D. Bankier Image and Reality in the Third Reich Source: D. Bankier, The German and the Final Solution (Oxford, 1992), pp.14-27. Unlike dictatorships of traditional elites which sought to neutralise the masses by preventing them from taking an active part in political life, the Nazi regime attempted to create a situation in which the public would be permanently mobilised. Many researchers attribute the broad consensus behind the Third Reich to the readiness of almost all strata of the population to participate in the new order. They argue that a religious devotion gripped the masses, which spontaneously and willingly followed the party's lead. The picture which emerges is one of unequivocal support for the Nazi system and its political culture by most of the German public - a picture closely matching the one painted by Goebbels' propaganda media, and in keeping with what the regime hoped to achieve, rather than with any historical reality. In contrast to this idealised state of affairs, our sources reveal that, from as early as summer 1934, the euphoria, which had accompanied the party's rise and accession to power was steadily on the wane. The Limits of Mass Mobilisation Once the party was entrenched in power, public attitudes were characterised not by mass revolutionary fervour, but by a growing distaste for political action, manifested in unwillingness to participate in mass-mobilisation campaigns, and reluctance to support the rallies, parades and meetings organised by, or on behalf of, the party. Indeed, there was a marked tendency to political indifference, and official propaganda was often met with passive hostility. The Nazis' purpose in holding rallies and meetings was to get rational individuals to succumb to the spell of cliches and stereotyped slogans and undergo an emotional experience of collective awakening. It seems that this form of indoctrination often fell short of its target 1 . Only a year after the party came to power, sizeable sectors of the population began to criticise the mass mobilisations, though the criticisms were phrased with utmost caution for fear of reprisals. Early signs of the dwindling influence of Nazi propaganda can be traced in the April 1934 report of the district governor in Regensburg. Among other things, he pointed out that 'In the county of Deggendorf, the peasants complain about too many festive, political parades and too much canvassing; this discontent is, however, expressed very cautiously.' 2 Evidence from all over the Reich shows that little by little this disposition became a widespread phenomenon. At first the surveys merely mention this new trend in a few casual sentences without any attempt at appraisal or interpretation, because the reporter regarded it as insignificant and transient. However, by summer of 1935 it had become so strong that many observers thought that the broad base of support for the regime might be cracking. From August 1934 the central authorities started to receive reports from all areas of the Reich noting increasing apathy and withdrawal from political life. The governor of the Aachen district, for instance, detected, 'more and more indifference... as far as political life is concerned.' 3 The optimistic and self-satisfied accounts that local party bosses submitted to the leadership, in order to consolidate their own positions, were contradicted by more objective surveys. In October the Duesseldorf Gestapo wrote in no uncertain terms of deep-seated apathy, political lethargy and lack of faith. Bowed down by pessimism the public tacitly rejected the daily press, particularly the party organs. The same Gestapo station even cautioned the decision-makers not to misinterpret the state of affairs in the Reich: Even though the external image is one of quiet and equanimity, one cannot obtain an objective appreciation of the prevailing public mood when one realises that the undercurrents mentioned are gaining in importance. The indifferent and often apathetic disposition of broad sectors of the population points definitely in this direction 4 . In Muenster the local Gestapo similarly noted that 'The true mood of the population is reflected in the passivity of great parts of the public towards the movement's activities. Only because of fear of reprisals has this attitude remained submerged.' 5 The Aachen Gestapo further warned that the rosy accounts purveyed at the national convention of party leaders in Munich should not be taken too seriously. Although the convention reported impressive achievements and an extraordinary rise in party popularity, the reality was rather different 6 . A central reason for the public's apathy was the numbing effect of too much propaganda. There is little doubt that, after the Nazis had gained power and begun to consolidate their position, there were two opposing trends. Like other revolutionary movements, which have succeeded in winning power, Nazism experienced a clash between the impulse towards permanent revolution and the forces of institutionalisation. The Nazi ideal was itself a contradiction in terms: political stability achieved through, and expressed in, constant action. All the festivals and parades were part of an attempt to regulate the pace of life of the German nation, to overcome crises by diverting people and at the same time to maintain a high profile for the party. Dynamism was at the heart of Nazism, inherent in both its revolutionary nature and its vitalist philosophy, which it shared with all other fascist movements. Propaganda had an essential part to play here, both through indoctrination and through inculcating a heightened sense of political consciousness. Hitler himself pointed this out when he decided to establish a propaganda ministry: 'There will now have to be a large-scale campaign of propaganda and information in order that no political lethargy should set in.' 7 The bulk of the population sought to institutionalise the achievements of the revolution and prevent dynamism from becoming the basis of day-to-day life. The party leadership, by contrast, sought constantly to reactivate the masses, to prevent ideological ossification and a loss of fervour. To this end it attempted to detach people from their traditional cultures and to prevent a simple (return to normal'. The result was the opposite of the one intended: people became satiated with political activity and lost interest. This was the background to the report of the Hanover Gestapo in February 1935, which commented that participation in party assemblies was declining everywhere owing to the abundance of such mass gatherings 8 . The governor of the Minden district had a similar tale to tell. Illustrating developments in his region, he mentioned that an order to assemble for a rally had met with an apathetic response. This he thought understandable, considering the fatigue engendered by years of consciousness-raising 9 . It would be a mistake to assume that these attitudes were typical only of areas in which Nazism was less firmly entrenched. William S. Allen, using different evidence, arrived at similar conclusions: the marches, flag-waving and rallies induced and coexisted with public weariness, boredom and lack of involvement 10 . Moreover, our sources show that this was so even in areas with a political record of mass support for Nazism. Erfurt Gestapo reported in April 1935 that very few people attended the indoctrination evenings. The same went for all the rallies and ceremonies, which, in the view of the reporter, aroused absolutely no interest in the public 11 . A study of the opinions of various social classes, taking into account geographical, religious and other variables, shows how widespread such indifference was. Let us look first at the bourgeoisie. A good deal of material has been preserved about what the Nazis termed (the better circles' - the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. In August 1934, the Trier Gestapo noted a significant drop in the number of better-off people joining the party; the writer added, referring to information he had from other Gestapo stations, that it would appear that this sector of the population was losing interest in political life 12 . While this picture relates to the bourgeoisie of a Catholic region, it is not essentially different from what we know of Schleswig-Holstein, a Protestant district where the Nazi Party had deep roots. A Gestapo Report from Kiel notes the reluctance of the bourgeoisie to participate in rallies or use the 'Heil Hitler' greeting, and their increasing withdrawal from political life 13 . Statistical evidence of this was reported by another Gestapo station in the region: 'the split in the vote in the Luebeck area shows a drop in support for Nazism among the "better circles".' 14 If these attitudes might have been expected among the educated classes, whose initial enthusiasm was dampened by Hitler's methods of repression and brutal terror, the phenomenon is also apparent among a sector of the population generally considered supporters of Nazism: the peasants, especially those of northern and eastern Germany. From the start, the Nazis spared no energy in winning over the peasants. They promised comprehensive and far-reaching agricultural reforms, and mounted an intensive propaganda campaign aimed at the rural population. With Hitler's rise to power, Walter Darre, the Minister of Agriculture, embarked on a broad program of legislation designed to transform agricultural production - for instance, through the Entailed Farm Law (Erbhofgesetz). In addition, the regime courted the rural public through its Blut und Boden ('blood and soil') doctrine idealising the peasant as the fount of the Nordic race. How effective was this propaganda, and what was the response to it? Most of the comments on the mood of the rural population speak of political apathy and fatigue. The governor of the Magdeburg district reported that the harvest celebrations in his area in 1934 had attracted little interest: at some ceremonies only the local peasants' leader and a few dozen farmers had turned up 15 . A propaganda campaign in the autumn failed to improve matters, and, according to the governor of the Koblenz district, was responsible for an increase in complaints. In his view, apathy and lack of concern had begun to give way to opposition: (The farming public claims that so long as no significant changes have actually been instituted, despite the party's tales of constant improvements, there is no point in attending its meetings' 16. The same reservations were evident in the Trier Gestapo's report in May 1935. Here an attempt was made to blame seasonal factors for the peasants' absence from parades: (in the summer months the farmer puts in late hours in the fields and he is not interested in meetings after a hard day's work.' It seems, however, that the writer was himself unconvinced by this excuse, for he immediately added that party speeches did not interest the rural audience 17 . Through its monopoly of the media the Third Reich reached the rural public, and demanded its active participation in the Nazi rituals; but people's attitudes were not to be changed so easily. Political indoctrination bored them and, despite the fact that some, particularly the young, stood to benefit from the new system, the bulk of the peasant population continued to have reservations. A major reason for this was the irreconcilable contradiction between the Nazis' promise to establish an agrarian state (part of the romantic-racial myth of Blut und Boden) and the industrialisation, which actually followed. Another important group that the Nazis tried to win over was the industrial labour force. From its inception the party devoted considerable effort to canvassing workers, especially in the north, but when Hitler acceded to power the workers were not a significant component of the Nazi movement. In order to reach them and make them part of a general consensus in favour of the new system, the regime established (temples' of the Hitler cult in factories; arranged for street-cleaners to be interviewed by the press, to make it appear that they were being taken seriously; and promised various rewards. The climax of the propaganda efforts came on May Day 1933, when the rector of Heidelberg University marched beside a common worker in a festive parade symbolising the realisation of the slogan 'The unity of the workers of the mind and fist' 18 . To what extent were the workers won over by the propaganda campaigns? Some idea of this may be gained from the festivities of May Day, which the regime declared a 'national labour holiday'. The fact was that, as the Nazis recognised, workers were too attached to the traditional celebrations for them to be abolished outright; but, at the same time, efforts were made to give the holiday a new, Nazi content and significance. Press articles on May Day conjure up a picture of mass participation and spontaneous enthusiasm that would appear to demonstrate the workers' identification with the holiday in its new guise. However, a look at other sources shows that this picture is basically distorted. Most reporters begin by noting the success of the party's propaganda and the high rate of participation in marches. Thus, in its report on the 1935 May Day festivities, the Munster Gestapo claims that the holiday was a great success: that there were public celebrations; that homes were adorned with flags and that people displayed many other signs of loyalty to the regime. Later, however, the report notes that there was a significant decrease in flag-waving in comparison to the previous year. Participation in rallies is declared good, but it is also stated that the rural population and the middle classes tended to keep their involvement to a minimum. Most enlightening are the report's concluding words: The good participation at parades and rallies cannot serve as a true gauge of the public's real mood and we must not be led astray by what appears on the surface. The public mood has considerably deteriorated in recent weeks, particularly among the local workers. This negative mood has already manifested itself in various ways on Allay Day. According to reports, which have reached me, the workers joined in parades and rallies under duress; at many sites they tried to abscond from the rallies as soon as they had received the beer vouchers, which were distributed. This was particularly noticeable at the Gladbeck Stadium: immediately after the festive entrance they decamped en masse. This shows that some of the workers feel more or less compelled to participate in the rallies while in their hearts they do not exult in them' 19 . It is patently obvious here that the reality was not always what the regime made it out to be. The above example is, moreover, nothing out of the ordinary: in other localities we find a similar picture, even in the Nazi organisations themselves. Thus, for instance, the Bielefeld Gestapo commented on the May Day celebrations, (Complaints have been received from various areas in the Padeborn district to the effect that the NS-HAGO [Nationalsozialistische Handwerks, Handels und Gewerbe Organisation: Nazi Craft and Commerce Organisation] and the Peasants' Estate did not participate in the May Day festivities to the same extent as last year.' To substantiate this point, the station furnished concrete examples, quoting reports from various police stations 20 . We learn from the Herford police that at many factories nobody showed up, not even the factory leader on behalf of the party and the German Labour Front; and that, among the workers who did appear, there were signs of overt opposition to the regime: 'Some removed the German Labour Front insignia and swastika from their blue caps, and when the parade arrived at the assembly site they retired from it so that they would not be compelled to listen to the Kreisleiter's speech' 21 . Finally, it should be mentioned that the Berlin Gestapo explicitly stated that mass public participation in the May Day celebrations could not be taken as a measure of the public mood. To underline the point, it enumerated the means used to coerce people to attend rallies 22 . That public attitudes were vastly different from what they are commonly assumed to have been can be further demonstrated by examining the public responses to mass rallies, for which the party set its mighty conscriptive machinery in motion. At Osnabrueck, for example, the Gestapo reported that a rally addressed by the governor was poorly attended, because, as the writer admitted, the public was tired of parades and meetings 23 . The Aachen Gestapo likewise reported that a party-conference rally for the entire Cologne-Aachen Gnu attracted little support, and that the public in general demonstrated a basic lack of interest in political activity 24 . A study of the public responses to other major campaigns organised by the party leads to similar conclusions regarding the failure of mobilisation. In a community-affairs report for the Hesse-Nassau Gau, for instance, we find a note that the number of marriages in the region has risen surprisingly - in one district by 150 per cent over the previous year 25 . In a comparable report from the Cologne-Aachen Gau, we hear that marriages there have risen among the under twenty-fives, and this time the reporter adds significantly that the development should be viewed as an attempt to evade conscription for work service, to which all unmarried males under this age were liable 26 . This evidence of reluctance to perform work service contrasts with the familiar photographs of happy youngsters marching in ranks to build roads, and is confirmed by Gestapo surveys as well. The Duesseldorf report for September 1934 states that marriage is on the increase in the under-twenty-five age group, and surveys from Bielefeld, Koesslin and elsewhere say the same 27 . It would seem that, after only one year of Hitler's rule, the willingness of various social groups to take part in the mass-mobilisation campaigns was declining, producing a growing gap between the regime and the populace. This contention can be further substantiated by looking at another tool of indoctrination - the press. The Limits of the Press as an Instrument of Propaganda The fluctuations in the circulation of the party press, subservient to Goebbels' propaganda machine, is a partial indicator of the degree to which many Germans responded to Nazi indoctrination. In order to obtain a fuller picture, we must compare the circulation rates of the Nazi press to that of the non-party periodicals published during the first years of the Third Reich. Our main emphasis will be on dailies, weeklies and periodicals which, despite the coercive policy of Gleichschaltung (forcing into line), continued to serve as a sounding-board for the right-wing conservatives and the churches. In Nazi Germany, as in all totalitarian systems, the press played a vital role as an agent of political socialisation - taking the lead in transmitting and instilling official ideology. When necessary, it churned out propaganda aimed at mobilising the masses and channeling their activities in the interest of the government or the party. It is therefore hardly surprising that surveys of the public mood devoted a special section to the media - press, cinema and radio - keeping the state and party authorities up to date with the effectiveness of these propaganda tools in transmitting the ruling doctrine to the masses. These reports contain an abundance of information on the fate of the various press organs in Germany and the public response to what was printed in them. It stands to reason that this information was invaluable to policy- and decision-makers, helping them assess the influence of the propaganda machine on people's lives, and the degree to which people were susceptible to, or would tolerate, such indoctrination 28 . It is commonly assumed, even by some researchers that with the collapse of the multi-party system the German population became an amorphous and disorganised mass of individuals, devoid of political or social views. People lost all capacity for independent judgement and critical thinking, and submitted to the regime's pressure to conform. This in turn, the view holds, produced total loyalty to the system, and credulous acceptance of the regime's propaganda 29 . A critical look at the Gestapo reports, the district governors' surveys, and other sources concerned with the press and its influence suggests that the reality was quite otherwise. These sources indicate that, at least during the early years of the Nazi regime, there was still a struggle between the party press and the various church journals. They continued to operate despite pressure from the regime for uniformity, and, for those who knew how to read between the lines, served as an alternative source of information. It would appear, then, that the notion that all Germans underwent a process of social atomisation in the Third Reich is nearer to Nazi propaganda than to historical reality. Public receptiveness to press propaganda reached saturation point soon after Hitler came to power, and thereafter went into decline: it was not long before a trend of outright rejection became manifest. This process can be detected both in the general introductions to the reports and in the survey material on the media. It is also evident in the statistical data furnished by the summaries, which point to a steady decline in the circulation of party journals. This was undoubtedly part of the reaction noted earlier, that set in after the first year of Nazi rule, when the new system's inability to fulfil all its promises became apparent. From the beginning of summer 1934 one finds neither the 'disappearance of faith in the ordinary reality, the pull towards indoctrination', nor 'the cancellation of independent views in the face of official propaganda' 30 , but rather the reverse: a gradual widening of the credibility gap between the regime and those segments of the public which refused to bow to the tide of propaganda. Various commentators tell of critical responses among readers, and lack of confidence in the information published in the press. Thus the president of the Rhine province wrote in his report for September-October 1934, 'The little information that has been transmitted to the public has proved harmful, rumours are ever rampant. The press and radio are not considered reliable and two public opinion systems are developing: the one represented by the press and on the radio, and the one known as the "rumour press" which spreads quickly' 31 . Equally illustrative of this state of affairs is the report by the Aachen Gestapo covering the same period. Among other things it states that, in response to articles praising the changes and improvements initiated in the country since the inception of the Third Reich, people say that about 50 per cent of what is written distorts the truth and should be discounted 32 . This report, of course, came from a Catholic region with a more liberal tradition than in some parts of the Reich, but reports from other regions tell a similar story. The same September the president of Westphalia said that people no longer believed what was written in the press 33 , and during the autumn and winter the credibility gap widened all over the country. As can be seen from the surveys, the public adopted two main forms of response. One was to refrain from reading several newspapers daily, since, in the words of Oldenburg's Minister of the Interior, '[In the public's view] all newspapers say the same thing' 34 . The other response was to search out alternative information sources. Once a gap had been opened between their sense of reality and the picture presented by the media, people quickly learned to rely on foreign newspapers or on church periodicals, which managed to get round the Gleichschaltung policy to some extent. As a result the church press experienced a great surge of popularity. The Aachen Gestapo report for September 1934 indicates that people thought church periodicals more reliable than their competitors 35 . In the space of three months, the local church weekly increased its circulation from 65,000 to100,000 copies 36 . The yearly summary for the same region is equally revealing. It states that this same periodical more than doubled its circulation during the year: from 38,000 to 90,000 copies on av. The Nazi who reported the success of this non-Nazi paper correctly attributed it to the ordinary reader's lack of trust in the party press 37 . The foreign press enjoyed increased circulation in Germany for the same reason. The Swiss Basler Nachrichten was especially popular, and the Aachen Gestapo reported an increase of almost 100 per cent in the number of foreign newspapers found and confiscated by the security services 38 . While the actual number of foreign papers in circulation remained relatively small, the Duesseldorf Gestapo reported that the readership far outstripped the available copies: We are aware that apart from constantly tuning to the foreign stations, [the public] is intensely reading the foreign press. The latter is sold as soon as it appears and is passed from hand to hand among friends and acquaintances until it is completely illegible, while with the local press an attempt is made to read between the lines' 39 . Of course, geography affected the availability of foreign papers: they were easier to come by in border regions such as the Rhineland, which received newspapers direct from Belgium and Holland. At the same time, many foreign papers penetrated further into the Reich, as the reports from such regions prove. After voicing the familiar claim that the population was critical of the press and complained of its one-sidedness, the governor of the Kassel district stated that the public was turning more and more to the foreign press 40 . The situation in the Minden district in August 1934 was described in the following terms: (Reading the foreign press is becoming increasingly widespread, a fact which unequivocally shows that the population does not agree with what is written in the German newspapers' 41 . The same reporter noted that 'The people listen avidly to news broadcasts on foreign radio stations, and read the foreign press, chiefly from Switzerland' 42 . It could be argued that this was not so surprising in a district that, with industrial centres such as Bielefeld and Herford, had a high concentration of voters who had previously supported the leftist parties. However, in Protestant eastern regions known for their support of Nazism a similar picture prevailed, as may be seen from a Gestapo report from Frankfurt-on-the-0der 43 . Even on the Jewish question, the official version of events was not accepted as reliable. With regards to the anti-Semitic riots in Berlin in July 1935, it was reported from Aachen that (The vague official news printed in newspapers on what is happening in Berlin is not deemed reliable by the public.' The same Gestapo station added that the public had lost all trust in the party press, and relied on foreign papers and broadcasts to find out what was really happening 44 . This rejection of, and alienation from, official propaganda by large sectors of the population explains the steady decline in the circulation of the party press. Casual statements in various reports at the start of Nazi rule already point to this trend. To begin with, the Gestapo commentators noted the phenomenon but dismissed it as a local aberration since they were unable to see the picture for the Reich as a whole. A case in point is the governor's account from the Aurich district for the month of September 1934. The report states that the circulation of the only party paper in Emden, the Ostfriesische Tageszeitung, had decreased and that the public was searching for alternative information sources 45 . As in Protestant Friesland, so in the Catholic west: the governor of the Koblenz district, in his report for October-November, complained that the public was gradually cancelling its subscriptions to the local party paper, the Koblenzer Nachrichtenblatt 46 . The vacuum produced by the declining circulation of the party press was quickly filled. Side by side with this decline, all reporters noted a steady rise, or at least no decline, in the circulation of church-connected papers. The governor of the Wiesbaden district wrote in his survey for February 1935 that, parallel to the decline in circulation of the party press, there had been a 100 per cent rise in sales of the St Georg Blatt, a church paper 47 . The situation in Aachen was much the same. Here the Nazi press enjoyed wide popularity in 1933, but in September 1934 the public, particularly the rural population, was switching to newspapers which took a bourgeois or Catholic line 48 . Even the most important Nazi newspaper in the west of the country, Robert Ley's Westdeutscher Beobachter, was injured by the rise in circulation of competing newspapers 49 . Indeed, Goebbels' own paper, Der Angriff suffered in the same way: its circulation fell from 94,200 in January 1934 to 82,996 in July, and to 61,000 in January 1935 50 . The decline was unsurprising. Der Angriff was sold only in the streets and not by subscription, and it was therefore more difficult to coerce people to buy it. Again, the process was not confined to a few regions. A Gestapo station in Protestant Lower Saxony, a stronghold of Nazism, reported that, 'Despite the pressure of the party, and despite the financial support extended through advertisements, the circulation of the National Socialist press is constantly declining' 51 . He went on to describe the fate of the local party organ, the Hanoverian Niedersaechsische Tageszeitung. Similarly a survey from Speyer shows that there the party press had declined by one quarter 52 . This state of affairs was well known to exiles, who apparently had access to very reliable and accurate information sources 53 . The changing fortunes of the press in the Cologne area is illustrated by the following table, which compares the circulation figures of a Nazi paper, the Westdeutsrher Beobachter (WB); a bourgeois paper, the Koelnische Zeitung (KZ); and a Catholic newspaper, the Katholische Kirchenzeitung (KK) 54 . WB KZ KK Jan. 1934 202,657 104,190 80,939 Apr. 1934 191,416 99,181 83,822 July 1934 184,450 99,825 84,193 Oct. 1934 186,620 92,061 84,715 Jan. 1935 186,029 93,127 88,000 The increase in circulation of the foreign and church press, and decline in circulation of the party press, was accompanied by another manifestation of the reading public's resistance to indoctrination: conscious de-politicisation. This found expression in a growing interest in strictly local events, and unwillingness to consider country-wide topics. Thus, for instance, we learn from the Gestapo in Hanover that people there wanted the press to increase coverage of local events at the expense of national affairs 55 . This is typical of public reaction to the press in dictatorial systems. While in regimes with a free press the individual can voice criticism of, or express his own views about, events of which he has no first-hand knowledge, in totalitarian regimes his personal experience necessarily becomes the most reliable information source, and it is by this that he judges what he reads. The reader assumes that reports on local events cannot be distorted, since he has some first-hand knowledge of them and has no need of an official commentary 56 . From the point of view of the Nazi regime, distrust of the party media reached crisis level in early 1935. The Duesseldorf Gestapo report for February states in this connection, 'The National Socialist press is facing extremely serious difficulties and is hardly holding its ground. The number of readers is steadily declining for the newspapers do not interest them at all. Only an economic blow or the total destruction of the bourgeois press can change the situation' 57 . In March the Bielefeld Gestapo reported that in Padeborn the latest edition of the Voelkischer Beobachter had sold only forty-five copies 58 . A month later the district governor announced that the local Nazi paper had closed down due to financial difficulties, and that the public was reading the Catholic press 59 . In the same month the Aachen Gestapo complained that the Westdeutscher Beobachter was losing its readers and that even party members were criticising it 60 . There is no reason to suppose any inaccuracy here, since broadly the same picture surfaces from statistical data for other areas. The SD survey of the Bavarian press, and circulation statistics for the Rhineland and Stuttgart, confirm the trend 61. It would appear that, despite the blows dealt to the non-Nazi organs, the circulation of the party press did not improve. And, given that the regime could not afford to have propaganda weakened or contradicted by rivals, it could not remain indifferent to the situation. This type of regime, based on a delicate balance between coercion through terror and persuasion through propaganda, relies on the press to instil its message and encourage political conformity. It is therefore important that it should possess a reasonable level of credibility. There seems little doubt that the decline of the Party press was the chief motive for the measures adopted by the authorities in the spring of 1935 to curtail the freedom of the press. The notorious 'Amann regulations' of 24 April 1935 were directed at (Revoking the license of any publisher whose newspapers are detrimental to the honour of the press because of their sensationalist character or because of the moral harm they constitute to the public. Shutting down newspapers to stamp out unfair competition. Ensuring the independence of the newspaper industry' 62 . The un-stated purpose behind these regulations was undoubtedly that of bridling the competition and halting the decline of the party press, in an effort to repair the widening credibility gap between the regime and the public. Beyond these regulations, the party did all it could to strengthen its own newspapers, weaken the competition and restrict the influence of papers, which represented a non-Nazi stand. Along with the 'legal' and financial damage inflicted on the non-Nazi press came a vigorous propaganda effort to get more people to subscribe to the party papers. On the face of it, the regime's measures worked. The Augsburg police reported that the local party paper had 3,000 new subscribers 63 . Police elsewhere in the same region inform us that, although the church press continued to be popular in rural areas, the party press managed to maintain its circulation rate as a result of the increased propaganda." Statistical figures for the first and second quarters of 1935 in the Munich area reveal that, while the circulation of the church press remained stable, and that of the non-Nazi papers declined, the party press increased its sales 65 . It appeared that the regime had persuaded thousands of readers to switch to the party papers. We learn from Gestapo reports, however, that this was not the whole story. A careful comparison of statistical data from different regions of the Reich shows that the Amann regulations by themselves were unable to increase the readership of the party press. The regime knew very well that any rise in circulation was achieved mainly by coercing the public, not through any propaganda successes. The governor of Potsdam, for example, reported improved sales of the Voelkischer Beobachter, but went on to admit that, in deciding to take the paper, people had been responding to pressure rather than exercising their choice 66 . From Aachen, too, we hear of readers taking out subscriptions to the party paper because of threats, and out of fear of reprisals. The reporter noted that the situation had come to light through the censors' reading of letters being sent abroad. The writers candidly revealed that they had taken out subscriptions under duress, and planned to cancel them at the first possible opportunity 67 . In July the same Gestapo station indicated that the central party organ in the Rhineland, the Westdeutscher Beobachter, had been unsuccessful in obtaining new subscriptions on its own merits, and that those it had secured had been obtained through coercion 68 . It is safe to say that the central government in Berlin was well aware of this state of affairs and so of the inadequacy of its attempts at indoctrination. The governor of Bielefeld district commented that the authorities knew the danger of trying to activate the public during ae crisis of confidence, and that in view of this the party's organisations had better stop soliciting contributions. Many refused to contribute, thereby dissociating themselves from the party's activities, and the exercise as a whole helped lower the party's popularity still further 69 . Given that in only one month people in Muenster, for example, were asked to give to the Hitler Youth, to the youth hostels, to the mother and child fund and to the Red Cross, and to buy posters for Navy Day, for Handicrafts Day and for the Gnu rally, it is small wonder that people refused and that the order to stop canvassing from July to October was widely welcomed 70 . This picture, however, should not lead us to ignore three things. First, criticism was limited to certain aspects of the political and social reality and not to the system in principle. Secondly, in the last analysis the disaffection found no practical expression and the regime was not seriously challenged. Thirdly, most of those who manifested dissent appear to have belonged to the 'other Germany'. Vast numbers did identify ideologically with the Nazi regime and consent to its policies. Radical Nazis criticised the government for being too moderate and for not proceeding fast enough with the Nazi revolution. The revolutionary potential of these elements is evident from the contemporary anti-fascist literature, both leftist and conservative; far from disappearing in 1934 with the purges of the SA leadership, which apparently laid to rest the idea of a 'second revolution', they remained a dynamic political force. At the same time, the regime subordinated these elements to its political objectives, when their growing activism endangered the very basis of the social and political order. In the next chapter we turn to this issue and its consequences for policy on the Jewish question. References: 1. For a similar reality in other totalitarian regimes see A. P. L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China (University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1975), pp. 111¯12; A. Inkeles and R. Bauer, The Soviet Citizen. Daily life in a totalitarian society (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 172¯3; G. H. Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination. Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda since Stalin (Praeger, New York, 1972), pp. 163ff. 2. RP Niederbayern und Oberpfalz, report Apr. 1934, BHStA, MA 106676. 3. RP Aachen, report Sep. 1934, BA, R 18/1555; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 104. 4. Gestapo Duesseldorf, report October 1934, GStA, REP/90P. 5. Gestapo Muenster, report June 1935, ibid. 6. Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 255. 7. Documents on German Foreign Policy (Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1957), series C., vol. I, p. 114. See also K. D. Bracher, M. Sauer and G. Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Westdeutscher Verlag, Cologne, 1960), p. 906, n. 34. 8. Gestapo Hannover, report Feb. 1935, BA, R 58/1128; Gestapo Muenster, report June 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; RP Koenigsberg, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 58/1563. 9. RP Minden, report Aug. 1935, BA, R 18/1566. 10. Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power , pp. 241¯67. 11.Gestapo Erfurt, report Apr. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; OP Koenigsberg, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 58/1563. 12.Gestapo Trier, report Aug. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P. 13.Gestapo Kiel, report May 1935, BA R 58/480. 14.Gestapo Luebeck, report Aug. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P. 15.RP Magdeburg, report Sep. 1934, YVA, JM/2834. 16.RP Koblenz, report Nov. 1934, BA, R 18/1564. Cf. RP Wiesbaden, report Oct. 1935, YVA, JM/2834; RP Minden, report Aug. 1935, BA, R 18/1566. 17.Gestapo Trier, report May 1935, BA, R 58/510. 18.On the Hitler cult see D. Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution (Anchor, New York, 1967), pp. 73ff. 19.Gestapo Muenster, report May 1935, BA, R 58/510. 20.Gestapo Bi, report May 1935, YVA, JM/2834. 21.RP Oppeln, report Apr.¯May 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 22.Gestapo Berlin, report May 1935, BA, R 58/436. At the same time the Gestapo stations at Duesseldorf, Muenster and Osnabrueck reported that participation in the elections for workers councils was expeto be poor, owing to the critical mood among workers. Similar problems were experienced at other times: for example, the Gestapo at Braunschweig reported that in May 1938 (BA, R 58/449) most of workers gathered for rally left the assembly place, and only with difficulties were a third of them reassembled. 23.RP Osnabrueck, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 18/1569. 24.Gestapo Aachen, report Oct. 1934, HStA D, RAP 1025; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 108. 25.Reichsleitung fuer Kommunalpolitik, Vertrauliche Berichtsauszuege, Gau Hessen-Nassau, report Mar. 1935, BA, NS 25/85, fo. 1. 26.Report on Gau Koeln-Aachen, ibid. 27.Gestapo Duesseldorf, report Sep. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P; RP Minden, report Oct. 1934, BA, R 18/1566; Gestapo Koeslin, report July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 28.In the analysis of this theme I found the newspaper collection of Borge Maciejewsky (YVA, JM/3454 1¯105) most helpful. It comprises eighty volumes of newspapers covering the years 1921¯45. From the large body of literature dealing with the press and its impact see esp. J. Hagemann, Die Presselenkung im Dritten Reich (Bouvier, Bonn, 1970); F. Saenger, Politik der Taeuschungen. Missbrauch der Presse im Dritten Reich, Weisungen, Informationen, Notizen, 1933¯1939 (Europa, Vienna, 1975); Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (Oxford University Press, London, 1973); W. A. Boelcke, Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg?' Die geheimen Goebbels Konferenzen 1939¯1943 (DVA, Stuttgart, 1967); H. Bohrmann and G. Toepser Ziegert (eds.), NS Presseanweisungen der Vorkriegszeit (Saur, Munich, 1985¯7). 29.Hagemann, Presselenkung , p. 201, a view shared by H. Storek, Dirigierte Oeffentlichkeit. Die Zeitung als Herrschaftsmittel in den Anfangsjahren der nationalsozialistischen Regierung (Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1972). On the limitations of the media in other totalitarian regimes see W. Pye (ed.), Communication and Political Development (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1963); N. Wessel, The Credibility, Impact and Effectiveness of the Soviet Non-Specialised Newspaper' (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 1972), pp. 166ff.; Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination , pp. 59ff.; A. Buzek, How the Communist Press Works (Pall Mall, London, 1964). 30.Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism , p. 351. 31.OP Rheinprovinz, report Nov. 1934, BA, R 18/1563. 32.Gestapo Aachen, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 58/660; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 79. 33.OP Westfalen , report Sep. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Koeln, report January 1935, BA, R 58/681; Gestapo Aachen, report May 1934, BA, R 18/568. 34.Minister des Innern, Oldenburg, report Nov. 1934, BA, R 18/1568. 35.Gestapo Aachen, report Sept. 1934, HStA D, RAP 1024; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 94. 36.Gestapo Aachen, report Dec. 1934, HStA D, RAP 148; Vollmer, Volksopposition , pp. 134¯5; RP Aachen, report May 1935, R 18/1555. 37.Gestapo Aachen, report Dec. 1934, HStA D, RAP 148; Vollmer, Volksopposition , pp. 134¯5. 38.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1934, HStA D, RAP 1049; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 48. 39.Gestapo Duesseldorf, report March 1935, BA, R 58/381. 40.RP Kassel, report Sept. 1934, BA, R 18/1561. 41.RP Minden, report Aug. 1934, BA, R 18/1566. 42.Ibid. 43.Gestapo Frankfurt ad. Oder, report Apr. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; RP Osnabrueck, report Apr. 1935, BA, R 18/1569. 44.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 255. 45.RP Aurich, report Sep. 1934, YVA, JM/2834. 46.RP Koblenz, report Oct.¯Nov. 1934, BA, R 18/1564. During 1934 the total circulation of the party press decreased by a million copies and the trend continued in 1935. This assessment is based on the Nazi sources themselves: see O. J. Hale, The Captive Press in the Third Reich (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1964), pp. 57, 145¯6, 231. 47.RP Wiesbaden, report Feb. 1935, YVA, JM/2834. 48.Gestapo Aachen, report Sep. 1934, BA, R 58/660; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 94. 49.Gestapo Aachen, report Mar. 1935, BA, R 58/514; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 186. 50.For a detailed report on the German press see Sopade, June 1936, B 10¯55. 51.Gestapo Hannover, report Mar. 1935, BA, R 58/386. Sopade, Feb. 1935, A 72. 52.RP Pfalz, report Mar. 1935, BHStA, MA 106675. 53.F. Morstein Marx, State propaganda in Germany', in Harwood L. Childs (ed.), Propaganda and Dictatorship (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1936), pp. 11¯34. Gestapo Koeln, report Jan. 1935, BA, R 58/681. 54.Gestapo Koeln, report Jan. 1935, BA, R 58/681. 55.Gestapo Hannover, report Mar. 1935, BA, R 58/386. 56.Ibid. 57.Gestapo Duesseldorf, report Feb. 1935, BA, R 58/1127. 58.Gestapo Bielefeld, report Mar. 1935, BA, R 58/100; RP Minden, report Apr. 1935, BA, R 18/1566. 59.RP Minden, report Mar.¯Apr. 1935, BA, R 18/1566. 60.Gestapo Aachen, report Apr. 1935, BA, R 58/661. 61.SD Oberabschnitt Sued, May 1935, NAW, T 175 R 271 F 2768198; Gestapo Aachen, report Dec. 1934, HStA D, RAP 148; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 159; Sopade, June 1936, B 28. 62.Hale, The Captive Press , p. 143. On the limited effect of this measure see Gestapa Sachsen, report Jan. 1935, StA N, Polizei Direktion Nuernberg-Fuerth 430. 63.Polizei Direktion Augsburg, report Mar. 1935, BHStA, MA 106675. 64.RP Pfalz, report Apr.¯May 1935, BHStA, MA 106675. 65.Polizei Direktion Muenchen, report Sep. 1935, BHStA, MA 106677. 66.Gestapo Potsdam, report May 1935, GStA, REP/90 P. 67.Gestapo Aachen, report Marc. 1935, BA, R 58/100; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 181. Gestapo Aachen, report June 1935, HStA D, RAP 1029, Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 237; Sopade report, June 1936, B 29. 68.Gestapo Aachen, reports on June and July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 255. 69.RP Minden, report July¯Aug. 1935, BA, R 18/1566. 70.Gestapo Muenster, report May 1935, BA, R 58/510. Back to the top