionist leader, headed the activities on behalf of German Jews. See his letter to Chaim Weizmann, December 31, 1935, S 25/9810. 14 See the report of the German Ministry of Finance of February 18, 1936, to be found in the collection of documents of the German Foreign Office (hereafter ¯ GFOC), AA Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland, Inland II, A 13, Vol. 1, 1930¯1937, photocopies in Yad Vashem Archives (hereafter ¯ YVA) JM/3138. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Werner Senator to Rosenblueth, November 5, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810. 18 Rosenblueth to Landauer, November 13 and Landauer to Rosenblueth, December 24, 1935. See also the appendix of J. L. Cohen, CZA, S 25/9810. 19 Marks to Weizmann, December 31, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810. 20 Rosenblueth to Landauer, December 23, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810. 21 Landauer to Senator, December 31, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810. 22 Rosenblueth to Landauer, November 19, 1935; and compare Rosenblueth to Adler-Rudel, September 6, 1935, CZA, S 25/9810. 23 Herbert Samuel's report about his visit to America as the head of a delegation of British Jewish leaders, December 13, 1936, CBFA, London. See also another report, seemingly of J. L. Cohen CZA, S 25/9810. 24 Korrespondenzblatt , September 1936, p. 10. 25 Hilfsverein 1936, p. 5. 26 See conversation between the author and Arthur Prinz, one of the senior officials of the Hilfsverein , November 22, 1967. 27 Korrespondenzblatt , September 1936, p. 6. Part B The Zionist Camp As far as the Zionists were concerned the Nuremberg Laws did not constitute a sudden blow, since its leaders had predicted a development of this kind long before. The platform which had been published at the beginning of the period of persecution , and which was published with minor alterations as "The Four-Point Plan," was appropriate to a situation of this nature, which they had foreseen as being inevitable sooner or later. 28 There were three main groups within the Zionist camp; the largest was "The German Zionist Federation" ( Zionistische Vereinigung fuer Deutschland - Z.V.f.D.), which comprised several trends, including the General Zionists (both A and B), the Labour Movement and Mizrachi . The opposition consisted of the Revisionists, who were united as "The Organisation of State Zionists" ( Staatszionistische Organisation ). The third group was the He-Halutz Movement, which maintained an independent framework and stand in spite of its close co-operation with the Z.V.f.D. Zionists of various groups did not hesitate to react publicly to the Nuremberg Laws. In fact, shortly after their publication, the Zionist organisations expressed their opinion in a series of articles in their organ Juedische Rundschau 29 , with passages from Adolf Hitler's speech in the Reichstag, as quoted in the introduction to the new laws. 'The German Government is guided by the thought that it might still be possible to find a separate, secular solution for building a basis upon which the German nation can adopt a better attitude towards the Jews.' 30 At roughly the same time an item of information was issued by the official German Press Agency ( Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero - D.N.B.), stating that Hitler had expressed his opposition to arbitrary acts of violence ( Einzelaktionen ), adding that the Nuremberg Laws made it possible for an independent national existence to be developed by the Jews in all spheres. The Zionist organ also quoted in full the interpretation given by A.I. Brandt, the director of the German Press Agency, stating, amongst other things, that: 'In the wake of the new laws... a defined situation has been created after years of conflict between Germans and Jews. This makes it palpably evident that the German nation has no objection to the Jews, provided they do not aspire to being anything more than Jews, and behave accordingly. On the other hand, however, the German nation refuses to regard the members of the Jewish nation as German citizens like themselves and to grant them the same rights and duties which devolve upon Germans.' 31 In the author's opinion, the sole purpose of the Nuremberg Laws was to declare the Jews a national minority: 'As a result of the new laws the Jewish minority will gain independent cultural life, a national life of its own... the German nation is convinced that the passing of these laws is both beneficial and regenerative for Judaism as well. By giving the Jewish minority an opportunity to lead its own life and assuring governmental support for this independent existence, Germany is helping Judaism to strengthen its national character and is making a contribution towards improved relations between the two peoples.' 32 The Juedische Rundschau published special editorials on this topic as well as citing passages from official sources concerning the government's intentions. 33 In the opinion of the Zionist leaders the Nuremberg Laws did not simply mark the close of an important chapter in the history of German Jewry, but also obliged them to institute a process of serious self-examination and to alter their way of life. Assimilation had taken its toll and the increase in the rate of intermarriage was threatening the future, but the blow, which the new laws represented, was to put an end to these phenomena. If the Jews were to maintain the partition between themselves and their environment it was to be hoped that, under the State's auspices, they could pursue an independent existence of their own on German soil. In this context it was noted that the law even allowed them to fly their national flag without hindrance. The Four-Point Plan of the Z.V.f.D. leaders defined the conditions, which they considered to be sine qua non . 34 The Jews had to be guaranteed: a. their material existence and the prevention of any damage to their honour b. the preservation of their heritage and the development of Jewish life c. education and vocational training d. regulated emigration during the coming years. The major stress was laid upon the development of autonomous Jewish life, namely, filling daily life with Jewish content, while at the same time creating the organisational tools needed for supplying material requirements. The Zionist leaders demanded that the educational system for Jewish children be expanded and that the activities of the existing sports association, theatre groups and orchestra be intensified. The institutions, which had been set up during the period of persecution, as well as the long-established network of community services, would be the tools for carrying out this task. In short, the leaders wanted to exploit the fact that Jews were being excluded from surrounding society to enhance Jewish creativity and strengthen their inner unity. This they regarded as the major challenge of their time. Thus far we have discussed in brief the initial reactions of the Zionist Federation to the Nuremberg Laws during the first few weeks after their publication. Although the attitude of the He-Halutz Centre was not substantially different from that of the leaders of the Z.V.f.D., it did not coincide with it on all points. The members of He-Halutz did not usually trouble over much about questions connected with institutions and internal arrangements of the community. 'Our purpose is education towards Zionist fulfilment and we do not concern ourselves with offices taking care of the affairs of the public as a whole, was written in a letter sent by one of its active members at that time. 35 Their attention was concentrated on preparing the youth, in ideological and practical terms, for immigration to Palestine. They made no attempt to solve the problems of the entire community, with its differing age groups and social strata, nor did they seek top positions in the community's central institutions or organisations. The Nuremberg Laws engendered a change in this line of thinking. The first report issued by the He-Halutz Centre after the publication of the laws contained an extensive analysis of the internal situation of German Jewry, culminating in a demand for immediate changes in the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) and the other public bodies 36 . The author of the review accused the assimilationists of gaining control of the community's institutions and of being insensitive to current trends. He also claimed that they had deliberately countered every attempt at reform, which could create an autonomous network of existence within Germany and encourage "constructive emigration." 37 In his view, it was essential that the number of Zionist representatives in the central organizations be increased. At the same time, the He-Hal Centre in Berlin decided that one of its senior members, Georg Josephtal, should be instructed to participate in the National Representation (Reichsvertretng) . All those involved agreed to increase the number of Zionists in the presidium of the Representation 38 . The twenty-five year old Josephtal brought a breath of new life into the ranks of elderly and respectable dignitaries. The He-Halutz Centre simultaneously demanded that a proposal for the settlement of the Jewish question be submitted to the German Government. 39 The idea that a systematic and continuous flow of emigration would lead to the disappearance of Germany's Jewish communities within fifteen to twenty years was at the base of the plan. The He-Halutz leaders assumed that this underlying goal would prove so alluring to the German authorities that they would agree to extend aid towards further emigration by liberalising the laws governing the transfer of foreign currency abroad, by providing opportunities for vocational training and by "political means," t he nature of which were not defined in the report. 40 The government would also have to acknowledge the fact that the implementation of this plan hinged on the guarantee of adequate economic rights for German Jews until they left the country, since a shattered and impoverished Jewish community would not be capable of organising an extensive emigration movement. Although this plan did not include any revolutionary ideas, it should be noted that the He-Halutz Centre in Berlin really did believe that the time was ripe for negotiations with the German Government. The National Representation (Reichsvertretung), as well as the other Jewish associations, with the sole exception of the Organisation of State Zionists, did not think that this was the case. The previous attempt at negotiations between the central Jewish institutions and the authorities, in January 1934, had proved fruitless 41 . The government's failure to respond to the Jewish organisations' request had demonstrated that there was no point in making another attempt. The He-Halutz leaders, on the other hand, regarded the Reichstag's resolutions at Nuremberg as an indication that the conditions for conducting negotiations with the government concerning an overall agreement on the Jewish question now existed. The reaction of the Organisation of State Zionists to the Nuremberg Laws was not surprising in its content, although its form was unusual. The interview with Georg Kareski, head of the Organisation, published in Der Angriff , the well-known National Socialist newspaper, caused a sensation throughout the Jewish world. Der Angriff , which was connected with Joseph Goebbels and was notorious for its virulent anti-Semitism, published a lengthy article entitled "Stringent Separation Highly Desirable" in its issue of 23.12.1935 42 . Oskar Liskowski, who interviewed Kareski for the newspaper, asked for his opinion of the Nuremberg Laws, commenting that it was "well-known" that their object was to lay the foundation of a solution to the Jewish problem and to create better relations between the German and Jewish nations. In his reply, the head of the Organisation of State Zionists expressed his approval of separation between Germans and Jews, adding that he was referring to a relationship, which involved mutual respect. Kareski did not conceal the fact that his approval of the principle of dissociation did not extend to the restrictions on civil rights invoked by the new legislation. Kareski condemned the phenomena of assimilation and mixed marriage, and emphasised the necessity of expanding the Jews' cultural activities and preserving their unique collective character. The wider Jewish public regarded the interview as degrading, taking it to signify approval of the German Government's policy towards the Jews. It was claimed that Kareski intended to remove the Jews from society with his own hands and to undermine their status within it. However, one fact was ignored: he had taken pains to emphasise the need for German-Jewish relations based on mutual respect, expressing his reservations concerning the racist laws, which damaged the status of the Jews as German citizens. During this period the Organisation of State Zionists published a statement the content of which was far more important than the interview described in the foregoing paragraphs. 43 The statement made it clear that the Nuremberg Laws had destroyed the assimilationists' illusions once and for all, vindicating the Zionists' contention that the Jews constituted a national minority within Germany. But the State Zionists who held this view were also concerned about the government's intentions as reflected in the new legislation, and particularly about the loss of equal rights. There could be no doubt that the publication of the laws had helped to clarify the position, establishing a clear-cut legal situation. 'As a result, the sense of uncertainty..., which prevailed in many Jewish circles has vanished. The Jews have lost the legal status of equality, but at least henceforth they stand on a firm legal basis'. 44 It was claimed that the Head of State's words should be welcomed, as should the interpretation put on them by the German Press Agency, namely, that the German Jews would accordingly be allowed to develop their own national character under the aegis of the government. September 15, 1935 should be regarded as a turning point in the life of German Jewry, leading to a fundamental change in its attitudes and management. In accordance with this the assimilationists should be removed from key positions and a "Provisional National Councils" ( Provisorischer Volksrat ) should be established 45 . This public statement marked a change, even if only a temporary one, in the attitude of the Organisation of State Zionists. This shift touched upon two areas: whereas in the summer of 1935 the leaders of the Organisation had submitted a plan for the gradual evacuation of all of Germany's Jews, this was altered in the light of the official interpretation put on the Nuremberg Laws 46. The terms "emigration and removal" no longer served as the basis for the solution of the problem, being replaced by an arrangement founded on granting minority status to the Jewish community in Germany 47. The members of the Organisation thus returned temporarily to their former stand 48, viz. that the equal rights granted to the Jew as an individual should be replaced by an arrangement under, which Jews as a group would have collective rights, as per the law of minorities accepted throughout the world. 49 A parallel modification in their demand for the establishment of a new leadership was also noted. A few days before the publication of the Nuremberg Laws, the heads of the Organisation of State Zionists had applied to the German Foreign Ministry; requesting the appointment of an Emigration Commissar ( Auswanderungskommissar ) responsible for implementing the general exodus of the community. 50 Now, however, they proposed the establishment of a Provisional National Council, which would guarantee the rights of the Jews in Germany. It should be noted that at that time the Z.V.f.D. also believed that the government intended to accord the Jews the status of a national minority 51 . A few days after the publication of the Nuremberg Laws a Zionist meeting was held in Berlin with the participation of Benno Cohen and Joachim Prinz. These two men, who were among the leaders of the movement, reviewed recent developments and outlined a plan for the emigration of German Jews to Palestine during the ensuing five years. On the basis of their proposal, 15,000 persons would emigrate each year, and at the end of this period the total number of immigrants would be 75,000. At the same time, they cautioned against advocating mass emigration, which might spell the end of German Jewry 52 . Was this indicative of the attitude adopted by the Zionist Federation as a whole and of the trend of its planning and activity for the future? The emigration question obviously exercised the members of the movement and the problem became more and more acute as increasing numbers of individuals who had completed vocational training found themselves waiting for a considerable length of time for immigration certificates which did not materialise. Joachim Prinz, who complained bitterly about this, voiced the feelings of dismay felt by so many. 53 It was in this atmosphere that the Convention of Z.V.f.D. delegates, the last to take place on German soil before the Holocaust, was held in Berlin at the beginning of 1936. Although the emigration problem occupied a prominent position, it was not the only topic on the agenda. A good part of the lectures and discussions centred upon such matters as internal organisation, cultural activities, the Jewish schools, the budget and the fund-raising caof the Keren Hayesod . Nonetheless, the calibre of the men chosen to discuss the emigration question and the extensive nature of the debates on this subject underlined its importance. Some of the statements made by the movement's leaders at the Berlin Convention and a selection of the resolutions passed are given below. Siegfried Moses, the Chairman of the Z.V.f.D., declared: 'The central institutions and the communities must adopt the concept of emigration as the point of departure for all the activities'. Adding that the educational system, the study program, the vocational training institutes and all other instruments, which could aid in achieving this, should be adapted accordingly. 54 He stated explicitly that for him this was the most important task. The resolutions passed at the conclusion of the Convention are also in this vein, containing such statements as: 'German Jewry, and in particular its youth, is primarily being directed along the wanderer's path.' 55 The leaders distinguished between immigration to Palestine and to other countries. Although, they contended, their attitude to both was positive, they demanded that primacy be accorded to Palestine, since it constituted the basis for the existence of the Jewish nation as a whole and was not merely a refuge for the individual in his hour of need. The dispersion of emigration into many different directions would not solve the Jewish question, but would merely transfer its focal points to new places 56 . Most of the speakers praised the large-scale efforts, which had led to the emigration to Palestine of 30,000 German Jews since 1933. Siegfried Moses maintained that the magnitude of this campaign should not be measured on a quantitative scale alone. He claimed that the quality of the immigrants was the deciding element in evaluating the significance of the achievement. Because of their age, abilities and training these immigrants would participate in the efforts of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) to build the national home, and this, he maintained, was the main point 57 . Various speakers presented reports assessing ways of absorbing immigrants, various types of settlement and the finances necessary, but did not present a working plan and refrained from clarifying how they would operate with regard to the pace and extent of emigration in the future. There were two reasons for this vacillation, which were not fully known to the public at large. The first is evident from a secret document drawn up at the end of 1935 and in, which it was stated that, 'the situation regarding the transfer is disastrous?' 58 Dr. Werner Feilchenfeld, Director of the "Transfer" Institution, noted that whereas Jewish property amounting to 27.3 million marks had been transferred to Palestine between November 1, 1933 and December 31, 1935, by the end of this period more than double this sum had accumulated, and nobody knew when it would be possible to transfer it to Palestine. 59 He also claimed that if the system of transferring funds was not changed in the near future it would be necessary to make a public announcement to the effect that property-owners would no longer emigrate from Germany. The second reason was the restriction in the number of immigration certificates issued by the Mandatory Government. This aspect of British policy had aroused the ire of Jews throughout the world and was also opposed by the delegates to the Berlin Convention, though in a more restrained tone 60. References: 28 Juedische Rundschau, 5.3.1934, 30.11.1934 (hereafter ¯ J.R.). 29.J.R., September 17, 1935. 30. Ibid. ; and compare the text of the speech in Max Domarus, Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen . 1932¯1945, Vol. 2, Munich, 1965, p. 537; see also the interview with Hitler of November 28, 1935, by the American journalist Baillie, in The Speeches of Adolf Hitler 1922¯1923 , N. H. Baynes (ed.), Vol. 1, London, 1942, pp. 732¯734. 31. Ibid. 32.Ibid. 33.J.R., 17.9., 24.9., and 27.9.1935. 34.J.R., 17.9 and 24.9.1935. 35.A Report of He-Halutz Centre in Berlin, February 4, 1935, Archives of the Labour Federation Executive (hereafter ¯ LFEA); Germany emissaries files. 36.Yitzhak Ben Aharon to the Labour Federation Executive in Palestine, September 19, 1935, LFEA, Germany emissaries files. 37. Ibid. 38.See JTA (Jewish Telegraphic Agency), November 10, 1935, Archives of the Leo Baeck Institute, Jerusalem (hereafter ¯ ALBI); Section Reichsvertretung ¯ “C”. 39. He-Halutz Report, LFEA. 40. Ibid. 41.GFOC, Neue Reichskanzlei, Juedische Angelegenheiten, 16.1.1934, YVA, JM/2461. 42. Der Angriff , No. 299, 23.12.1935; the interview with Kareski took place as early as October 2, 1935. 43.The manifesto was published in stencil and undated (hereafter ¯ Kundgebung ), Kareski's bequest, Ramat Gan. 44. Ibid. , “sodass das... Gefuehl der Rechtsunsicherheit... verschwinden darf. Die Rechtsgleichheit haben die Juden in Deutschland verloren, aber sie haben wenigstens wieder einen Rechtsboden unter den Fuessen.” 45.Compare Y. Ben Aharon's report of September 19, 1935 to the Labour Federation Executive about Kareski's intention to establish a Nationalrat . In a later report of December 8, 1935, it was mentioned that Georg Kareski was in contact with Rudolf Hess, but no clear connection is drawn with Kareski's plan of establishing a “National Council”; LFEA, Germany emissaries files. 46. Der Staatszionist , 31.3.1935 (special issue). 47. Ibid. 48.Der Staatszionist , 20.1.1934, p. 4. See another article under the title “Warum nicht Minderheitenrecht?” ibid., 3.1.1934. 49. Kundgebung, ibid. Compare Der Staatszionist , 3.3.1935. According to their views it would be possible in the wake of the Nuremberg Laws to substitute civil rights of the individual for collective rights of a minority group. 50. Der Staatszionist , 25.8.1935; compare Max Schulmann's application of 11.9.1935 on the same subject to the German Foreign Office, CBFA, YVA, JM/2245 (K¯1506). 51.Kurt Loewenstein at the Zionist Convention in Berlin, J.R., 4.2.1936, p. 5. 52.J.R., 24.9.1935, p. 3. 53. Ibid. , p. 5. 54. Ibid. , p. 2. 55. Ibid. , p. 7. 56. Ibid. , p. 2. 57. Ibid. 58. Werner Feilchenfeld, Das bisherige Ergebnis der Auswanderung und Vorschlaege fuer eine Verbesserung der Auswanderung, 13.2.1936, CZA, S 25/9713. 59.According to the “National Representation (Reichsvertretung) ” Report of January 28, 1936, the sum was 26 million Reichsmark (RM): Eingabe der Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland betreffend Foerderung der Auswanderung von Juden aus Deutschland (hereafter ¯ Eingabe R.V.), CZA, S 25/9810; according to another report of the Zionist institutions (undated), 24.5 million RM were transferred to Palestine by the end of 1925, CZA, S 7¯01. 60.J.R., 7.2.1936, p. 7. Part C The discussions at this Zionist Convention reflect the state of confusion in, which the movement found itself. While the leaders were aware of the need to get as many Jews as possible out of Germany, they were unable, under the prevailing conditions, to provide a haven in Palestine for such large numbers. This explains the equivocation of their stand, which is also reflected in the following words of Siegfried Moses: 'First among our claims is the demand that emigration should serve as the focal point of a general Jewish plan; but at the same time there is also a need to establish Jewish schools... and to strengthen our Jewish cultural roots.' 61 Thus, for want of an alternative, they grasped at the concept of autonomy. The need to develop cultural independence as a way of stabilising internal life was widely discussed in the ranks of the Z.V.f.D 62 . Various speakers stressed the need to invest considerable efforts in the study of Hebrew language and literature, and in furthering knowledge of contemporary Judaism and Jewish traditions. They sought to help the Jewish population, which had been detached from its wider environment, by strengthening its links with Judaism. Considerable thought was devoted to the Jewish schools, the reinforcement and expansion of, which was demanded by the delegates 63 . They sought to derive support from the strengthening of the spiritual links with the Land of Israel, and to provide the Jewish public with spiritual comfort through various artistic spheres, Jewish theatre in particular. Thus, just at this time the slogan of cultural autonomy became an accepted phrase in Zionist circles, and it appears to have been regarded by many as a solution in itself and not merely a temporary expedient. The demand to replace the leaders of the Jewish community was raised in no uncertain terms at the Berlin Convention 64 . This, however, was no innovation. At various times in the past changes had been demanded in the central institutions and community boards, guaranteeing the Zionists a decisive voice in their management 65 . The publication of the Nuremberg Laws, however, seems to have given an added impetus to the critics of the veteran leadership, where the Zionists were in the minority. The resolution demanding a change in the leadership was placed first on the list of the Convention's resolutions and was phrased as an ultimatum: 'If this demand is not fulfilled the Zionist representatives will be removed from those bodies which refuse to comply.' 66 It was however not made clear just what were the changes to be implemented once the leadership had been replaced. It would appear that the Zionists' demand for the reinvigoration of the top echelon of Jewish leadership was more an expression of their aspiration for ideological reorientation than a reflection of any well-prepared plan of action for the future. The Central Institutions Let us first examine the declaration published by the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) shortly after the new legislation was introduced. It was phrased as follows: 'The laws promulgated by the Reichstag at Nuremberg have constituted a severe blow for German Jewry, but their object is to create the basis for a better relationship between the German and Jewish nations. The National Representation of Jews in Germany is prepared to contribute whatever it can to furthering this end. A precondition for better relations is the hope that by putting an end to the acts of degradation and the boycott the Jews and the Jewish communities of Germany will be able to exist, both morally and economically.' 67 The gist of this pronouncement by the representation was to make it clear that, it was first and foremost necessary to guarantee the conditions enabling most of the Jews to remain in Germany. This was the prince, which lay behind most of its policy. The Representation appears to have subscribed to the statements made by government representatives according to, which the Nuremberg Laws were designed to create a modus vivendi for Germans and Jews. 68 Consequently the authors of the statement demanded that a livelihood be guaranteed to the Jews and that the campaign of defamation, which they found injurious, should be stopped. In actual fact, there was nothing new in this claim. Ever since the establishment of the Third Reich the central Jewish institutions had waged a continual battle against the virulent attacks by the National Socialist Party's spokesmen and their press channels. They had repeatedly protested against the abuse directed at them by Julius Streicher and Joseph Goebbels 69 and against the various other kinds of anti-Semitic insults 70 . Their demand that the boycott against Jews be ended had also been voiced many times before 71 . Their claims were supported by the official policy of the Ministry of Economics, which at that time opposed ousting Jews from their livelihoods as it wished to prevent any shock to the national economy. When it transpired that the Nuremberg Laws did not include new economic restrictions, the Jewish institutions were doubly convinced that there was some chance of opposing the boycott as well as the other hostile actions, which had been mounted without official sanction. The manifesto also contained other points, which merit attention. It comprised a demand to develop the network of Jewish education in order, 'to educate youth to be steadfast in its religious beliefs and proud of its Jewishness and to draw strength from an awareness of its links with the Jewish nation as a whole, from working for the Jewish present and from its faith in a Jewish future.' 72 This activity would also include vocational training for youngsters in preparation for their emigration abroad. Mention was also made of the need to develop an independent cultural life. The authors' intention was to strengthen the sense of the uniqueness of the Jewish heritage, as a counterweight against edicts, which brought shame and disgrace. But this manifesto also clarified an additional change in the basic current of their thinking; for generations Jews had aspired to an integration of their tradition with the culture in which they lived, whereas at this point their first consideration was to encourage activities in the sphere of Jewish education. The stand adopted by the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) vis-a-vis emigration, which became the most important issue for German Jewry, is of particular interest. This is what the Representation had to say on this score in September 1935: 'The increased necessity for emigration obliges us to undertake planning on a large scale, directing candidates primarily to Palestine, but also to other countries where possible. This refers to youth in particular... in addition to this it must be our concern... to create possibilities for liquidating the property of independent businessmen and transferring their funds abroad.' Does this passage indicate that a change had occurred in the attitude of the National Representation, which had not encouraged large numbers of Jews to leave Germany until then? It is difficult to reach a clear-cut conclusion on the basis of these sentences alone and the subject requires more extensive examination. It should be noted at this point that the report of the central institutions of German Jewry for the year 1935 states that the Nuremberg Laws led to an "enormous increase" in the drive to emigrate. 73 This would seem to indicate that the warning signs inherent in the Nuremberg Laws had been correctly read by the Jewish public, and that many had sought to leave Germany in good time. Similarly, a number of small companies sprang up and expanded at that time, offering their services as regards settlement in Cyprus, Latin America and other foreign countries 74 . In what way did the leaders of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) react to this awakening temigration? They do not seem to have been prepared for the new development and had not crystallised a policy of their own in advance. Instead, they decided to lend their support to Max Warburg's plan, adding supplements to fit their own views. A manifesto along these lines was submitted by the National Representation to the German Ministry of Economics in January 1936 75 . It concentrated on the problem of transferring emigrants' property out of Germany, claiming that the smooth functioning of this aspect would determine whether it was possible to organise a systematic emigration movement. It was claimed that this also required the establishment of enterprises providing vocational training on a large scale in order to prepare candidates for settling abroad. Nevertheless, while examining this subject it becomes clear that the manifesto was also designed to protest the dispossession of German Jewry. The authorities were requested to put an end to the arbitrary interference of those who would undermine Jewish livelihoods, thus damaging their ability to plan emigration on a large scale. It transpires, therefore, that even while conducting negotiations on the subject of emigration, the leaders of the Representation did not waive their demand to guarantee the Jews' material existence as long as they were still in Germany. On the other hand, they were most cautious not to quote any figures as to planned emigration. Neither in the manifesto, nor during the negotiations which followed, were any figures disclosed, obviously with the intention of preventing the authorities from obtaining any information which could be used to expel Jews from Germany. 76 The direct negotiations with the Ministry of Economics began on January 29, 1936 77 . The delegation sent by the Representation consisted of its most senior members, Otto Hirsch, Max Warburg and Siegfried Moses. Georg Landauer from Jerusalem also participated in the negotiations. During the discussions it became clear that the organised Jewish community had not succeeded in drawing up an agreed platform. Sharp differences of opinion were evident between Max Warburg and Georg Landauer, the spokesman of the Zionist camp. It would seem that Landauer thought in terms appropriate to the operation of the "Transfer Company" and the absorption needs of German immigrants in Palestine 78 ; consequently, he regarded as most exaggerated the foreign currency figures cited in the manifesto as being necessary for emigrants abroad 79 . Warburg, on the other hand, at whose instigation these calculations had been made, upheld the idea of widespread emigration abroad, not only to Palestine. He thought that it would be impossible to open the gates for immigrants to South America and other countries throughout the world without immense financial investments. This internal dispute, which was conducted in the presence of the Ministry of Economics officials, cannot have done much towards finding a solution for the real problem, namely, planning a large movement of emigration by Jews from the area controlled by the Third Reich. The question arises whether the members of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) were in actual fact interested in this. The doubt is augmented further if one pays close attention to a long and detailed report, extending to fourteen pages, which was sent in March 1936 to the Council for German Jewry in London 80 . The memorandum opens with demographic figures showing that German Jewry at that time numbered 438,000 individuals according to the following distribution: 240,000 aged 45 or younger; 110,000 aged between 45 and 60; and 88,000 over the age of 60. It was stated that only 220,000 drawn from the 6-45 age group, were appropriate for a "constructive solution." However, according to estimates drawn up by the National Representation, the number of candidates for emigration in the near future was far lower, amounting to between 40,000 and 50,000 persons. In the course of time these were likely to be joined by another 70,000 candidates who were suitable as regards age. According to these figures, the number of candidates for emigration would not be more than 120,000 in all, and almost certainly even fewer. The authors of the memorandum, keeping to the minimalist approach, which is reflected in these figures, claimed that the emigration could be only “in a gradual manner" ( allmaehlich ). There appears to have been a close connection between this contention and their comment, that most of the potential candidates for emigration 'still have jobs, which provide a living for them and their families.' 81 The most striking expression of this attitude can be found in the introduction to the Berlin Community's budget for 1935: 'The idea of emigration is becoming increasingly prominent today. The trend towards reducing the number of Jews through emigration reflects the wishes of influential bodies in the State. It also accords with the desires of a large part of German Jewry as a result of the new legislation.' The passage continues as follows: 'It is generally agreed that a considerable number of Jews will be unable to leave Germany,' adding that it would be necessary to help those who remain. 82 It should be noted at this point that even as great an authority as Bernhard Kahn, the Joint Organisation's representative in Paris, expressed a similar opinion. He believed that although the Jews of Germany were obliged to profess their support for emigration, in actual fact most of them would have to continue residing in Germany for dozens of years 83 . While there was no change in the attitude of the National Representation on this point, it was precisely at this period that they began to strengthen their relations with Jewish organisations throughout the world, seeking support from Jewish communities outside Germany. A sense of association with the Yishuv in Palestine and with the Jews of Britain and the U.S.A. fortified the National Representation in carrying out its tasks. 'The feelings of fraternal solidarity and the generous assistance of world Jewry have given the Jews of Germany solace in their hour of need, constituting a source of renewed strength, encouragement and bravery which has enabled them to continue to bear the heavy burden of their efforts to help themselves.' 84 The content of this passage, and the final phrase in particular, is highly instructive, since mention is made here of both the material and psychological support extended by their brethren abroad and the fact that the underlying principle of their activities was their desire to help themselves. It is patently clear that they carefully avoided presenting an image of poor relations passively waiting for salvation from their wealthy cousins. When they travelled to London for meetings of the Council for German Jewry, or to Paris or New York for consultations with leaders of the Joint Organisation, they did not look for patrons who would make decisions for them, but for loyal associates. Even though they fully appreciated the financial contributions raised for them by English and American Jewry, they nonetheless aspired to establishing their relations with them on a basis of equality and mutual respect. 85 In crystallising their reaction to the Nuremberg Laws, the leaders of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) did not act in isolation from Jewish leadership in other countries. On the contrary, as a result of the events of September 1935, the contact between them was closer than it had ever been before. On many occasions ideas were exchanged between Otto Hirsch, Siegfried Moses and Max Warburg on the one hand, and the Jewish leaders gathered in London on the other 86 , but in the final analysis they took their own conclusions, which differed from the suggestions raised by Herbert Samuel, Simon Marks and their associates, who at that time supported "large-scale emigration." 87 Not only did they differ as regards principles but also concerning methods. Whereas the Council for German Jewry outlined a program of action for the ensuing four years, the members of the Representation preferred in the light of thcurrent vicissitudes, to adopt a more short-term policy, in accordance with the needs of the moment. 88 The Nuremberg Laws put an end to the emancipation of German Jewry and were framed with the express intention of subjecting Jews to degradation. Their promulgation did not, however, lead to any dramatic alteration in Jewish life. In effect the laws merely gave official sanction for a situation which had gradually been developing ever since Hitler's rise to power. As early as the summer of 1935 Jews had finally been prohibited from joining the newly emerging German army, thus effectively being prevented from enjoying equal civil rights. It was apparent that the government sought to isolate them from the rest of the population, but no clear-cut conclusion could be drawn from the racial laws as to whether Jews would be prevented from residing in Germany. On the contrary, official spokesmen made statements testifying that the Reichstag's decision at Nuremberg was designed to determine what would henceforth be the Jews' sphere of existence within the Third Reich. The attitude of the Jewish organisations was influenced to a considerable extent by the fact that the new legislation neither contained limitations regarding their livelihood, nor restricted the sphere of activities of their autonomous institutions, nor even impaired the position of the Community as a legally recognised official body serving as the backbone of the Jewish population. It was for these reasons that most of the organisations did not regard the legislation of September 15, 1935 as signalling the fact that the government intended to force the Jews to leave Germany in massive numbers. They believed that they would be allowed to remain in Germany as a separate minority group. They were strengthened in this view by three things: a While at the beginning of 1935 there had been another outburst of violence by SA and SS troops (for example, in Munich in May, at the Kurfuerstendamm and other places in July), close to the period when the Nuremberg Laws were passed the German Government restrained the rioters and put a stop to the wave of anti-Semitic terror. b As is well known, the Nuremberg Laws were accompanied by placating explanations on the part of government representatives, some of which have been cited above. Today, in retrospect, it is obvious to us that these were simply part of the policy of fraudulent deception practised by the rulers of the Third Reich. At that time, nevertheless, they misled the leaders of German Jewry as regards the government's objectives, encouraging them to believe that it really wanted to solve their problems. c The Winter Olympics were to begin at Garmisch-Partenkirchen in February 1936, just a few months after the Reichstag's decision at Nuremberg. Throughout this period the government was preparing for the massive rally at which it wanted to present to the world an image of a peaceful and moderate state with good intentions. For this reason, instructions were issued by the German Government forbidding unofficial activities ( Einzelaktionen ) directed against the Jews. Signs distinguishing non-Aryan stores were removed, as were notices forbidding Jews entry to vacation sites and certain villages in Frankonia. It seemed as if henceforth the rule of law and order would be observed as regarding the relations between Germans and Jews. We have indicated the reasons why Jewish leaders did not realise that under the existing government the further deterioration of their situation would be inevitable. There is, however, no cause for assuming that in the autumn of 1935 they were imbued with a spirit of optimism. The attitude of their organisation was characterised primarily by a deep sense of uncertainty as to what was to come and how to confront the dangers of an uneasy future. Thus the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws though unmistakably pointing towards the decline of German Jewry, did not ma decisive turn in the course of its policy versus the National Socialist Government. References: 61 J.R., 4.2.1936, p. 2. 62 See, for instance, the article “Kultur-Autonomie als Loesung,” in J.R., 12.5.1933. 63 Hans Gaertner in J.R., 7.2.1936. 64 J.R., 4.2.1936. 65 See, for instance, J.R., 6.6.1935; 7.5.1935. 66 J.R., 7.2.1936. 67 J.R., 24.9.1935. 68 C.V.-Z., 26.9.1935; J.R., 17.9.1935. 69 See the protest of the Reichsvertretung against false charges of the Stuermer of April 26, 1934, GFOC, AA Neue Reichskanzlei, Juedische Angelegenheiten, YVA, JM/2462; see also the protest of the Reichsvertretung against the defamations of Goebbels, May 15, 1934, ALBI, L¯1431, E 612042¯44. 70 Informationsblaetter im Auftrage des Zentralausschusses fuer Hilfe und Aufbau der Juden in Deutschland , Berlin, Jg. 2, No. 6, 27.8.1934. 71 See note 41. 72 J.R., 24.9.1935. 73 Arbeitsbericht des Zentralausschusses fuer Hilfe und Aufbau, 1935, p. 26. 74 J.R., 13.11.1935. 75 Eingabe R.V., CZA, S 25/9810. 76 Landauer's report, January 31, 1936, CZA, S 25/9810. 77 Ibid. 78 Landauer was one of the initiators of the Transfer Agreement, and after his immigration to Palestine acted as the director of “The Office for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.” 79 The authors of the manifesto fixed the sum of 250,000,000 RM. 80 The report was sent on March 16, 1936, under the title “Juedische Auswanderung aus Deutschland und deren Vorbereitung” (hereafter ¯ Auswanderung Vorbereitung ¯RV), CZA, S 25/9810. 81Ibid. 82 Geleitwort zum Etat 1936; Juedische Gemeinde, Berlin, Gemeindevorstand. 83 Bernhard Kahn's letter to J. S. Hyman, The Joint Archives, New York, Section 1934¯1939 ¯ Germany general. 84 See Auswanderung Vorbereitung-RV, CZA, S 25/9810. 85 Ibid. 86 Rosenblueth's reports to Landauer on December 13, 19 and 20, 1935; Rosenblueth's report to Marks, December 29, 1935. 87 Central Fund for German Jewry, German Jewry ¯ A Four Year Plan of Emigration (from the end of December 1935), CZA, S 25/9810. 88 Ibid. Back to the top