D. Bankier Public Responses to Anti-Semitism Source: D. Bankier, Chapter 4 in: The Germans and the Final Solution , Public Opinion under Nazism, Oxford 1992, pp.67-88. Part A, B, C The initial months of Hitler's rule, and especially the week that followed the victory at the polls on 5 March, were marked by a wave of violence: arrests, maltreatment, kidnappings of people singled out for political reasons, assassinations of politicians and of those suspected of Marxist tendencies were daily affairs. The assaults on Jews were part of the ruthless eradication of the regime's opponents, a direct continuation of the antisemitic attacks, which preceded Hitler's rise to power, and an outgrowth of the euphoria that came after the seizure of power. Prominent examples of this situation were the large-scale outrages that members of the Nazi Party and its' affiliated organisations provoked: harassment, murder, vandalising of synagogues, desecration of Jewish graveyards, and destruction of property. During this period a large number of Jews were removed or suspended from all positions of prominence, subjected to arrest and stripped of their jobs at various public institutions. Jewish lawyers, doctors and teachers were dismissed throughout the Reich. Many had to flee for their lives, and others were incarcerated in prisons and camps. About the middle of March the physical attacks diminished in intensity, chiefly due to Hitler's appeal to his followers to adhere to blind discipline'. However, the unrest did not cease: there was a growing demand for measures against German Jews because they had allegedly instigated the reports of outrages, which had appeared in the foreign press. The antisemitic atmosphere reached a climax with the nation wide anti-Jewish boycott staged by the Nazi Party on 1 April 1933, which also signalled the beginning of a new phase. Although the party apparatus formally planned, organised and carried it out, the boycott was de facto a state act and, as such, its impact on the Jews of Germany went far beyond the material damage involved. The boycott itself was officially stopped after one day, but from this point on antisemitic policy also took the form of state legislation. The very first law passed by the new regime, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (7 April 1933), established race as a condition of employment and led to the removal of thousands of officials. Overriding the Constitution, it removed non-Aryans' from the civil service with the allegation that the Weimar Republic had filled the bureaucracy with incompetent functionaries, although in reality the Nazis wished to purge it of Jews and politically unreliable officials. This law was a milestone in Nazi antisemitic legislation because it furnished a new and important definition of a non-Aryan': i.e. anyone who had a non-Aryan' parent or grandparent. Besides, given that Jews in cultural, artistic and media occupations were being fired, academics discharged and teachers forced to relinquish their jobs, the law merely regulated existing practice by granting retroactive legality. The antisemitic legislation also prohibited Jewish conscription into the army when, at the end of February 1934, the law of 7 April 1933 was made applicable to the armed forces. This was not entirely new: already in December 1933 the army, on its own initiative, had proposed to observe the Aryan clause when dealing with appointments of officer cadets. Further measures included the dismissal of Jews from state, municipal and public services; a prohibition against employing Jewish judges and magistrates; harsh restrictions on Jews studying at schools and universities and the adoption of a law to annul the citizenship of Jews who immigrated to Germany after the First World War. Jewish rights were henceforth restricted by the ordinances and directives issued by the local and provincial authorities, as well as by professional organisations, which implemented the principles of the new law. How did the German public react to this reality? It is impossible to determine from the reports what the population felt about the antisemtic drive. Few surveys exist on 1933, and from the crumbs of evidence it appears that the Jewish question was of marginal concern. If the reports provide scanty evidence on public reactions, there is little difficulty in finding other sources: diplomatic dispatches, eyewitness accounts and recollections allow tentative conclusions. From the impressions of a variety of observers representing a wide range of viewpoints, it looks as though the public identification with Nazi antisemtic policy was not clear-cut. Although in general the public recognised the necessity for some solution to the Jewish problem, large sectors found the form of persecution abhorrent. The impression these accounts give is that the boycott failed to achieve its objective and that there were misgivings about the brutal methods employed. These sources further suggest that a good many disapproved of the barbarity, which they feared would have disastrous economic consequences at a time when the country could ill afford them. Not only did sizeable parts of the population severely condemn the persecution, but even Nazi sympathisers did not fully endorse it. Sometimes there were animated discussions in front of Jewish shops and fighting broke out between the public and party men. Even generals wearing medals came to stores owned by Jews in Berlin to demonstrate their disapproval of the Nazi policy. The educated bourgeoisie seized the occasion of the rioting to take a stand and vent expressions of censure and protest. This sector in particular did not subscribe to the boycott, showing indignation and disgust that Germany should resort to such medieval methods 1 . Aside from the criticism of violence, the campaigns conducted against the Bible caused heavy resentment in the church-going population. Yet the churches scarcely voiced these reservations officially, although they were still relatively independent. The Churchmen who levelled public criticism, such as Cardinal Michael Faulhaber in his sermons in December 1933, were exceptional. None the less, foreign observers rightly perceived that, while all these acts indicated opposition to the Nazis and their methods, they did not necessarily imply feelings in favour of the Jews 2 . In the short run most of those who felt embarrassed learned to turn a blind eye and retreat into non-political privacy. It was much easier to conform than to swim against the stream. Where dismissals of Jews are concerned, the picture changes. In contrast to the criticism aroused by boycotts and violence, there seems to have been little public objection to the sacking of Jews, for a number of reasons. First, there was almost no disruption of bureaucratic activities, because the purge was limited to avoid any disastrous consequences. In Prussia it affected only 12.5¯15.5 per cent of the administration, in other states even less: between 4.5 and 5 per cent 3 . Second, all purges are a source of upward mobility: the extensive dismissals opened jobs for the unemployed and allowed young people to advance their careers. The expulsion of Jews and leftists from the universities and public service opened up posts and created opportunities for promotion, thus contributing to complacency and conformism in the academic and intellectual public. Third, and far more important, the absence of negative reactions in the existing sources ¯ mainly recollections ¯ seems to suggest that the removal of Jews from influential positions was consonant with the wishes of the great majority of the public. Just how far these wishes permeated German society is shown by the fact that even anti-Nazis subscribed to the measure. Following the removal of Jewish civil servants Thomas Mann wrote in his diary, It is no great misfortune after all that...the Jewish presence in the judiciary has been ended' 4 , and later on he added, I could to some extent go along with the rebellion against the Jewish element.' 5 Further evidence of such attitamong people who opposed the regime is prby a repowhich cites the outlook of a Catholic teacher from southern Germany who definitely disliked the Third Reich. The reporter says, however, that The Jews are for her another world. It is true that she finds barbarian their persecution and economic extermination. But she would think reasonable the introduction of a numerus clausus and certain limitations on candidacy for the civil service.' 6 Similarly, the application of the Aryan principle in the army elicited no public reaction, for it also left the military structure unharmed and only seventy officers were affected. We should not attach any importance to the few voices of protest, which were heard from army circles. They objected to the army's subordination to a party's ideology, not to the Aryan principle itself 7 . For subsequent years, the broader documentary base allows more precise analysis. As shown earlier, the most striking development from 1934 on was the sobering of the spirit of national renewal' and the growing apathy towards indoctrination. If in this context we measure the results of the propaganda by its success in moulding attitudes and integrating the uncommitted public in the antisemitic drive, we can safely conclude that in most cases it failed. Whereas antisemitism played an integrative role for the party and its followers, it did not have the same function in spurring the general population to action. Abundant evidence of this appears in the responses to the renewed antisemitic wave in the autumn of 1934. Reporting on public attitudes, the Gestapo station at Potsdam commented in September of that year, Undoubtedly the Jewish question is not the main problem of the German public... Utterances on the Jewish peril are diminished and those engaged in enlightening the population are to a certain extent depicted as fools.' 8 Reports from different regions show that this state of affairs was fairly widespread: the public was not galvanised by antisemitic propaganda, and Nazi observers realised that there was a gulf between the ideal of a society mobilised to fight the Jews and the reality that they encountered. Even if those who launched raids on the Jews cannot always be identified from the reports, it can certainly be assumed from endless testimonies that these were mostly members of Nazi organisations. Hence antisemitic terror ought to be attributed mainly to the Hitler Youth, the SA and other party foundations; the bulk of the public remained passive on the sidelines. Many were amused, but many were also deeply troubled by what they witnessed. These attitudes were not confined to periods of relative calm, but featured prominently in the summer months of 1935, when the antisemitic thrust reached unprecedented heights and swept the Reich. Even during these turbulent months the propaganda scarcely motivated the public to respond positively to Nazi agitation. The harangues did not crack the wall of indifference: most of the population did not join in. One of many examples of this is to be found in the report of the Kiel Gestapo for July 1935: It is noteworthy that, whenever there are actions against the Jews, these emanate chiefly from members of the party and its affiliated organisations, whereas the majority of the population shows little participation in the Jewish question.' 9 Furthermore, if this report, from an area in the Protestant north noted for its vast support for the Nazis, shows that antisemitic campaigns did not bear fruit, then the response in other regions was even less favourable. In surveys of the public mood in Catholic regions, such as the Rhineland, with more liberal traditions, we find flat rejection of the incitement. Large sections of the population were repelled by the Stuermer methods and refused to comply with demands to take action against the Jews. We should also bear in mind that certain elements exploited antisemitic incitement in order to settle personal accounts, especially by damaging Jewish business competitors. In a number of reports we find the public suspicious that the true motives behind the boycott were not ideological but a matter of personal interest. If this was the case, there was no point in taking part in the antisemitic campaign and fighting other people's wars. The fact that the reports' authors themselves mention the harmful role of the Nazi Craft and Commerce Organisation (NS-HAGO) on the antisemitic front is significant as an indicator of the Gestapo's sensitivity on the matter. When the NS-HAGO set the boycott in motion, the district governor in Wuerzburg noted that the general opinion about this organisation was that it was only out for itself and did not care at all about the wider population 10 . These claims seem to have been fairly common, for they crop up in many surveys, such as those from Koenigsberg, Dortmund and Harburg-Wilhelmsburg 11 . The last-mentioned station significantly observes that local people saw no ideological motives behind the antisemitic campaign, because the NS-HAGO was heading the boycott. Everybody regarded the campaign as an attempt to destroy business competition and not as an expression of racialist policy. Gestapo stations repeatedly said that the amount of verbal, or even physical, violence engendered could not serve as an indicator of the success of propaganda in convincing people of the need for antisemitism. This was precisely the point made by the Kassel station with regard to the campaign of incitement in that area: It is easier to invite attacks on the Jews, than to persuade the public of antisemitism.' 12 The station repeated its assessment in September, concluding that incitement against Jews in meetings and rallies did not contribute to the desired goals. It did bring about rioting, but was of little help in winning over the apathetic public to the antisemitic cause 13 . The fact that most people took little part in the antisemitic movement has a simple explanation. It is easier to arouse hooligans and the young to attack some concrete target than to win general adherence to an idea. Agitation against the Jews struck a chord first and foremost in the Hitler Youth and the SA, whereas the ordinary Germans remained passive onlookers. This point can be elaborated by exploring a number of representative cases. The concentration on the Jewish question in the late winter months of 1935 was part of a nation wide propaganda campaign to activate the lower middle classes and restore their faith in Nazism. In September 1934, the Koblenz Gestapo had reported that retailers were still waiting for the fulfilment of promises made by the Nazis before they came to power. The traders demanded the immediate liquidation of the agencies, consumer co-operatives, department stores and other companies owned by Jews. The commentator also expressed his personal opinion that the lack of real policy in this field was depressing the morale of the lower middle class, generating negative attitudes towards the state and the party 14 . From the Aachen Gestapo report for March 1935 we gain much information on the methods employed in connection with the new antisemitic drive to lift the spirits of small shopkeepers. The local party organ, the Westdeutscher Beobachter , brought out a special supplement devoted entirely to the Jewish question; and antisemitic propaganda, which multiplied throughout the country, foreshadowed physical attacks on Jews and their property. The walls of Jewish homes and shops were smeared with faeces and red paint; Stuermer stickers were plastered on the walls; shots were fired into Jewish houses and so forth 15 . This hostile climate set the stage for the Cologne-Aachen Gauleiter , Grohe, who boasted that this drive had revived the morale of the lower middle class 16 . As for the population in general, however, did this campaign win it over and bring it into line with Nazi policy? To answer this question let us look at the region in Grohe's charge, for there, fully supported by a fanatical Nazi, the antisemitic drive was whipped up to an exceptional degree. It is particularly striking thateven the surveys from Grohe's jurisdiction to limeffects ofpropagandon the behaviour of the general public. A report for March from Cologne indicates that workers failed to respond to the call for a boycott and continued shopping in department stores. Workers' wives', the commentators noted, said they couldn't care less whether the store was owned by a Jew or a German'. 17 Further proof of the failure of indoctrination to penetrate the public consciousness is furnished by the report for April. The Gestapo agent concluded unequivocally that the public in general understood very little about antisemitic propaganda and the boycott 18 . The same gap between the avalanche of propaganda and the public response to it emerges from surveys of the Trier area. Summing up the antisemitic activities during April and May 1935, the Nazi agent proudly declared the party's achievements: notices were posted demanding a boycott of Jewish shops, windows were smashed and Jews were beaten up in the streets. He also mentioned the role played by children in this campaign. Yet he admitted that the majority of the population refused to comply with the demands of the party and continued shopping at Jewish stores. In one shop during the Easter sales there were so many customers that the Jewish shopkeeper was forced to close several times, in order to serve all of them properly 19 . It should not be assumed that such behaviour was typical only of working-class opposition to the Nazis. Businessmen also did not react favourably to the party's appeals, though not out of ethical considerations. They complained that antisemtic activities damaged Germany's economic interests, showing that they merely feared the anti-Jewish boycott would hamper their ties with traders abroad 20 . What worried those involved in the tourist industry is illustrated by the Bielefeld Gestapo, which commented, For ten years the Dutch consul spent his holidays in Bad Oeynhausen, and now he will not return because of the scenes of hooliganism he witnessed.' 21 Added to these worries was concern for Germany's image, especially if such actions were observed by foreigners and could be used for anti-German propaganda abroad. For similar reasons brutal attacks alienated the educated bourgeoisie in Potsdam and Koenigsberg 22 . For a good many inhabitants of Cologne the question was merely a practical one: who would pay the bill for the damage caused by rioting? They were troubled by the cost of antisemtic outrages. In the course of a fortnight rioters smashed plate glass to the value of RM 20,000, a loss which would be met by German insurance companies and so would, in the final account, have to be paid by people such as themselves 23 . It seems, therefore, that at this stage of Hitler's rule people did not co-operate willingly with the party organisations in enforcing antisemitic boycotts. On the contrary, they mostly continued shopping in stores owned by Jews despite the heavy pressures exerted by the SA to frighten off customers. We should not conclude, however, that refraining from participation in the antisemitic campaign originated in, or was identical with, principled opposition to persecution of Jews. We rarely find rejection of Nazi antisemitism on ethical principles, or indignation based on humanitarian values. Moreover, expressions of solidarity with the persecuted Jews are quite exceptional. The real motives behind the refusal to accept the party's calls are usually stated in the reports themselves: very rarely did they exceed utilitarianism or self-interest. A comprehensive examination of the violent disturbances which erupted in the summer of 1935 contradicts two widespread images: the one of a terrorised German population whose silence enabled the Nazis to pursue anti-Semitic persecution; the other of a brainwashed society mobilised to endorse unconditionally any sort of Nazi policy. In stark contrast to these popular images, it is clear that the public was neither silent nor brainwashed. The prosecution of anti-Jewish policy depended, to a large extent, on the public's reaction. There is conclusive evidence that on the whole the population consented to attacks on Jews as long as these neither damaged non-Jews nor harmed the interests of the country, particularly its reputation abroad. As a passing comment in a report from northern Germany puts it, far from being passive, the population demonstrated opposition when it feared that its own interests were being endangered 24 . Occasionally the Gestapo illustrates its surveys with concrete instances of public, non-conformist behaviour in the face of anti-Semitic policy. A report from Magdeburg, for example, records an unusual form of opposition to the boycott: buyers stood demonstratively in front of the camera placed by the party at the entrance to a Jewish shop and bade defiance to the Nazis 25 . It is impossible to know what lay behind the courageous stand in this place. There seems little doubt, however that in most cases the fate of the Jews was not important enough to elicit criticism. The Jewish theme was instrumental for some discontented sectors in expressing their dissatisfaction with the Nazi system. The Gestapo stations in Muenster and Dortmund correctly captured the reality when they stated that the public went to Jewish shops not as a demonstration of solidarity with the persecuted, but as a way of expressing disillusionment with the regime 26 . Furthermore, people could support the Nazis and yet disapprove of measures against the Jews. A striking example of rejecting Jewish persecution from an anti-Semitic stand is provided by a report from Harburg-Wilhelmsburg. The local Gestapo admitted that the public did not just fail to understand the attacks on the Jews, but actually condemned them. The reason for this attitude was given by the commentator himself: people felt that maltreatment of Jews was counterproductive, since it turned them into martyrs; the party thus achieved the opposite of its original objective 27 . Criticism of the political wisdom of persecuting Jews reappears in a later report from the same station. This time what upset the public was not the tragic image Jews presented to their neighbours, but anxiety over Germany's reputation: in the face of the rioting many went on saying that it ought to be stopped because it harmed Germany's image abroad. The Gestapo noted further that, even when most people firmly adhered to a tough policy on the Jewish issue, they nevertheless objected to its implementation through violence. The population, explained the reporter, argued that such excesses only added fuel to the atrocity propaganda spread against the Third Reich 28 . The Gestapo in Kiel likewise noted the negative reaction of people who worried that the Jewish question had cost too much from the point of view of foreign policy 29 . This case is worth noting because intertwined in the utilitarian argument over Germany's image we find a rare humanitarian motive: the belief that Jews should be left in peace because they also are human beings. All signs point to the conclusion that, even in a Catholic region with considerable anti-Nazi feelings, it was not the fact that Jews were being victimised that upset the public but the brutal and vulgar nature of the persecution. The Cologne Gestapo throws light on this matter: The following factors must be considered for the prevailing bad mood: (1) the unclear situation in foreign policy; (2) the struggle against the Church; and (3) the form of the anti-Jewish struggle.' 30 The report from Magdeburg for July bears witness to the fact that it was not anti-Semitism as such, but its extent and degree, that aroused public criticism. There was a point at which the bourgeoisie felt that the violence, and the anti-Semitic campaign that had produced it, might have gone too far 31 . The Koenigsberg Gestapo summed up public reaction in almost the same terms 32 . References: 1. J. Tomaszewski, The situation of the Jews in Germany in spring 1933 as reflected in reports of the Polish Republic Legation and Consulate General in Berlin', Biuletyn Zidwskiego Instytutu Historycznego , 139-40 (1986), pp. 131-42; H. J. Robinsohn, Ein Versuch sich zu be', Tradition , 3 (1958), pp. 197-206; R. Weltsch, First of April 1933', World Jewry , 1 (1958), p. 11; Uhlig, Warenhaeuser , p. 84; Genschel, Die Ausdraengung , p. 52; report of the Italian Embassy in Berlin, 6 Apr. 1933, CDJC, CDL-15; diaries of Mally Dienemann and Max Riener, LBI, entries for 3 April 1933. Riener noted that in Berlin people just moved away from the SA men and went into Jewish shops. There was no sympathy for the Jews but people complained that a government could not sanction such political manoeuvres. 2. H. Rumbold to Foreign Office, 5 and 13 April 1933, PRO, FO 408/62. 3. J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945 (Exeter University Press, Exeter, 1984), vol. II, p. 225. 4. F. Stern, Dreams and Delusions. The drama of German history (Knopf, New York, 1987), p. 180. 5. Ibid., p. 181. 6. Sopade, Feb. 1937, A 22. 7. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945 , vol. II, pp.642-3. 8. Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P. 9. Gestapo Kiel, report July 1935, ibid. Various party reports indicate the apathy with which calls for participation in the antisemitic drive were received by the populace: see for example Kreispropagandaleiter, Kreisleitung Eichstaedt, report Mar. 1935, StA N, NSDAP Nr. 8. See also F. Wiesemann, Judenverfolgung und nichtjuedische Bevoelkerung', in Broszat et al., Bayern in der NS Zeit , vol. I, pp. 441, 449. 10.RP Wuerzburg, report May 1934, YVA, JM/2858. On the old middle class and its attitude to antisemitic policy see C. D. Krohn and D. Stegmann, Kleingewerbe und NS in einer agrarisch-mittelstaendischen Region. Das Beispiel Lueneburg 1930-1933', Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte , 17 (1977), pp. 1-40; A. von Saldern, Mittelstand im Dritten Reich' . Handwerker¯Einzelhaendler¯Bauern (Campus, Frankfurt a.M., 1979), pp. 154-82. 11.1269.Gestapo Harburg¯Wilhelmsburg, report July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Koenigsberg, report Apr. 1935, ibid.; Gestapo Dortmund, report Aug. 1935, ibid.; RP Oldenburg, report July 1935, BA, R 18/1568. 12.Gestapo Kassel, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 13.Gestapo Kassel, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/529. 14.RP Koblenz, report Sep. 1934, BA, 18/1564. 15.Gestapo Aachen, report Mar. 1935, BA, R 58/100; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 181. 16.Gauleiter Grohe, report Apr. 1935, BA, NS 22/vorl. 583. On the agitative value of antisemitism see Gestapo Wilhelmshaven, report Aug. 1935, NAW, T 175 R 313 F 2813141. 17.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 255. 18.Gestapo Koeln, report Mar. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 19.RP Trier, report Apr.¯May 1935, LHA, 441/15625. 20.Gestapo Koeln, report Mar. 1935, GStA REP/90 P. 21.Gestapo Bielefeld, report Aug. 1935. ibid. 22.Gestapo Potsdam, report July 1935, BA, R 58/1591; Gestapo Koenigsberg, report July 1935, GStA REP/90 P. 23.Gestapo Koeln, report Apr. 1935, ibid.; RP Augsburg, report May 1935, BHStA, MA 106676. 24.Gestapo Wesermuende, report Jan. 1936, BA, R 58/1149. 25.Gestapo Magdeburg, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 26.Gestapo Muenster, report July 1935, ibid.; Gestapo Dortmund, report July 1935, ibid. 27.Gestapo Harburg¯Wilhelmsburg, report Aug. 1935, ibid. 28.Gestapo Bielefeld, report July 1935, ibid. 29.Gestapo Kiel, report July 1935, ibid. 30.Gestapo Koeln, report May 1935, BA, R 58/480. 31.Gestapo Magdeburg, report May 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 32.Gestapo Koenigsberg, report July 1935, ibid. Part B If the population criticised the anti-Semitic policy because it feared retaliation in the form of an anti-German boycott organised by Jews abroad, or because it was anxious about the possible damage to Germany's prestige, it was all the more alarmed with it directly. An array of reports mention people, who approved anti-Semitism in principle but, afraid of its consequences for themselves, criticised its application. A case in point is a Gestapo report from Koesslin. The writer had his finger on the pulse of the public mood when he wrote that the local population was indeed anti-Semitic but did not want to be harmed by anti-Jewish policy 33 . Many of those objecting had good reasons to worry. They were alarmed that the violence initiated by party activists would spread to those Germans depicted as targets in the surging tide of propaganda. This included the Catholic Church as well as anyone who maintained social or economic contact with Jews or was suspected of such. The feelings of insecurity generated by unbridled denunciations became especially intense towards the summer. Small wonder, then, that those Germans who feared that they might be casualties of the anti-Semitic drive asked party leaders to retard the implementation of anti-Jewish policy. How far practical interests outweighed loyalty to Nazi doctrine can be clearly seen in a report from Koblenz for August and September 1935. A town in the district requested a reduction in the pressure on the Jews. The reason cited was that anti-Semitism did not pay: the inhabitants made their living from a medical institution owned by Jews, and its closure would deprive many family heads of an income 34 . What effect did these attitudes have on the Nazi authorities? There is no doubt that they were taken very seriously. Some commentators mention local decisions to discontinue violent anti-Jewish methods because they had antagonised the public. The Bielefeld Gestapo, for example, realised that the anti-Semitic campaign had become counterproductive when outrages made the victims into martyrs, and Germans, instead of keeping away from Jews, felt sorry for them. In view of this, it decided to set a limit to anti-Semitic outbursts 35 . It seems, then, that the exile periodical Weltbuehne was not far from the truth when it stated that the attacks on the Jews lessened at the end of May to diminish political disaffection 36 . With this background in mind, we can analyse the reactions of the German public to the Nuremberg Laws. Reactions to the Nuremberg Laws There can be no doubt that the desire of the public for an end to the internal contradictions of the regime's Jewish policy, and the widespread confusion and fear generated by the wave of violent antisemitism, provided an added incentive to push through the Nuremberg Laws. These included two laws that crucially affected the status of German Jews ¯ the Reich Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour ¯ and the law establishing the Swastika banner as the new German flag. This new flag law provides a useful point of reference for our analysis, since the reports convey responses to all three laws. We can thus compare public reactions to the antisemitic legislation, on the one hand, and to the law bringing about a break with Germany's imperial heritage, on the other. In both issues the legislation simply legalised what was already the case: the flag law regularised the fact that the Swastika banner was far more in evidence than the imperial flag; the antisemitic laws created a legal framework that curbed the violence against Jews and Jewish property, which was undermining public order. Sometimes the Nazi agents do not go into great detail on the responses to the legislation. The report from the Harburg-Wilhelmsburg Gestapo only states that, in relation to the citizenship law and the protection' law, there was no reaction, while the public talked a great deal about the flag law 37 . The actual content of the conversations becomes apparent from reports from other parts of the country. The political police in Munich distinguished sharply between the laws in reporting people's reactions to them. Whereas the population did not express any opinion on the citizenship law, the protection' law produced a positive response. The flag law, however, was openly criticised by officers and war veterans 38 . This was also the assessment of foreign observers. The British consul in Munich noted that the new flag law was beyond doubt universally popular in Bavaria, where the Swastika is known as the circus flag.' 39 From Koblenz we hear of a wider range of public responses: the party congress excited great interest, and the protection' law was received with much approval ¯ because, people thought, it would help prevent disturbances and isolate the Jews ¯ but the flag law met severe criticism from the older generation 40 . The different reactions elicited by the three laws show that for the bulk of the German population an assault on a historical symbol such as the black¯white¯red imperial flag was far more serious than ostracising Jewish fellow citizens. The law annulling Jewish citizenship was not much discussed: it was accepted as an obvious and absolutely natural measure. There was no point in reacting to a law that just rubber-stamped an existing reality. On the other hand, the abolition of the old flag was a matter of public interest and consequently elicited criticism, at least from the older generation. Let us consider the different reactions to the two laws dealing with the Jews. As to the revocation of Jewish citizenship, the Sopade reporter from Saxony missed the point when he observed that there were no reactions to the law because the German population had other things to worry about 41 . The absence of comment was not a result of indifference to the Jewish question or of simple acceptance that the law, whatever its moral basis, had been enacted by the state and was therefore binding (legal positivism'); it was a silence of tacit consent to the Nazi solution, based on a deep identification with the spirit of the law, which institutionalised the principles of racial separatism by isolating and removing Jews from the Volksgemeinschaft . The Potsdam Gestapo fully captured these feelings. It stated that all believed that with the stabilisation of the regime the time was ripe to realise this item on the party's agenda. At the same time, the commentator added, the public hoped that other points of the Nazi program would be acted upon, especially those related to social issues 42 . In Kiel, too, there was approval of the antisemitic laws, and people expected the status of the churches to be resolved in an equally satisfactory way 43 . The Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour was especially applauded because it checked antisemitic violence by confining it to the framework of law and order. This law expressed the desire of most Germans to remove the annoyances caused by uncontrolled terror, establishing a legal basis for the policies towards German Jews. The public assumed that the legislation would restore calm to the streets and put an end to behaviour that was besmirching Germany's image as a civilised country. The situation in various districts before and after the laws were adopted fully proves this point. In August, according to the Bielefeld Gestapo, there was widespread public unrest over cases of Rassenschande (race defilement), leading to popular demands for steps to be taken against it 44 . In its report for September, after the law had been adopted, the same station described the public as content. Everybody hoped that from this point on the Jewish problem would be solved within the framework of the new law and therefore without acts of terror 45 . We hear the same from Berlin. As early as March the Gestapo had noted that the population expected the matter to be settled, and in the summer it indicated that wreally disthe public was the lack of a clear line towards the Jews. In the Gestapo's view, given the abundance of denunciations of race defilement, common police methods were inadequate to prevent the renewal of anti-Jewish riots 46 . These circumstances clarify the reactions to the laws in Berlin. They aroused great enthusiasm everywhere because it was believed that they finally defined the relation between Jews and Germans: Jewry converted into a national minority and gets through state protection the possibility to develop its own cultural and national life.' 47 Similarly in Merseburg the Gestapo station observed that the legislation had won public approval; people expected the restoration of law and order, and, particularly, the scrapping of Der Stuermer 48 . It was only natural for the public to deem Der Stuermer obsolete after the enactment of the protection' law: Streicher's pornographic newspaper, among others, had deliberately provoked antisemitic rioting by spreading libels about race defilement; but, now that discriminatory practices had been legalised and a legal definition of race defilement provided, the excuse for radicals to take the law into their own hands had been removed. Thus far we have considered the reactions of the population in general. How did the party radicals respond? As discussed above, the reports for July and August touched on the clashed between radicals and the various agencies charged with keeping public order. The extremists' acts of violence did not stop even after Hess and Frick issued restraining directives, which in Berlin and Trier, for example, produced protests from the radicals 49 . The Nuremberg Laws, in their turn, were received by party activists with mixed feelings. The flag law was greeted with jubilation, for it symbolised the victory of party over government. The antisemitic laws were also seen as rekindling the revolutionary flame and thwarting the conservatives. Many saw in their promulgation a ceremonial declaration of antisemitic principles and, as such, a victory for Nazism in realising the party platform. Thus, for example, the report from Kassel recorded the fervent enthusiasm of radical circles: The state is still revolutionary. The party platform has not been forgotten.' 50 Many, however, thought the new laws too moderate', too mild'. Only a few justified this as a political manoeuvre to camouflage antisemitic terror from the outside world 51 . The Dortmund Nazis were more typical, considering the provision allowing the Jews to use their own symbols too great a concession. The author of the Dortmund survey added his opinion that this was liable to bring renewed troubles 52 . Similarly, the Potsdam Gestapo stated that party men deemed the laws too mild. They drew solace from their hopes that the reactions of world Jewry would raise the topic again and consequently sharpen antisemitic policy 53 . The Koblenz district governor reported activists' demand that the clause forbidding the employment by Jews of German maids under the age of forty-five should be extended. In Bielefeld the local Nazis wished that the law had specified no age limit 54 . The criticism of this clause seems to have been quite widespread. Some considered it should have included a ban on the employment of German maids by mixed couples, or by a single Jewish woman 55 . The reports recorded a few pockets of dissent to the new laws. Some Gestapo agents furnished interesting information on the response of the communist underground to the riots and antisemitic laws. The Dortmund Gestapo, for instance, reported that communist youth had disseminated underground leaflets in Bochum warning of the dangers inherent in the demagogic use of antisemitism among the masses, and calling for a common front between communist, Protestant and Catholic youth. Alongside an appeal for the release of political prisoners, the leaflets asked for tolerance towards the Jews 56 . The sharpest reaction seems to have come from a communist cell in Berlin. The local Gestapo's report for September informs us that the propaganda against antisemitism occupied a prominent place in underground material. Some of the slogans printed by clandestine communists in pamphlets and on stickers are also quoted in the report 57 . It is worth noting, however, that, even though the communists responded vigorously to antisemitic legislation, their basic conceptions of the nature of Nazi antisemitism remained unchanged. As underground publications from this period show, the communists resorted to stereotypical and dogmatic assertions: some stated that only poor workers were arrested for race defilement, while rich Jews were not touched by the Nazis 58 . Others maintained that there were no racial principles behind the ban on keeping maids under forty-five years of age; rather, the clause was simply an excuse for firing thousands of women form their jobs 59 . The churches had more than once been forced to react to incitement against the Jews, although they actually preferred to avoid this thorny issue altogether. The reports cite a few instances of aversion in church circles to racialist rituals and agitation, and even of protests regarding them; we learn from the Aachen Gestapo that such attitudes were especially prevalent among Catholic priests in the Rhineland 60 . In addition, some Protestants reacted against the regime's racial laws: a report from Speyer tells us that sermons hostile to them were distributed among the public by Evangelical pastors 61 . It is not possible, however, that the motives here were not so much concern for the Jews as anxiety over the status of converts of Jewish origin. Some misgivings and criticism by the liberal intelligentsia are also recorded. A few opposed the laws on principle, others on pragmatic grounds, mainly out of fear of economic reprisals against Germany. In Potsdam, for example, the better educated worried about an international boycott that would punish Germany for its racial policy 62 . Finally, some individuals employed by Jews made their feelings known since they feared for their income. Bielefeld Gestapo echoed the apprehensions of German clerks working for Jewish firms: they had reservations about the laws because they were afraid of losing their jobs. The same reaction was heard in Munich: commercial circles believed that Jews abroad would use the laws as an excuse to step up anti-German boycott 63 . The clause forbidding employment of German women under the age of forty-five upset those directly affected by it. Maids in Koblenz and Hildesheim criticised it as a threat to their livelihood and therefore asked for its revocation or for exemptions in order to retain their work, arguing that otherwise they would become a burden to the public. It is clear that in most of these cases, too, the objections stemmed from self-interest rather than from opposition to discrimination. To sum up, the vast majority of the population approved of the Nuremberg Laws because they identified with the racialist policy and because a permanent framework of discrimination had been created that would end the reign of terror and set precise limits to antisemitic activities. The Years 1936 ñ 7 During 1936 and 1937, the whole country experienced a period of relative calm and there was no essential change in public reactions to antisemitic policy. The first half of 1936, when Germany was in the limelight owing to the Olympic Games, was particularly quiet: in order to avoid international controversy, almost no attacks were directed against the Jews in that period, even after the killing of Wilhelm Gustloff, head of the Nazi organisation in Switzerland 65 . Immediately after the games were over, however, the antisemitic agitation started up again, both among local activists and at the party's headquarters. In November 1936, Munich University held a festive opening of the Department for Research into the Jewish Question in the National Institute for the History of the New Germany; Der Stuermer published Der Weltverschwoerer , a special edition prepared for the party congress, which reprinted passages from the Protocols of the Elders oZion, and Stuermer showcases appeared again all over the country 66 . In addition to the renewal of antisemitic propaganda, various governmental agencies issued new regulations and guidelines to increase pressure on the Jews, to force their removal from Germany. The Ministry of Education forbade non-Aryans to teach in private schools and recommended Der Stuermer for religious instruction&Mac226; Jewish doctors and assistants restricted to working in Jewish hospitals; and the number of arrests for alleged currency offences or race defilement again multiplied. Were there any changes in the reactions of the population in this period of relative calm? A thorough examination of reports for these years shows that people's moral insensibility to the fate of the Jews became more profound and widespread. This was not necessarily a result of Nazi indoctrination: on the contrary, propaganda continued to bore people, and antisemitic indoctrination evenings were still considered dull and tedious. A socialist observer from Schleswig perceptively noticed the lack of correspondence between responses to antisemitic propaganda and antisemitic attitudes. Although the public had no interest in indoctrination evenings on National Socialist historiography', The race question', Judaism and Freemasonry', and so on, the regime did succeed in driving a wedge between Jews and Germans 67 . This is hardly surprising, for, as we have seen, the bulk of the public did not need Nazi propaganda in order to ostracise Jews. The growing urge to avoid them stemmed from deep-seated anti-Jewish prejudices, and the resulting wide spread approval of segregation. It is true that the Stuermer methods and the violence met with the same disapproval as in the past and remarks condemning the Stuermer showcases appeared in almost every report. Nevertheless, the picture of what the public thought of the Jewish question is totally uniform: the general opinion was that the race laws should be carried out and the Jews removed from posts in administration, science and arts 68 . It is against this background that the attitudes of educated Germans to the Nazis' antisemitic policy are best viewed. Their criticism of the regime had been aroused by the earlier riots and boycott campaigns, but, once the Nuremberg Laws had been introduced and the violence damped down, total indifference to the fate of the Jews became dominant. The January 1936 Sopade report from Berlin, which examined the influence of antisemitism on the population, asserted that the race question as an ideological issue had not penetrated the consciousness of the educated classes. The incitement of Der Stuermer was seen as a national disgrace and elicited occasional manifestations of pro-Jewish feelings, but otherwise they were not interested in the issue and did not find antisemitism deserving of concern 69 . Still, even when the Jews were socially segregated, commercial relations with them continued as long as it made economic sense and German customers went to Jewish shops. The peasants in particular were slow to give in. As long as it was possible to deal with Jewish cattle-dealers, peasants traded with them 70 . Again, it has to be emphasised that this fact should not lead to conclusions of sympathy for the Jews. Since most Germans were not fanatically' antisemitic, practical interest outweighed common' anti-Jewish sentiments. References: 33 Gestapo Koesslin, report Aug. 1935, ibid. 34 RP, report Aug.¯Sep. 1935, BA, R 18/1565. 35 Gestapo Bielefeld,report July 1935, GS, REP/90 P. 36 Die W , 6 June 1935, pp. 726-7. 37 Gestapo Harburg¯Wilhelmsburg, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/529. 38 Polizei Direktion Muenchen, report Aug.¯Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/671. 39 British Consul in Munich, 17 Sep. 1935, PRO, FO 371/18880. 40 RP Koblenz, report Aug.¯Sep. 1935, BA, R 18/1565. 41 Sopade, Sep. 1935, A 35 (Sachsen 1). 42 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591. 43 Ibid.; Gestapo Kiel, report Sep. 1935, YVA, JM/2834; Kulka, Die Nuernberger Rassengesetze', p. 609. 44 Gestapo Bielefeld, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Kershaw, Persecution of the Jews', p. 270; Kulka, ”Public opinion” ', p. 130. 45 Gestapo Bielefeld, report Sep. 1935, YVA, JM/2834. 46 Gestapo Berlin, report Mar. 1935, BA, R 58/513. 47 Gestapo Berlin, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513. 48 Gestapo Merseburg, report Sep.¯Oct. 1935, YVA, JM/2834. 49 Gestapo Trier, report Sep. 1935, ibid. 50 Gestapo Kassel, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/529. 51 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591. 52 Gestapo Dortmund, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/514. 53 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591. 54 Gestapo Bielefeld, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513; RP Koblenz, report Oct.¯Nov. 1935, BA, R 18/1565. 55 Gestapo Koblenz, report Nov. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 56 Gestapo Dortmund, report Oct. 1935, BA, R 58/1143. 57 Gestapo Berlin, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513. 58 Ibid. 59 D. Bankier, The German Communist Party and Nazi Antisemitism, 1933-1938', Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute , 32 (1987), pp. 331-3. 60 Ibid. 61 RP Speyer, report Sep. 1935, BHStA, MA 106677. 62 Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/1591. 63Gestapo Bielefeld, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/513; RP Oberbayern, report Aug.¯Sep. 1935, BA, R 18/1567. 64 RP Koblenz, report Oct.¯Nov. 1935, BA, R 18/1565; Gestapo Hildesheim, report Oct. 1935, BA, R 58/1144; RP Ansbach, report Oct. 1935, YVA, JM/2858. Other issues, which remained unclear despite the legislation also confused the public: see Gauamt fuer Kommunalpolitik, Magdeburg-Anhalt, 25 Oct. 1935, and Schwabe, 31 Dec. 1935, BA, NS 25/85, fo. 1. 65 RP Ansbach, report Mar. 1936, BHStA, MA 106690. 66 Sopade, Dec. 1936, A 11 (Suedwest). On the renewal of antisemitic and persecutions, but the removal of Jews from the civil service, science, arts, etc. is endorsed by almost everyone' (Sopade, Oct. 1936, A6). 67 Sopade, June 1936, A 62 (Mitteldeutschland); Jan. 1936, A 21 (Berlin 3). 68 The Sopade contact man informed that People condemn violent antisemitism and persecutions, but the removal of Jews from the civil service, science, arts, etc. is endorsed by almost everyone' (Sopade, Oct. 1936, A6). 69 Sopade, Jan. 1936, A 20 (Berlin 2). 70 Kershaw, Popular Opinion , pp. 231-45; S. M. Lowenstein, The struggle for survival of rural Jews in Germany 1933-1938: the case of Bezirksamt Weissenburg, Mittelfranken', in Paucker, Die Juden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland , pp. 115-24; Wiesemann, Juden auf dem Lande: die wirtschaftliche Ausgrenzung der juedischen Viehhaendler in Bayern', in Detlev Peukert und Juergen Reulecke (eds), Die Reihen fast geschlossen. Alltag im Nationalsozialismus (Hammer, Wuppertal, 1981), pp. 381-96. Part C The Year 1938 From the end of 1937 the Jewish question was again central to a massive onslaught which resulted in reckless maltreatment and terror. The new campaign was sharply differentiated from previous ones by the fact that the state was active in arbitrary persecution; hitherto the party had been the main perpetrator. The Aryanization process was abruptly stepped up; new regulations on relations with Jews were published; antisemitic legislation and extensive administrative measures rapidly encompassed all areas of life. The state's initiative did not mean that the party lagged behind: it unleashed a barrage of propaganda to escalate the pressure to expel the Jews. In the space of two weeks in Saxony alone, 1,350 antisemitic meetings were held under the slogan A nation breaks its chains.' 71 As usual, agitative propaganda preceded terror: vandalising of Jewish institutions, businesses and private homes; abuse and torment of individuals, and arbitrary arrests. Whenever the foreign press gave prominence to these events, wholesale arrests followed. The Nazis hoped that as a result the Jews would restrain foreign observers from recording abuses. The euphoria, which followed the annexation of Austria in March, led to such outrages that Austrian Gauleiter Buerckel had to arrest members of the Austrian Legion 72 . At the end of April a boycott was started in Frankfurt and a month later pogroms broke out in Berlin. The terror was undoubtedly also fed by concrete show' examples such as the demolition of the Munich synagogue after Hitler's referendum in May. These initiatives from above always served as a signal for a tide of abuse against German Jews. The mayor of Bad Kissingen, for example, was one who understood this green light: Jewish visitors to the town's spa were issued special yellow tickets, prohibited from frequenting the concert hall and reading-rooms, and restricted to properly designated baths and garden benches 73 . In the summer this policy assumed even more serious dimensions. The most embracing act of state terror was the Juniaktion (June Action). In Berlin, as well as in other cities, there were systematic house-to-house searches and arrests; cafes were raided and even cinemas were emptied of Jews. Those who had a police record of any kind, even for parking a car on the wrong side of the road, were treated as criminals and transported to concentration camps. The fact that release was made conditional on leaving Germany clearly demonstrated that the main purpose of the operation was to force emigration. Again the party sought to show its zeal by outdoing the state in persecuting Jews. Police arrests were matched by revived party brutality. From 10 June antisemitic furore masterminded by the Berlin Gauleitung and perpetrated by party organisations erupted: Jewish stores were defaced with signs; clinics and lawyers' offices were marked. In several cases businesses were smashed and gutted, and in the coming weeks the storm extended to South Western Germany. That these attacks were engineered and carried out by the party is clear from internal SD material. The initiative came from the local party chiefs and not from the Jewish section of the SD or a government agency 74 . An atmosphere fuelled by fears of impending war at the time of the Sudeten crisis found expression in the antisemitic mood of party elements and in the recourse to violence. During the month of October there were a number of outbreaks in Vienna and provincial towns, staged mainly by the SA and the Hitler Youth, which discharged accumulated passions. Bands of SA men who had been demobilised after being called up for service raided Jewish houses in Vienna in search of means to punish Jews for their unpatriotic' attitude during the Munich crisis. The most virulent outbreak was a large-scale pogrom lasting from the 14th to the 21st. Hundreds of Jewish houses, schools, synagogues and businesses were raided, wrecked and looted. In Krems the Jews were compelled to turn over the synagogue to the local Nazi Party. As a consequence of these events suicides multiplied 75 . The persecution reached a climax in the mass expulsion of Jews of Polish origin, whose tragic fate sent ripples throughout the world. Some 15,000 of them were rounded up, bundled into trains and unloaded at the Polish frontier. That this was not the first expulsion of Jews is often overlooked. In April the Nazis planned to expel all Jews from the Burgenland province for strategic reasons', and prohibit any Jews from residing within 50 kilometres of the border. In fact, some 400 were ordered to leave twelve towns in the Burgenland and sent over the frontiers into Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Since many were refused permission to enter Czechoslovak territory, they remained interned in barracks on the border 76 . All these measures made it clear to everyone that, unlike in previous years, this time antisemitic policy would be pursued regardless of its effect on Germany's image. After two years of relative calm on the Jewish question, how did the population respond to these developments? The dimensions and chof the wave of anti-Jewish terror prior to Kristalln received pamentiin the SD's national report of 1 November 1938. In its view, the public attitude toward the Jewish question was expressed in the proliferation of rioting, and on the whole enjoyed the support of the local party organisations 77 . This generalisation by the SD requires closer scrutiny. The events of 1938 brought no significant change in the pattern of public reactions established in previous years. The overwhelming majority approved social segregation and economic destruction of the Jews but not outbursts of brute force. Notwithstanding the fact that traditional anti-Jewish attitudes not only persisted but even grew in this period, practical interests had priority over loyalty to the official doctrine. The Berlin observer of the Sopade rightly noticed that, although antisemitism was gradually taking root in the population, it was not Jew-hatred in the Nazi sense. The public did not feel sympathy for the Jews, but this fact did not lead them to abstain from shopping in Jewish stores, and many workers frequented them without encountering difficulties 78 . In Cologne a pattern of non-conformist conduct we are already familiar with appears again: some continued to shop in Jewish stores, but as a way of expressing their opposition to Nazism and not necessarily out of sympathy for the victims 79 . As in previous years, economic measures against the Jews were universally welcomed. Thus the decree which provided for the registration of all Jewish property over RM 5,000 received general acclaim and the public hardly regretted the state taking possession of wealth which they believed Jews had stolen from the German people 80 . Yet the Sopade reporter in Schleswig asserted that many did not understand the point of reviving the antisemitic drive after the Jews had already been marginalized economically 81 . Similarly, another report states that even those who endorsed the expulsion of the Jews from the economy and public life rejected the brutal methods employed 82 . As previously, those condemning the disturbances did so out of opposition to the form of antisemitism and not to the policy itself. An observer in Berlin noticed that as a result of the constant incitement many had become antisemites. However, the report adds, more than a few voices had been raised against the hooligans: the general public witnessed these ongoings with morbid interest, and the outrages were regarded by many as being inconsistent with modern civilisation.' 83 As in the summer of 1935, people thought that the authorities had gone too far in their crusade against the Jews. The reports on rural areas reflect the specific reality of small communities. The dominant pattern of behaviour was identification with antisemitic policy so long as it was not applied too clto home. Hence absolute indifference to the victimisation of unknown Jews was compatible with manifestations of sympathy towards local Jews. Despite the propaganda, the peasants did not cease to distinguish between their Jew', who should stay in the village, and the rest of German Jews, who should be expelled so that the Jewish question in general could be solved. A report from Saxony in a region with a small Jewish population exemplifies these attitudes: people endorsed the antisemitic measures they read about in the newspapers, but when a Jew trading there was harmed by this same policy they regretted it 84 . A Sopade contact from south-western Germany got the same impression: in villages where Jews had lived for generations and were part of the social landscape, even though there were no more social contacts between Jews and Germans, people felt sorry that the local Jews were leaving 85 . It is true that we could explain this absence of interest in what was happening to the Jews by the fact that the German public had its own troubles which concerned them more than the Jewish question. Indeed, one commentator emphasised that The population fears a coming war. In this mood the whole Jewish question arouses little interest. People have better things to worry about than the Jews.' 86 To be sure, the mood of the population in 1938 was characterised by an almost universal fear of war. Hitler's foreign-policy success generated more relief than rejoicing. In domestic affairs, economic hardships caused mounting discontent and tension. However, to attribute people's lack of interest in the Jews to the effect of these competing factors would be too simplistic. The attitudes in previous years explain the reactions in this period. On the basis of the reactions from 1933 on, it can safely be concluded that the attitudes from the early months of Hitler's rule became a normative pattern of behaviour. Reactions to Kristallnacht The comprehensive SD report for 1938 merely sketched the contours of the population's reaction to the Kristallnacht : generally speaking, in the south (except Austria) and in the west (mainly Catholic, more populous and urban) criticism was stronger than in the north (Protestant, rural and less populous). Economic circles protested against the damage, and the bourgeoisie feared the possible consequences abroad 87 . This picture, although basically correct, deserves further elaboration. The nation wide pogrom of Kristallnacht ¯ while initiated, organised and executed throughout Germany by state and party agencies ¯ belonged to the renewed anti-Jewish wave of terror. Hence the reactions of the public cannot be detached from the responses throughout 1938, particularly to the turbulence of the summer and autumn months. It must be borne in mind that behind the widespread distrust of the regime's policies, as well as discontent over internal conditions, were the waning of the optimism, which the Munich agreement had aroused, the shattering of hopes for international appeasement, and the feelings that another eleventh-hour conference could not be conjured up to prevent war. The pogrom was just the straw that broke the camel's back; overall criticism ensued. And, while critical tone is apparent in all the reports, the dominant motif is not condemnation on moral grounds. Shame at the act, shock at its extent, and regret for the property destroyed converged to create a negative reaction. Nevertheless, the responses to Kristallnacht far outstripped public reactions to any other antisemitic outrage. For the first time, all Germans were personally confronted with antisemitic violence. For this reason there is no trace of indifference. All sections of the population reacted with deep shock. The public was polarised on the handling of the Jewish question: party circles and their periphery gave full support, while the large majority condemned it. For the first time, there were large displays of shame. People felt humiliated that Germany's Kultur was disgraced in the eyes of the world. According to eyewitnesses, people in the streets of Berlin who saw Jewish camp inmates returning home looked as though they were ashamed, and numerous stories went round of Germans who tried to compensate Jews for what the regime did 88 . For the first time, non-Jews sensed a real danger of being the next victim of Nazi terror. Many who had hitherto profited from Aryanization felt they were not secure because they stood to lose from revived radicalism. They feared that the confiscation of Jewish property could be a precedent for plundering other well-off sections of the public. For example, Carl Goerdeler, the leader of the 20 July 1944 plot, forecast further persecution of capitalists and Christians 89 . Hence it was only natural that the most vehement condemnation of the pogrom came from those sectors who suspected they were next in line for such treatment; these apprehensions were especially noticeable in among the Catholic public. The fact that in certain places the pogrom was accompanied by attacks against the Catholic Church, when SA men who did not have Jews to attack deflected their fury onto Catholic churches, destroying crosses and effigies, aroused a fear that the government was losing its grip. It was not coincidenthat the communist underground directed its propaganda at Catholics. It knvery well thatthey were particularly sensitive about the violence against the foes of Nazism', and that they feared that once terror had been unleashed the churches and religious leaders would be the next victims. In this light it is no surprise that the communists tried to win over the Catholic population by drawing parallels between the fate of the Jews and the fate of the churches. Again and again they said that the pogrom was the beginning of a process which would eventually destroy Christianity. A communist underground leaflet disseminated in the Rhine region is an eloquent example of this line of reasoning: Catholics were horrified to see that the burning of synagogues was frighteningly similar to the attacks of the Hitler gangs against the bishops' manses in Rothenburg, Vienna, and Munich 90 . Added to the underground responses to the pogrom, the Berlin Gestapo Report for November tells us that the Jewish question was of central interest to communist activity throughout the Reich. The reporter stressed that the communist underground's call for solidarity with the Jews, fell on sympathetic ears among the upper class and Catholics, and even among certain sectors of the public who supported antisemitic policies but rejected vandalism. The Gestapo stations of Schwerin and Cologne also recorded lively debates in factories, which had previously been under communist influence 91 . It is particularly noteworthy that the underground reaction did not necessarily mirror the attitudes of all workers. Even a Sopade report had to admit that condemnation was by no means unanimous 92 . Even though the communist underground spoke out strongly against the pogrom, its chief complaint was the waste of public property ¯ contrary to the objectives of the Four Year Plan. In this respect there was no essential difference between the reaction of the communists and the responses of other groups in Germany. Condemnation of material damage and regret at the loss of property came before the immorality of abusing defenceless civilians. This is evident in one of the underground circulars issued at the time: No one in Germany believes that the burning of synagogues and Jewish homes, the destruction, plunder and burning of Jewish shops, warehouses and factories, the bestial maltreatment, the murder, the mass concentration of Jews in camps, is due to the rage of the German people'. Workers are calculating the number of extra hours they will need to work to repair the damage done to German national property. Workers' wives who manage to buy something for their homes only after much work and hardship watched the waste of much property with bitterness, and numerous housing-candidates watched with repressed rage as Nazis burned houses, villas andsynagogues' 93 . The treatment of the Jews aroused disapproval among many who had hitherto endorsed moderate' antisemitic measures. For example, only Kristallnacht shook the educated bourgeoisie out of their apathy. Up to this moment many of them felt the utmost contempt for the regime's vulgarity and lack of culture. Up to this moment they were ready to tolerate this because the Nazis were seen as the saviours who could prevent Germany's collapse into Bolshevism. But the pogrom was too much, disappointing and politically alienating the bourgeoisie. A Sopade report from Saxony for January 1939 told of scientists, intellectuals and army officers who were deeply affected by the acts of vandalism. They vigorously condemned the action, especially the foolish destruction of property. The reporter added that the few who had supported Nazism in these circles had begun to detach themselves from the system, voicing hostile criticism against this sort of National Bolshevism'. Following the pogrom, the bourgeoisie no longer considered it bon ton to invite party members to tea parties and concerts 94 . Some were so deeply troubled that they wrote to the British Embassy in Berlin to express their shame. One monarchist asked for help to liberate Germany from the gang of terrorists ruling it. He called for retaliation against the Germans in the United States, Britain and France, and efforts to enable German Jews to find refuge in former German colonies 95 . Even party circles condemned the way the pogrom was carried out. Their reasons were obviously different: they argued that the arson contradicted the goals of the Four Year Plan, and that it was politically unwise to arouse sympathy for the Jews. References: 71 Sopade, July 1938, A 76. 72 British Consulate General in Vienna, 29 April 1938, PRO, FO 371/21635. 73 Ibid. 74 SD II¯112, Berlin, 1 July 1938, BA, R 58/996. 75 British Consulate General in Vienna to British Embassy in Berlin, 7 Oct. and 7. Nov. 1938, PRO, FO 371/21665; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, News Bulletin 88 (14 Apr. 1938). 76 British Consulate General in Vienna, 13. Apr. 1938, PRO, FO 371/21634. 77 Kulka, The ”Jewish Question”', vol. II, pp. 396-9. 78 Sopade, Feb. 1938, A 60-2. 79 Sopade, July 1938, A 89. 80 Henderson to Halifax, 2 May 1938, PRO, FO 408/68. On the expropriation policy see A. Barkai, ”Schicksalsjahr 1938”: Kontinuitaet und Verschaerfung der wirtschaftlichen Auspluenderung der deutschen Juden', in Ursula Buettner (ed.), Das Unrechtsregime (Christians, Hamburg, 1986), vol. II. pp. 45-68. 81 Sopade, July 1938, A 94. 82 Sopade, July 1938, A 89-90, 94-5; British Consulate in Hamburg, report June 1938, PRO, FO 371/21635. 83 British Charge d'Affaires in Berlin to FO, 13 July 1938, PRO, FO 371/21635. 84 Sopade, Feb. 1938, A 67 (Sachsen 2). 85 Sopade, Feb. 1938, A 62. 86 Sopade, July 1938, A 101. 87 It is important to remember that widespread antisemitic rioting preceded Kristallnacht . Thus, there were outbursts of violence in the night of 7 Nov., in Rothenburg, Fulda and Vebra: Jewish houses, shops and schools were demolished and acts of terror committed. The synagogue of Bad Hersfeld was burned on the night of 8 Nov. and other synagogues ¯ in Eschwege, Witzenhausen, Fritzlar, Kirchhain and Neustadt (near Marburg) ¯ were destroyed before Kristallnacht . See Chef Sicherheitspolizei an Chef Ordnungspolizei, 9. Nov. 1938, BA, R 58/979; also Kulka, The ”Jewish Question”', vol. II, p. 399. 88 The varied reactions to the pogroms, including the objections, are reflected in most sources. For Nazi reports see for example SD Unterabschnitt Thueringen-Erfurt, Aussenstelle Gotha, 24 Mar. 1939, report for first quarter of 1939, BA, NS 29/77; SD Unterabschnitt Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, 1 Feb. 1939, report for fourth quarter of 1938, StA L, K110 Bue. 44, and 1 Apr. 1939, report for first quarter of 1939, ibid., Bue. 45. Cf. the impressions of foreign diplomats: for example those of the Italian Consul in Munich, R. Pittalis, contained his report of 19 Nov. 1938, Le ulteriori ripercussioni delle recenti manifestazioni antisemite' (Comunicazioni did diplomatici italiani su misure ed azioni antiebraiche nel terzo Reich. Documenti tratti dagli Archivi del Ministero degli Affari Esteri Italiano, CDEC); the British diplomat Ogilvie Forbes noted in his dispatch of 15 Nov. 1938 (PRO, FO 371/21637) that he heard no expressions of shame or disgust, and that the onlookers appeared completely passive, but he noticed the inane grim which often inadvertently betrays the guilty conscience'. By contrast the British Consul in Cologne noted that Germans who had nothing at stake displayed a certain amount of Schadenfreude (report of 14 Nov. 1938, PRO, FO 371/21638). Cf. also L. Kochan, Pogrom (Andre Deutsch, London, 1957), pp. 93-4. For the subjective dimension as reflected by personal diaries see for example E. Nies, Politisches Tagebuch 1935-1945 (Ebner, Ulm, 1947), entry for 11 Nov. 1938. 89 On Goerdeler's reactions to the expulsion of Polish Jews see PRO, FO 371/22961; A. P. Young, The X' Documents. The secret history of Foreign Office contacts with the German Resistance 1937-1939 (Andre Deutsch, London, 1974), pp. 139 (on Kristallnacht ), 153, 160-1. 90 Gestapo Aachen, 30 Nov. 1938, report Marxism, BA, R 58/446. Cf. the report of the Nazi Teachers' League (NSLB) of Marquenstein, Haslach, Erding, 19 Nov. 1938, StA N, NSDAP 983; Wiesemann, Judenverfolgung', p. 470; Sopade, Nov. 1938, A 45 (Rheinland-Westfalen 2). It is noteworthy that, in localities without Jews, demonstrations were staged in front of churches: see Sopade, Nov. 1938, A 35 (Bayern), A 45 (Koeln), A 49 (Schlesien 2); RP Mainfranken, report Nov. 1938, BHStA, MA 106694. 91 Gestapo Schwerin, report Nov. 1938, YVA, JM/2834; Gestapo Koeln, report Nov. 1938, BA, R 48/446. 92 Sopade, Jan. 1939, A 9. 93 The most common objection was that the destruction of property contradicted the goals of the Four Year Plan: see for example Kommandeur der Gendarmerie, Land Wuerttemberg, 31 Dec. 1938, StA L, E 151 cII, Bue. 434. See also Kerhaw, Popular Opinion , pp. 269-70. Kulka, ”Public opinion”', pp. 230-42. 94 SD Unterabschnitt Wuerttemberg, 1 Feb. 1939, report for fourth quarter of 1938, StA L, K 110 Bue. 44, and 1 Apr. 1939, report for first quarter of 1939, ibid., Bue. 45. For a suggestive interpretation of these reactions see W. S. Allen, Die deutsche Oeffentlichkeit und die ”Reichskristallnacht”. Konflikt zwischen Werthierarchie und Propaganda im Dritten Reich', in Peukert und Reulecke, Die Reihen fast geschlossen , pp. 397-412. 95 PRO, FO 371/21638. Back to the top